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Abstract
We present a study of conflict from an economic perspective. We start by re­
viewing the approach to conflict in the economic sciences. We model conflict as 
a process of allocation of resources into two main technologies, production and 
appropriation. Then we complement this framework by allowing participants 
to negotiate. We introduce models of bargaining with complete and incomplete 
information.
We incorporate the cost of conflict and this ensures that negotiated settle­
ments always produce a more efficient outcome. The possibility of conflict arises 
as a result of incomplete information, which takes the form of informational 
asymmetry about the cost of conflict. We find endogenous war equilibrium out­
comes and compare the outcome of optimal resource equilibria with arbitrary 
non-equilibria allocations.
We also present some empirical evidence in the literature supporting the choice 
of utility models of conflict and present new results showing support for our 
propositions.
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Preface
This PhD thesis forms part of a series of studies carried out by a group of re­
searchers, denominated the Arms Trade Group, whose objective is to provide a 
set of linked political economy models of the arms trade. These models can be 
used to organize and interpret the available evidence on the effects of military 
expenditure on security and welfare, and to improve policy formulations.
The economic repercussions of military expenditure have been the object of 
increasing attention by researchers in the last few years. Many of these studies 
highlight the benefits derived from lower defence spending and the conversion of 
the ‘military industrial base’ into civilian production. These effects have been 
grouped under a common denomination: the ‘peace dividend’- a term that has 
gone beyond economic analysis and is widely use by media, politicians and ac­
tivist, containing some general ideas about the beneficial effects of reducing the 
military budget on growth, security and welfare. At the same time there are 
increasing pressures to expand military expenditure and the arms trade, both at 
the supply and the demand side of the economy.
The supply side pressures presage that the trade could expand because arms 
markets and firms are experiencing a deep transformation. On the one hand, 
they need to sell abroad to compensate for declining budgets at home. On the 
other hand, firms are undertaking a process of rationalization, merging with other 
international firms and diversifying their production which makes it more difficult 
for national governments to control the arms trade.
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On the demand side, we are facing a climate of uncertainty which makes it 
difficult to forecast the potential use of arms sales/purchases. The subject of arms 
transfers is at the hard-core of the international security agenda. However, there 
is a lack of conceptual structure which could provide some guidelines for policy 
makers. Since unilateral reductions of military expenditure could have serious 
security repercussions, it is necessary to provide some theoretical explanations of 
the driving force underlying the need for arms; that it to say, conflict.
This work tries to extend the understanding of the demand for arms beyond 
the explanations provided by the models of arms races. In these models, secu­
rity is understood as a function of the proportion of arms that a country holds 
compared to its potential enemies.
We are going to try to understand the demand for arms by producing a 
scenario where military expenditure is directly related to conflict. For this, we 
will understand conflict as a special distributional mechanism that has many 
parallels with market exchange, but also fundamental differences.
In the first chapter we study the different definitions of conflict and produce 
an economic definition which will be consistent with our modelling choices. Since 
conflict is a very heterogeneous phenomenon, we try to restrict its definition to 
the activities where -  without prejudice to other discipline -  economic science 
can provided better explanations. These are mainly the choices amongst rational 
decision makers of the allocation of resources to productive and appropriative 
activities.
In the second chapter we review some of the models in the economic litera­
ture which are directly relevant to our study. These are classified into two main 
groups. The first category covers the models of rent-seeking activities and optimal 
allocation of resources. The second focuses on models of bargaining and negotia­
tion. In the third chapter we present a model that merges both traditions. In this 
model, countries must allocate their initial resources between income production 
and military capability production. Once they have decided their respective op­
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timal allocations, a process of bargaining takes place. Parties decide the share 
of income that they can claim according to their bargaining power. Bargaining 
power in this model is generated not only by military capability, but also by the 
cost of a hypothetical war and other features of the negotiating process.
In the fourth chapter we construct a model of conflict with incomplete infor­
mation and perfect allocation of resources between productive and ‘rent-seeking’ 
activities. The process of distribution of resources can also take two forms: a 
conflict whose outcome is decided by the resources allocated to that activity, or 
a negotiated settlement. We incorporate the cost of conflict and this ensures 
that negotiated settlements always produce a more efficient outcome. The pos­
sibility of conflict arises because of incomplete information which takes the form 
of informational asymmetry about the cost of conflict. We find endogenous war 
equilibrium outcomes and compare the outcome of optimal resource equilibria 
with axbitrary non-equilibria allocations.
In the last chapter we support the previous ideas with empirical information. 
We review two well known paradigms in the empirical analysis of conflict. We 
find increasing support for the so called utility models of war but we do not 
find support for the democratic liberal peace. We follow the models and use the 
data sets of the reviewed papers. However, we introduce some changes to the 
dependent variable in these models. In particular, we only consider conflict if 
physical violence is used. Our model is based on, and interpreted in the light of 
the game theoretic analysis presented in earlier chapters.
Chapter 1 
Defining Conflict
1.1 Introduction
In a broad sense conflict is defined as a state of opposition or hostility between 
incompatible ideas, desires, aspirations etc. Alternatively, it is defined as the 
distress resulting from this incompatibilities. Therefore, there are two funda­
mentally different concepts. One understands conflict as a cause and the other 
as a consequence. The difference is important in order to developed theoretical 
explanations. In this study, we understand conflict as a consequence and we will 
try to formulate the factors that produce it1.
Before we define conflict from an economic perspective it is worth to note 
that this is an ambiguous concept that has been approached by many different 
disciplines and has been given many different interpretations.
Scientist have studied the biological drive to violence in human beings. A
1It is also important to say that this concept is influenced by western ideological background 
which is grounded in the reproduction of mutually exclusive oppositions. The Gandhian[lj 
concept of peace offers an alternative to the existence of conflict. Some religions for example, 
see the individual in harmony with their environment or universe. However in our western 
rational mentality, we see conflict as something inherent to our human condition. From the 
very moment that we are born we see our personal development as a conflictive process. Conflict 
may be deeply rooted in our language and cognitive ability. This can be problematic for its 
definition because ‘conflict is the way we think’.
1
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group of scholars under a UNESCO [2] initiative challenged a number of alleged 
biological findings that have been used to justify violence and war. They alleged 
that the misuse of scientific theories and data to justify violence and war is not 
new, but has happened since the advent of modern science. For example, the 
theory of evolution has been used to justify not only war, but also genocide, 
colonialism, and suppression of the weak.
Peace studies refuse a narrow definition of conflict because it would perhaps 
imply a narrow definition of peace. One of the main differences is based on their 
approach to violence. Peace studies refuse the definition violence as a somatic 
incapacitation or deprivation of health. The most important of all dimensions of 
violence for Johan Galtung [3] is who is the subject that perpetrates it. According 
to Galtung there are two different kinds of violence: personal or direct, when it 
is carried out by a person, and structural, when nobody is directly committing 
it.
Based on that, he points at six important dimensions of conflict. The first 
dimension is the difference between what is potential and what is actual and what 
impedes this distance from decreasing.
. . .  if a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would 
be hard to conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite 
unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all the medical re­
sources in the world, the violence is present according to our definition
The great difference of this approach with others, is that conflict can take 
place without specific agents (subjects) and without specific actions. Conflict is 
secondary to Peace Studies and the absence of violence is represented in a broad 
manner. It depends in ‘what is5 and ‘what could be’.
Political Science has studied conflict more extensively than any other disci­
pline. Ted Gurr [4] in his study of political violence defines it as all collective 
attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors - in­
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eluding competing political groups as well as incumbents -  or its policies. For Gurr 
conflict is an action which involves force or the threat of force independently of 
its actors or their goals.
A great part of political theory has been concerned with the study of power. 
A variety of explanations have been put forth. Many of those theories focus on 
major conflicts in general and war in particular. Bremer [5] groups those theories 
in three main families according to what they think is the basic source of conflict 
(e.g. the concentration of power, power parity or balance of power).
Conflict is also a common subject in the field of social science. A great part 
of sociological research has been concerned with this theme. It also covers the 
political struggles for power as well as other expressions of social conflict, such 
us revolutions.
Social Scientists define conflict as a process of resolution of incompatibilities. 
According to Simmel [6, 7] conflict is “a way of achieving some kind of unity, even 
if it will be through the annihilation of one of the conflicting parties". Another 
common definition of conflict refers to the scarcity of resources.
Giner [8] defines conflict as:
a hostile contest for or against domination, control, and self-preservation. 
Domination may be sought over goods, values, thought or behaviour.
It may involve the annihilation of one collectivity or the harmless 
struggle for first place in a competition where the losers lose nothing 
or very little. More often, it is aimed at the re-arrangement of the 
relationships and hierarchies of power and authority in a given social 
structure.
1 . 2  Economic definitions o f  conflict
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This thesis is not concerned with analysing the origins of conflict by understand­
ing the sources of incompatibilities. The aim is to isolate some micro-foundations 
of conflict and look at the strategic behaviour of parties engaged in conflict. Our 
concern is mainly related to one problem: The process of allocation of resources 
to conflict. For that, despite the complexity of the subject, we will isolate a 
given dispute and consequently analyse different conflict-cooperation strategies 
of rational players. We do not take other problems for granted or try to avoid 
them. However, at this stage, we think is better to concentrate on understanding 
the micro-level. Therefore we will provide a general definition and then, propose 
a specific definition which relates directly to economic issues.
1.2.1 Conflict as a exchange process
We know of all the complications that may be introduced trying to define actors, 
goals, actions, and different structures. However, all these previous definitions 
have something in common: the understanding of conflict as a process of resolving 
a given incompatibility. Whenever two hypothetical actors fail to internalize the 
distribution of scarce resources, they will allocate efforts to impose a given share. 
Conflict is a process that takes place to restore equilibrium when both actors 
disagree between the balance of forces and the shares. This is our starting point.
Sometimes the absence of confrontation seems to be equivalent to the absence 
of the dispute. This is not true, peace research show us how in many cases a 
peaceful situation is based upon a violent imposition. We may see a great va­
riety of conflicts and many sources of disputes that lead to different formations 
of agents, historic subjects, and many different solutions, including the exter­
mination (by an agent’s action) or extinction (by structural conditions) of one 
party.
A more specific definition was used by Peter Wallensteen [9]. He defines con­
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flict as a social situation in which a minimum of two parties strive at the same 
moment in time to acquire the same set of scarce resources. This confrontation is 
produced because different agents, given some differences (in all the broad mani­
festations of culture) cannot internalise the scarcity of resources. This scarcity is 
the matter of our disputes. There is confrontation when one or more parties ded­
icate their energies to imposing a settlement to a dispute that cannot be solved 
by agreement.
At the same time, other activities may lead to the expansion of these resources. 
Isard [10] defines four main simultaneous activities basic to the understanding of 
conflict: competitive, curious and inventive, co-operative and self-propagating 
activities. Economics should deal with the efficient allocation of resources in all 
these activities.
Since scarcity is the driving force behind conflict it is not surprising that most 
part of the theories of conflict have a lot to do with economics. However, this 
scarcity of resources can be expressed in a very wide range of incompatibilities. 
Therefore, isolating economic conflicts can be a difficult task. For example, con­
flict can be built into cultural incompatibilities. Some typical conflicts in the 
history of humanity are the multiple religion wars.
John Rex [11] formulates a paradigm of conflict that has a strong relation to 
economic theory. The whole point about exchange theory which is essentially an 
attempt to base sociological theory on the theory of economics is that, although 
it starts by assuming actors who have conflicting goals, it posits the possibility 
of a point being reached at which each individual pursues his own ends in a way 
which is actually beneficial to the other. Although it starts with the potentiality 
of conflict it ends with what is in effect a process of co-operation.
Conflict theory approaches this problem from the opposite side. It starts 
with what appears to be a mutually beneficial exchange, but discovers within 
this relation elements of compulsion and exploitation which appear as normative 
only because the oppressed and the exploited do not have the power to resist
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them. It then focuses on the power underlying the relationship and considers the 
consequences of a change in the balance of power.
Another element further distinguishes conflict theory from exchange theory 
when the latter is extended to constitute a theory of market behaviour. The 
peacefulness of the market rests upon the use of the sanction of ‘going to another 
supplier’ . This peaceful process, however, is seen to break down in economic 
theory, and the theory of the free market has to be supplemented by a theory of 
oligopoly and monopoly. However, what is an embarrassment for exchange theory 
and economic theory is the essence of the matter for conflict theory. Market 
sanctions (i.e. the sanction of ’going to another supplier’) are used to regulate 
particular transactions only because there is the possibility of resort to the more 
fundamental political conflict if there is monopolistic competition on both sides 
of the market. They represent a convenient way of solving particular problems 
within a fundamentally political order which rests upon a balance of power.
Jack Hirshleifer [12] defines conflict as an extension of competitive behaviour. 
It takes place when instead of using the available resources for productive or 
consumptive purposes, contenders try to hamper, disable or destroy rivals.
According to consumer’s choice theory, every individual maximises her subjec­
tive status subject to the resources available to her and to her rivals. Therefore, 
there must be a mechanism to allocate resources optimally to those two activities. 
It implies two different technologies, one for production and other for destruction 
and two different main activities, exchange and struggle.
When we look at conflict from an economic perspective, we should take into 
account the other factors that affect it and assume that they are incorporated in 
either the environment variables, or the strategic ones.
For our studies we will concentrate on the question of distribution of resources, 
in colloquial language known as ‘sharing the cake’ . Then, we can also look at 
several disputes that can be related to that question, such as crime, litigation, 
rent-seeking activities in oligopolistic markets, industrial actions, warfare and
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revolutions.
In all those disputes conflict may take place in two different levels. At one 
level, the existence of a dispute diverts resources from production to rent-seeking 
activities, which might produce a higher individual outcome, given that there 
is no reaction from the other agents. In any case, this is an inefficient outcome 
compare to the social optimal, when all the resources are dedicated to production 
and consumption. In many of the disputes that I have mentioned, there is a 
regulator that could influence agents behaviour to achieve this optimal point. 
However, we will concentrate in warfare and similar situations where there is 
no social planner, and therefore we need to derive the conditions for an efficient 
outcome to take place. This will be always related to a given dispute.
We will focus on the study of two basic problems. First, given some scarce 
resources and socio-political differences, we will find what is the optimal allocation 
of those resources between productive and fighting activities. The second is to 
establish under which circumstances both parties manage to negotiate a peaceful 
outcome and when they decide to make war.
Following Hirshleifer [12], failure to agree does not necessarily imply actual 
fighting but it is certainly a precondition. The main determinants of this failure 
are the preferences of the players, the existence of opportunities to make gains 
either from co-operation or conflict and perceptions of the outcome in case of 
conflict.
The relevance of information as a source of conflict is being highlighted by 
game theory models. If we accept the classic assumptions made by game the­
ory about agents behaviour, we may come to the conclusion that asymmetric 
information is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of conflict.
The assumption of rationality is a main element of game theory. Individuals 
are said to act rationally when they attempt to maximise their utility given some 
constrains and some information set. The other important assumption is that 
individuals know that the rest of players in a game are also rational.
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Once we have established that individuals act rationally, we will establish why 
information is the basic source of conflict. We are going to present a model that 
distinguishes between two different aspects: optimal allocation of resources and 
sources of conflict.
In social sciences there is a trend to analyse the multi level properties of 
conflict. In many cases we can see that warfare is influenced by internal struggles 
for power. Its source is found in the social question that is also expressed in other 
disputes, such as high level of criminal activity or high levels of industrial action. 
If we have a basic understanding of the micro-foundations of conflict, it would 
be useful to understand the links between other levels of conflict and the relation 
between disputes.
In economic terms we could classify conflict as a process of allocation of re­
sources that works alongside, against or in spite of the market. We could classify 
both conflicts and markets according to the level of efficiency that they bring 
about. With perfect information we see that we have the most efficient process 
of allocation of resources. This is a perfectly competitive market. In second place 
we have monopolistic markets, and incomplete markets.
Following this line of thinking, we could go on and say that we can also have 
disputed allocations, where agents engage in non-productive activities. They 
spend their resources in coercion or appropriation technologies to force a non­
agreed outcome and finally conflict where, on top of the allocation of resources to 
unproductive activities, we have an extra cost produced by fighting. Conflict is an 
exchange mechanism which does not require agreement and is also characterized 
by high transaction costs.
1.3 Other considerations
In our definition we abstract from many important features that can be found 
in any process of conflict. We do not take into account the complex social and
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psychological determinants of the initial dispute such us cultural factors or the 
legitimation processes.
Since we are concentrating in the micro-foundations of conflict, we will post­
pone the study of other factors that may also be important for a better un­
derstanding of economics and conflict. In the meantime, the general question 
of resources is at the heart of our approach. While conflict is an activity that 
looks at the distribution of resources, other activities lead to the expansion of 
them. A clear example is technological progress which can be a double-edged 
sword. Technology can expand one resource while at the same time undermining 
another. But in general the outcome is believed to be positive.
We will also consider rational decision processes, given some disputes based in 
some particular determinants, such us different system values of different actors, 
and also given a basic source of incompatibility. By “rationality” we mean utility 
maximizing agents. In many cases, we will simplify this concept and say that 
utility depends solely on income. In others we will extend the utility function to 
account for different preference sets. But in general, we are analysing rational 
decision-making processes.
The structural complexity of conflict presents a few problems for the empir­
ical analysis. When we are analysing a given conflict we have to be sure that 
the contenders are not involved in any other dispute that may influence their 
behaviour. In the real world aseptic conflicts happen rarely. Most conflicts take 
place in complicated networks or nested disputes. International Conflict suffers 
from the kind of complications that can be found at the internal level of conflict, 
exponentially increased by the number of countries that are directly or indirectly 
affected.
I just mentioned that there are several analytical choices in the study of 
conflict. We also have two basic sources of incompatibilities. One is the existence 
of scarce resources and the other is the presence of cultural differences (in the 
broad sense of the term) that do not allow for a process of internalisation of
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scarcity. We will assume those mechanisms -such as cultural reproduction and 
assimilation- to be constant over time or not to affect the nature of our analysis. 
One of the key assumptions about our model is that agents are stable and make 
rational choices.
The existence of incompatibilities is a necessary condition but not sufficient to 
explain conflict. There are many theories that explain conflict according to differ­
ent classifications of it. It can be approached from many different methodologies 
and every one of them offers some understanding of it. However, no discipline 
can claim the production of some “General Theory of Conflict” . We do not claim 
that we can give a complete explanation of conflict from the discipline of eco­
nomics; however we can offer some understanding of the ‘economic dimensions of 
the problem’. We can understand the problem of optimal allocation of resources 
and derive the micro-foundations of conflict.
Chapter 2
Foundations of Conflict
2,1 Introduction
In the economic literature conflict is explained in different ways. Different branches 
of economics (Public Choice, Game theory, Trade, etc.) are coming together to 
produce what we could call an embryonic theory of economics and conflict. We 
identify two main activities.1 One is the allocation of resources to productive 
and appropriation activities and the other is the negotiation mechanisms that 
are usually present in most conflicts. These two activities may take place at 
the same time, but have been considered to be independent. Therefore, in some 
cases, researchers have concentrated on one or the other. Only in the last few 
years, are scholars producing models that integrate these two problems.
Conflict also takes place at different levels, involving two strategic actors and 
many non-strategic actors.2 However, for simplicity, models normally consider 
only the first scenario. We may also focus on a once for all conflict; or we can 
have a conflict in stages. There are many other variants which will be explained
1A question of great importance is the internalisation of scarcity which we assume to be 
explained by other factors such as cultural incompatibilities, etc.
2 A non-strategic actor is one that can influence the conflict but cannot make a move. For 
instance a producer is a non strategic actor in the perfect competition market and a strategic 
one in a monopoly (only with respect of setting prices).
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when we look at the principles of conflict theory in section 2.2.
Since participants must decide whether they engage in conflict activities or 
not, the decision to fight as well as the production of fighting capabilities must be 
endogenous. In relation to endogenous conflicts, we will review the rent-seeking 
literature in section 2.3. With respect to the negotiations that take place to avoid 
it, we will look mainly at game theory and bargaining models in section 2.4.
The models of rent-seeking activities are based on the concept of optimal 
allocations between production and fighting activities. Most part of these models 
have been developed within the branch of Public Policy and Political Economy. 
We also understood negotiation in its broadest sense. It normally entails some 
kind of transfer from one participant to another in order to avoid the cost of 
conflict at the level of hostilities.3
In this chapter we are going to review these two paradigms because -in 
combination- they can produce endogenous conflicts. In some way, we can say 
that they provide the most simple way of explaining conflict without resorting 
to the use of exogenous factors -such us malevolent preferences or restricted bar­
gaining options4.
2.1.1 Other considerations
Evolutionary game theory has been applied in the social and natural sciences 
to the study of conflict. It has provided interesting applications in the study of 
biological evolution, animal behaviour, and human behaviour in both primitive 
and advanced societies.
In a seminal paper Maynard Smith [13]proposed the concept of Evolutionary
3This is particularly relevant to the relation between trade and war; or other forms of 
transactions that although apparently peaceful may take place under the shadow of conflict.
4Malevolent preferences only means that we may get positive utility out of conflict because 
we enjoy loses to others as well as we enjoy our gains. Restricted bargaining options are very 
common in real life. It means that we may not be able to divide or make any small transfer to 
compensate other parties for the value of the disputed resource.
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Stable Strategy ESS. Among the issues addressed by these theories are altruism 
and selfishness, the dynamics and resolution of conflicts and bargaining processes 
and the emergence of conventions and social norms.
It is possible to argue that the study of conflict should start at this point, 
looking at the guiding principles for actors in the light of their evolutionary 
properties. It requires a shift of focus from the micro-level explanations of conflict 
-allocation of resources and negotiating processes- to the study the process of 
generation of incompatibilities and social agents that face the basic problem of 
acquiring scarce resources.
This constitutes a different paradigm in the political study of international 
conflicts applied to the study of systemic interactions and theories of hegemony, 
alliance formation, power struggles, theories of imperialism, etc. However, as 
we have mentioned in the previous chapter, we will concentrate on dyadic in­
teractions of countries, abstracting from these systemic factors. These dyadic 
interactions are assumed to be in a evolutionary stable environment. Extending 
the analysis of the micro-level to account for possible evolutionary influences goes 
beyond the scope of these thesis. We have therefore, decided to focus in a narrow 
definition of conflict where economic models can offer some added value to the 
already vast number of theories of conflict.
2.2 The Strategy of Conflict
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Conflict analysts have approached this subject from many different perspectives. 
We have already defined conflict as a process of solving an incompatibility. Due 
to the presence of scarce resources, conflict is part of the competition process that 
takes place in order to acquire them. Conflicts cannot be completely resolved as 
long as we do not find the way of dealing with the intrinsic scarcity of resources 
that human beings face in every given environment.
One of the options is to develop more efficient ways of using this scarce re­
source. For instance, the increase of the price of oil during the early seventies 
produced a crisis in the industrialized countries. As a result of that, there was 
a development of new technologies that produce and use energy much more effi­
ciently.
Since conflict is a process of resolving a given incompatibility, in many cases we 
cannot contemplate reducing it by this sort of supply side long term intervention. 
For this to happen, we need to have systemic stability. Conflict is a crisis that 
reestablishes this systemic stability. We understand conflict as a consequence, 
not as a cause.
There are two main different ways of dealing with incompatibilities in the 
short run. One is an agreement of all parts involved, the other is by the use 
of force. This use of force produces a high cost. Conflict analysis would try 
to promote crisis management by common agreement because this approach is 
Pareto-superior to any fighting outcome.
We can build paradigms along this line for nearly every known conflict in 
the world. Conflict models has been develop in Zoology which model fighting in 
the animal world, both inter and intra-species and for different sorts of scarcity, 
mainly for food resources and for the right to mate.5 Trade unions and employers
5Animal case is a special case in conflict analysis because conflict as understood by humans 
needs complicated organization and communication processes that animal lack. However, those
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fight for wages. People spend valuable resources in litigation processes over the 
greatest variety of subjects. Firms engage in a huge variety of rent-seeking activ­
ities such as aggressive price policies, advertising campaigns and other measures 
well known specially in oligopolistic markets.
Since the microeconomic foundations of conflict are at an early stage of de­
velopment, we can establish a initial parallel regarding the difficulties of the ap­
plication of the mathematical methods and the necessary limitation of objectives 
that were laid by the initial researchers in game theory.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [14] vindicated the mathematical “games of 
strategy” against some of its usual criticisms. Most of their assertions can be 
easily applied to our studies in conflict theory.
First, there isn’t a general theory of conflict. This gives room, to some degree, 
for speculation about the validity and applicability of its conclusions. However, 
this is a question that concerns the methodology of science that could be well 
applied to most hard-core disciplines. Human thought has been dominated by 
theories that claim a universal understanding until they were replaced by more 
advanced alternatives. In trying to established a universal core from the be­
ginning we would probable impede further development in this new field. The 
nature of human science requires in many cases a more descriptive method. In 
these cases we have no doubt that a careful compilation, classification and de­
scription of the facts around of conflict can be more useful, but in other cases 
mathematics can be applied with great success.
There is no fundamental reason why mathematics shouldn’t be applied to 
conflict theory. Von-Neumann and Morgenstern said something similar about 
game theory:
The arguments often heard that because of the human element, of the 
psychological factors, etc., or because the is -  allegedly -  no measure-
raodels give a very good insight into the evolutionary dynamics of conflict.
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ment of important factors, mathematics will find no application, can 
all be dismissed as utterly mistaken. Almost all this objections have 
been made, or might have been made many centuries ago in fields 
where mathematics is now the main instrument of analysis...
We can also find some parallels with the early game theory when we try 
to understand why mathematical techniques have not been applied with more 
success to the study of conflict. One of them is that it is very difficult to use 
these methods when there is no clarity of concepts. The very definition of conflict 
is ambiguous and confusing as we have seen in the previous sections; there are 
many definitions some of them quite contradictory. Nevertheless, there have 
been huge advances in conflict resolution which uses techniques of analysis often 
derived from game theory principles.
Anatole Rapoport [15] writes about the very same question:
Much of the controversy about the possibility of creating a mathe­
matical social science centres on the issue of “determinism” vs. “free 
will” and on the applicability of mathematical models to phenom­
ena as complex as those involving human behaviour. Indeed, both 
deterministic causality, which seems to govern the behaviour of non 
living matter, and the simplicity of the systems singled out for study 
in classical mathematized physical science constitute the foundations 
of that science. Determinism in human affairs remains a metaphys­
ical assumption without convincing evidence. The indefinitely large 
number of variables that perforce enter the description of any system 
with human components precludes the use of tractable mathematical 
models in deriving the behaviour of such systems.
Rapoport argues that the fact that determinism cannot be proved, the absence 
of it neither can be. At the same time, the assumption of determinism is not
CHAPTER 2, FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT 17
necessary since, for instance, probabilistic theories can be as logically compelling 
as deterministic ones. And the complexity involving human systems is a matter 
of degree although analogies with physical science cannot be established invoking 
only differences of degree of complexity with human systems. In human science 
there are no analogous to physical “laws” governing the systems.
Therefore so far, all mathematical models give some general ideas about the 
behaviour of different agents, or better, given some environment, what would one 
expect to be the outcome of a conflict situation if its agents were rational players 
or rational decision making units.
As the key variables get identified and precisely defined, data collected, com­
puter software developed6 and other factor necessary for quantitative analysis 
improved, we will get more and more accurate predictions.
Our project tries to bring together a set of theories and models that help us 
to understand the process of allocation of scarce resources among two main alter­
native uses, production and conflict technology. This resulting allocations would 
in term produce some equilibrium of forces consistent with a peaceful or a fight­
ing outcome. This generates some concepts and relationships that should help 
us to understand and provide policy advice in conflict resolution, international 
relations, labour economics and many other processes.
We think about conflict theory as a part of economics that deals with the 
microeconomic foundations of issues such as arms trade and arms races, military 
expenditure, defence industries, influence of military expenditure in GDP growth 
and other macro-economic variables. It shares many features with microeconomic 
theory such us the individual decision taking as the unit and method of analysis 
or the concept of rationality.7
Rationality is an strong assumption, specially when we refer to conflict. This
eSince it is likely unprovable that conflict experiments will be performed, computer simula­
tion is one of the key tools for the development of mathematical conflict theories
7See for example Gravelie and Rees [16].
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concept is used in the strict economic sense. That is:
1. The decision-maker sets out all the feasible alternatives rejecting anyone 
that is not feasible.
2. He takes into account whatever information is readily available, or worth 
collecting, to assess the consequence of choosing each of the alternatives.
3. In the light of their consequences he ranks the alternatives in order of 
preference where this ordering satisfies certain assumptions of completeness 
and consistency.
4. He chooses the alternative highest in this ordering. In other words, he 
chooses the alternative that he prefers the most and no other one.
All these points are consistent with the common meaning of rationality. The 
controversial part is point 2. Gathering all the relevant information is sometimes 
very costly and therefore the notion of rationality must take into account these 
costs. Many actions may seem at first sight irrational until we analyse the infor­
mational problems underneath or the costs of information-gathering. Information 
plays a crucial part in conflict. It may affect environment variables such as the 
knowledge of previous plays, it might affect the knowledge of available strate­
gies, the payoffs resulting from playing them and other crucial factors that would 
influence the final outcome. Information plays a crucial part in the strategy of 
conflict, specially in understanding the rationality of war or any other kind of 
costly confrontation.
2.2.1 General principles of conflict analysis
We are going to introduce next a general framework for conflict analysis. For 
this, we will review the methodology established by Isard and Smith [17]. This 
study compiled a great variety of techniques and models that can be summarised
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in some general principles. The well-versed reader will find many similarities with 
the principles of game theory and other mathematical methods in social science 
research.
The basic concepts defined by this analysis are very similar to the elements 
of game theory, that is: actions and joint actions, states of the environment, 
outcomes, preferences and utility, and extent and nature of available information. 
After the basic elements, we should establish in which forms this elements can 
be found in the real world producing a conflict situation.
Isard and Smith [17] found two main classifications. Conflicts can be classified 
according to two main factors. First whether there are a small number of actions 
or not and second whether participants can only rank outcomes or they have a 
numeric value for the outcome or a payoff.
Basic elements
In conflict there might be a wide range of different actions, for instance war is a 
very complex social phenomenon that involves highly organized chains of actions 
by the participants. The whole set of actions is called, in game theory terms, the 
pure strategy space Si for player i.
The other factors that determine the outcome of the game are collected in 
what is called the environment of the game. Here we collect all the factors that 
affect the final outcome, but are not under control of the participants.
The combination of actions and environment produces an outcome which can 
also be simple or complex. For example, war produces a complex outcome that 
can be evaluated in terms of the number of human and material losses and the 
gains in political controlled territory, political advantages etc.
Participants are assumed to have some preferences over all possible outcomes. 
These preferences are described by using a utility function that summarizes all 
the preference rankings for a given participant. The utility function can be car­
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dinal, ordinal or relative. Cardinal utility functions indicate how much utility 
participants get from each outcome. If the information provided by the utility 
function only tells which outcome is preferred with respect to the other outcomes, 
we represent preferences by an ordinal utility function and finally when the in­
formation also includes which outcome is preferred by a certain fixed amount, 
percentage or ratio, it is a relative utility function.8
Once the outcomes are known, we need some guiding principles. These prin­
ciples imply that all participants are aware of the behaviour considerations of 
the other players. In economics, the behaviour principle is utility maximisation. 
This is normally the principle that every player uses in order to choose actions. 
This might be far too general in some conflict cases. In conflict resolution a more 
specific principle might be needed. Utility maximisation might be difficult to put 
into practice in some complex situations and some general guidelines, such us 
moral codes, cultural practices, standards of fairness etc., are used in its place
Those principles relate to some objectives embodied in the concept of ‘optimal 
state of affairs’ considered attainable, which will take one of those two forms; To 
maximize or to minimize the level of some index reflecting the desirable properties 
of different sets of possible outcomes.
Finally, information is a key variable in conflict. Rationality of players, the 
strategies available and the payoffs depend on the perception of participants. 
Isard and Smith define the many possible states of information:
...there is a definition of a statement of knowledge, the distinction 
between objective and subjective knowledge, the consideration of the 
degree of belief associated with any piece of knowledge, the distinction 
of being fully informed of a piece of knowledge and being positive of
8The literature in economics also has studied different forms of utility functions. In the study 
of conflict it might be highly relevant to use reference dependent utility functions. This might 
deal with the fact that many times participants face some minimum constraints for survival, 
or there exist some political and cultural influences that might affect their behaviour in some 
or another way, depending on an initial reference point. See Samuelson and Zeckhauser [18]
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that knowledge, the distinction between knowing a relationship and 
assuming it, the distinction between certain, probabilistic and uncer­
tain knowledge of the stage of the environment and outcomes, and 
recognition of the need to specify the different amounts and kinds of 
knowledge that participants have regarding other participant’s pref­
erences and perceptions.
On the issue of information, it is important to explain the idea of ‘common 
knowledge’. Knowledge is what everybody knows about the environment and the 
payoffs, whereas common knowledge means that everybody knows that everybody 
knows it. The assumption of common knowledge has strong implications for the 
equilibrium strategies.9 Information structures can give place to very different 
outcomes and this is a question that hasn’t been properly explored in conflict 
theory.
Conflict with small number of actions and ordered preferences
This is a simple assumption that can be applied to real conflict situations. In 
terms of game-theory, the models that follow from this assumption could be classi­
fied as static models of complete information. We have argued in our introduction 
that under perfect information there is no possibility of conflict. However, the 
number of actions are limited. Given this limitation, the process might result in 
a fighting equilibrium. This limitation is exogenous, and therefore, these mod­
els can be only used in an ad hoc manner for any given situation. Although 
they provide a good tool for conflict management, they do not offer a positive 
explanation of it and it is difficult to make generalisations.
In the second place, for the moment, we are focusing only on static mod­
els. This is a contradiction with our definition of conflict as a process of in­
9For a survey of implication of common knowledge see the review of Brandenburger and 
Dekel [19].
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compatibility resolution. We must make an extra effort, collecting all dynamic 
factors in the exogenous variables represented by the environment. Robert Axel­
rod [20] has already shown the importance of the dynamic factors in shaping the 
equilibrium outcome in tournaments and games such us the iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma [21, 22].
In the next table we can find an example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and how 
game theory can help in conflict management.
In this example Cl and C2 represent the governments of two countries. Cl is 
the government of an hegemonic country that has economic interests all around 
the world. C2 is the government of a developing nation. Both governments are 
rational and follow the strategy that maximizes their own utility represented by 
the payoff matrix of Table 2.1.
The strategies available to the local government axe 3.
® To take a blind eye to the activities of the hegemonic power in his territory.
® To collaborate with him in the extraction of economic-rent from the ex­
ploitation of natural resources and labour
• To fight against foreign control in order to achieve a higher degree of eco­
nomic and political emancipation
In turn, the hegemonic power has also three different alternatives.
• To use a ‘fair’ policy in his economic relations with the developing country.
• To use sanctions in order to force the local government to collaborate with 
his economic policies.
® To engage in military action to remove the government and replace it with 
a more favourable one.
Table 2.1: The War Game 1
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C l , C2 Blind Eye People’s oppression War of Liberation
Fair Policy 10 , 10 0 , 20 -10 , 40
Sanctions 20 , 5 30 , -5 -5  , 20
War of Domination 30 , 0 40 , -10 5 , 5
To find the outcome of the game we proceed to the elimination of dominated 
strategies.10 The equilibrium is a war outcome with payoffs of (5,5) (Bottom 
right cell).
This is an example of how war might take place in an environment of complete 
information. The war outcome of this game is an ad hoc result. The war scenario 
takes place due to the fact that both governments have restricted actions and 
outcomes.
Continuous action spaces
In the previous case, both participants had three options only. We can give them 
an continuous number of options. In that case Cl might choose a completely fair 
policy to a completely greedy one whereas C2 might decided from fighting back 
or help C l with absolute control of its population.
For those who are not familiar with exchange theory, we proceed to draw an 
‘Edgeworth box’ representing all the efficient allocations for both countries’ ini­
tial endowments. Each point inside the box in figure 2.1(a) represents a unique 
outcome for every joint action. Preferences over those outcomes can be repre­
sented by a map of indifference curves represented in the graph by the continuous 
concave lines for Cl and the convex lines for C2.
For instance point A in this figure gives the same utility for C2 as point D 
because it is on the same indifference curve. Starting at point A, any policy 
choice that is outside the area delimited by the thick lines would make any of the
10A good introduction to statics games of completed information is Gibbons [23]
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Figure 2.1: The Edgeworth box and efficiency in conflict
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two participants worse off, and wouldn’t generate an agreement.
The move from A to B would be mutually beneficial but is not an efficient 
allocation. Only points of tangency between indifference curves can be considered 
efficient outcomes. For instance a point such as C provides the same utility for 
Cl and a higher utility for C2 because it is on a higher indifference curve.
As you can see point D is also an efficient allocation.11 In fact, there can 
be many efficient allocations, In figure 2.1(b) we can see the locus containing 
all allocations for which both participants indifference curves are tangent. Each 
point in this curve is efficient because one cannot make a party better off without 
making the other one worse off.
Formally the Bargaining Set X  is said to be Pareto-efficient if there is no 
other outcome y in X  that all the players like at least as much as x and some 
players like more that x
Vy;y > x => y X
This notion of efficiency should not be confused with what is socially desirable. 
As Binmore [24] explains:
Sometimes a Pareto-efficient point is said to be Pareto-optimal, but 
this is an unfortunate piece of terminology since it suggests that a 
Pareto-efficient point cannot be improved on. But it is Pareto-efficient 
for a mother to give all cookies in her cooky jar to one of her children, 
leaving the others with nothing. No child can then have its situation 
improved without making another one worse off. However, nobody 
would wish to claim that the mother’s decision is necessarily socially 
optimal. 12
11Isard and Smith [17] provide a thorough review of different management procedures to 
attaining different efficient outcomes according to some general guiding principles.
12Some of the techniques in conflict resolution are based in this concept of Pareto-efficiency.
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Biology would only consider those strategies that allow for the survival of the 
species, mainly concerned by a process of adjustment to a changing environment. 
A priest would only consider strategies that abide by the principles of his religion. 
Other people would like to eliminate strategies that impose a great damage in one 
of the participants or produce great inequalities. Since the scope of our study 
is restricted to the economics of conflict, we focus on Pareto improvements as 
the guiding principles of our theories. This implies not only the definition of the 
feasible bargaining set in the manner explained above, but also the definition of 
individual rationality, common knowledge and the information set in accordance 
with the rest of economic theories.
Identifying the bargaining set is quite useful for the evaluation of conflict res­
olution strategies. It says little about the micro-economic foundations of conflict. 
At this stage, we depart from the standard analysis in conflict management.
Our economic analysis should focus on two main issues. First, a theory of 
conflict should endogenise the bargaining set. Many conflict theories assume 
that the set is exogenously determined. However, economists are concerned with 
optimal allocation of resources. In the case of conflict, participants can allocate 
their respective resources into two main activities. One leads to the generation 
of more resources. Investment and trade are typically activities that lead to a 
more efficient use of some limited resources. The other activity leads to their 
appropriation. Military expenditure, and wars bring about a higher share of the 
initial scarce resources for one participant, but reduce the overall use.
Second, we analyse at which conditions exchange takes place by agreement 
and/or conflict. In situations with perfect information, markets are the most 
efficient mechanism providing the best allocation. In many circumstances markets
Groom [25] produced a conceptual review of different principles and paradigms from which the 
ones classified under the category of Peace Research could be the most critical with the concept 
of Pareto-efficiency, In many occasions they suggests solutions that would make a party worse- 
off in support of another party. This doesn’t contradict the fact that when Pareto-efficient 
solutions are found, they should be implemented
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fail and exchange takes place under the shadow of conflict. In extreme cases, 
agreement breaks down and the allocation takes place by fighting. This achieves 
equilibrium without agreement but is very costly.
The microeconomic foundations of conflict should establish some general the­
ories applicable to situations such as wars, strikes, litigation price and trade wars 
in oligopolistic markets, etc. These theories should be consistent with a process 
of optimal allocation of resources in conjunction with cooperative and one-side 
advantage activities. They should take into account that cooperation is in many 
case Pareto superior but requires agreement. Therefore, some mechanism of ne­
gotiation should be incorporated into the previous framework.
Regarding the study of the allocation of resources into productive or fighting 
activities, we may turn to the study of rent seeking models. There is a great 
variety of them, specially in the literature of public goods. With respect to the 
negotiations on how to split the pie, the literature in game theory has already pro­
duced extensive research from the Nash equilibrium to complicated equilibrium 
concepts in dynamic models of imperfect information.
In the next two sections we will be looking both at theoretical research and 
practical applications of rent-seeking activities, game theory and bargaining and 
other models that address different aspects of conflict. This will provide the 
theoretical background for developing our models of conflict in chapters 3 and 4.
2.3 Models of rent-seeking activities
There are several approaches in the recent economic literature dealing with dif­
ferent aspects of conflict -  understanding it as those activities that go beyond 
what is normally described as competition activities. In some cases, participants 
use the available resources to damage or destroy other participants. But there is 
a whole range of activities that rather than seeking other participants’ destruc­
tion, are concerned with the gain of economic rents. These activities, compared 
to competition activities, are directly unproductive. There are many models of 
rent seeking activities in the literature. In the last few years, we have seen a 
convergence between models of conflict and rent-seeking. As research advances, 
some common features can be identified in these models that may eventually lead 
to a formulation of a microeconomic theory of conflict.
The economic models of profit-seeking and rent-seeking have concentrated 
largely in the theoretical analysis of lobbying for protection, import licences and 
tariffs, Johnson [26], Bhagwati and Hansen [27]. The term rent-seeking is at­
tributed to Krueger [28]:
In many market-oriented economies, government restrictions upon 
economic activity are pervasive facts of life. These restrictions give 
rise to rents of a variety of forms, and people often compete for the 
rents.
These activities were reduced to a subset of what Bhagwati [29] calls di­
rectly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP). Krueger paper is concerned 
with the lobbying activities which are triggered by different licensing practices 
of governments. Some different licensing mechanisms can lead to different lob­
bying activities. At the same time, her paper studies the welfare implications 
of these activities in a model where three basic regimes are compared: Free 
Trade, Tariff or import restrictions without Rent-seeking, and Import Restric­
tions with Rent-seeking. The introduction of restrictions produces welfare losses
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since entrepreneurs dedicate resources to gain the economic rent produced by 
those restrictions. Prevention of that loss can only be achieved by restricting 
entry into the activity for which a rent has been created, which can have many 
political implications.
Bhagwati [29] makes a taxonomy of rent-seeking activities which are directly 
related to governmental policies. He classifies these activities into four main 
categories according to the distortiona! effect that they entail. These activities 
can be of a legal or illegal nature and can be grouped according to their analytical 
similarities.
There axe four main categories:
a) The initial and final situations are both distorted.
b) The initial situation is distorted but the final situations is not, as a result 
of DUP activity.
c) The initial situation is distortion free, but the final situation is distorted 
and
d) Both the initial and final situations are distortion free.
An example of a legal activity in the first category is premium-seeking which was 
studied by Krueger [28]. Illegal activities such as tariff evasion and smuggling are 
also part of these group, Bhagwati and Srinivasan [30], Pitt [31]. In the second 
category we can mention examples of tariff-destroying lobbying. Two typical 
activities in the third group are Monopoly seeking and tariff seeking. In the final 
category we can mention examples such us zero-tariff lobbying and theft.
We can summarize the results of his paper by looking at the consequences 
of these activities. Categories (a) and (b) produce a beneficial outcome and the 
activities in groups c and d produce a negative one. The critical difference is that 
the activities in categories (a) and (b) have initial situations that are distorted,
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whereas categories (c) and (d) depart from an initial situation of free distortion. 
The point here is that the diversion of resources from directly productive to di­
rectly unproductive activities, when undertaken in a context of initially distorted 
situations, is fundamentally different from the situations where diversion occurs 
in distortion-free initial situations.
The classic examples of rent-seeking activities with negative outcomes are 
monopoly and tariff seeking. In both cases the welfare cost imposed by those 
activities can be decomposed into two main negative effects.
a) the withdrawal of resources into unproductive activities and
b) the welfare effect of imposition of the distortion.
In figure 2.2, we draw two graphs for the monopoly and tariff seeking activities. 
Consider monopoly seeking in graph A:
In this small, closed economy which produces at P* initially, with 
welfare at 17*, the lobby to secure a monopoly in good 1 production 
succeeds. The resources expended in securing the monopoly shift 
the production possibility curve down to A'B', whereas the monopoly 
itself leads to non-tangency of the goods-price ratio with A'B1 in equi­
librium. Equilibrium production and consumption therefore shifts to 
Pim, Cim and welfare declines to Uim from U*. The total decline in 
welfare then can be decomposed into (1) the shift from U* to Ui re­
flecting only the diversion of resources from directly productive use to 
the lobbying activity and the resulting move of production and con­
sumption to Pi, Ci, if it is assumed hypothetically that monopoly has 
not resulted; and (2) the further shift from Ui to Uim coming from the 
admission of the monopoly into the economy and the resulting move 
of production and consumption to P*m, Cjm, respectively.
Figure 2.2: Welfare effects of rent-seeking activities
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In graph B we have a very similar situation in which a protectionist lobby 
manages to implement a tariff against free trade:
If we take only the diversion of resources to lobbying into account, at 
free-trade prices production would shift from P* to Pf on the shrunk- 
in production possibility curve A'B', which represents therefore a loss 
of RS measured in terms of good 1. Moreover, the tariff resulting 
from the successful lobbying shifts the production point further to 
Pi, which is the final observed equilibrium under tariff seeking; this 
is tantamount to a further loss of QR in terms of good 1. These 
measures are conventional Hicksian equivalent-variational measures, 
as before, at world prices. Thus the overall loss QS, as already ex­
plained, is decomposed into two constituent elements, each of which 
is unambiguously negative.
2.3.1 Contest success functions
The concern about the welfare effects of rent-seeking was soon captured by what 
is a classic in this branch of the literature. Gordon Tullock in his article, efficient 
rent-seeking [32], analyses optimal strategies from players that participate in a 
lottery that resembles very much a two party conflict. They are asked to buy as 
many tickets as they wish at one dollar each. The lottery tickets are collected 
together and only one is pulled out, and whoever owns the ticket wins the prize. 
The probability of success for participant A depends on the amount of tickets 
that he/she has and the total amount of tickets, Ai +  A2.
P ^  =
A i
Ai +  A2
For any prize of this lottery, we could calculate the expected value of the lottery 
for each player given the amount of tickets that each will buy. Since the value of
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this tickets is not added to the prize of the lottery, this is equivalent to the waste 
of resources that takes place in every conflict situation.
There is nothing to indicate that the lottery production function should be 
linear. Tullock also considered other cases with exponential functions for more 
than two participants.
Ar
P ai =  AI +  A5,...,+A5v
Thus Tullock introduces the first ‘contest success functions’ . Many other au­
thors follow the analysis of this kind of game, introducing different assumptions. 
Corcoran [33] considered a long-run setting, finding that rents would completely 
disappear if there was free entry. Hillman and Riley [34] allowed the players to 
value the prize differently, Linster [35] presented this analysis in a cooperative 
context.
The above lottery could be considered a Nash game in which participants 
spend resources in order to increase their probabilities of winning. Economists 
have studied such games in many different situations. Dasgupta and Stiglitz [36] 
examined rivalry in R&D. Nabeluff and Riley [37] studied wars of attrition; and 
Lazear and Rosen [38], Nabeluff and Stiglitz [39] and Rosen [40] dealt with conflict 
from the perspective of incentive design.
We should try to understand the incentives to manipulate the effort level to 
increase the probabilities of winning, given some strategic considerations such 
us the resource-holding potential, the technology of conflict or the symmetry (or 
asymmetry) of initial resources.
In Tullock’s formula each party’s success is a function of the ratio of the 
respective input levels X[ and A2. There is another possibility. The probability 
of success may also depend on the difference between these inputs. Hirshleifer [41] 
shows how the outcome can change considerably according to the choice of one 
or another variant of CSF (contest success function).
The generalization of the ratio CSF for any number of players N was provided
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by Tullock.
A™ \ ™
P  ~  th. =  1 (2 l)
Ai Af + A^ + .-. + A^ Af v ' ;
Another option for modelling ‘contest success functions’ is based on the dif­
ference in fighting efforts that a participant enjoys with respect to the other par­
ticipants. The probability of success in the difference version takes the following 
form for two participants:
Pa = 1 +  exp{fc(A2 -  A i)}
and for N Participants
P  _  expjfeAj}
A’ exp{kAj}
In the ratio form of the CSF equation 2.1, the parameter m is the effective­
ness parameter, or decisiveness parameter. High values of this parameter produce 
higher increases in the probability of success. In the difference version, the pa­
rameter k has a similar effect. The effects of these parameters in the shape of the 
CSF are displayed in figure 2.3. The resources for the other participant have been 
fixed to A2 =  100. In the ratio version, regardless of ro, we see that Pi =  P2 =  0.5 
when Ai =  A2. If m <  1 diminishing returns to fighting effort hold for any com­
bination of Aj. But if m > 1 there is an initial range of increasing returns. This 
indicates that, as long as one participant has much less expenditure on arms than 
the other participant, it enjoys increasing returns, which disappears when both 
military expenditures are similar.
In many occasions, it is recommended to assume that the appropriation tech­
nology follows the ratio version. But there are some implications that would 
make this form quite unreasonable in some circumstances. For example, if one 
side employs zero resources to fighting effort, the probabilities of success for the 
other party go to infinity as long as they commit some finite amount to fight, no 
matter how little. Hirshleifer gives a brief guide on how to apply these versions
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Figure 2.3: Contest Success functions.
In the top figure we see the plot of the ratio version of CSF. There are three loci, 
corresponding with three different values of the effectiveness parameter m. The 
figure at the bottom plots the difference version of CSF.
m =0.5
i —  ------   m = l
k=0
k=0.G2
k=0.04
k=i
Difference version
A,
100 200
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of CSF.
In a military context we may expect the ratio form of the Contest 
Success Function to be applicable when clashes take place under close 
to “idealized” conditions such us: an undifferentiated battlefield, full 
information, and unflagging weapons effectiveness. In contrast, the 
difference form tends to apply where there are sanctuaries or refuges, 
where information is imperfect and where the victorious player is sub­
ject to fatigue or distraction. Given such “imperfections of the combat 
market” , the defeated side need not loose absolutely everything.
2.3.2 Resource allocation and distribution of income
There is no unique model of allocation of resources between fighting and ap- 
propriative activities. These models have to be selected with a certain types of 
application in mind. However the process of allocation of resources by using the 
concept of lotteries introduced by Tullock is a common feature in the models of 
conflict.
These models try to reconcile two different branches of economic thought, as 
Hirshleifer says [12]:
A first aim of conflict analysis is therefore to provide an underlying 
micro-theory that would be applicable to all topical areas of applica­
tion such as warfare, litigation, etc. More sweepingly, exchange theory 
and conflict theory constitute two equal branches of economic anal­
ysis: the former based upon two-sided advantage and contract, the 
latter upon one-sided advantage and struggle.
A. Dixit [42] considers the effects of precommitment in contests where the 
rivals expend effort to win a prize. These players can have both symmetric or
CHAPTER 2. FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT 37
asymmetric power (favourite and underdog), resulting in over-commitment of re­
source in a Stackelberg equilibrium. This is one of the first models showing that 
the order of play is very important in the economic theory of contests. Alter­
natively, Baik and Shogreh [43] found that the favourite will never over-commit 
effort. Given endogenous order of moves, the favourite finds advantageous to 
wait until the underdog moves while the under-dog’s best strategy is not to wait, 
but to make the first move. Hirshleifer [44] uses the same scenario to show under 
which conditions there is system stability when one has no exogenous mechanisms 
of enforcing property rights, (e.g.: the system of international relations). Skaper- 
das [45] analyses the conditions under which cooperation is possible in long term 
relationships. In “full cooperation” none of the players invest in arms. Other 
things being equal, an agent’s use of power is inversely related to its resources 
when these are valued according to marginal-productivity theory.
Skaperdas and Syropoulos [46] produced an interesting framework to analyse 
the key elements of these conflict models, comparing the determinants of distri­
bution of income under conflict exchange to a market with perfect competition.
Except for the introduction of appropriative activities (‘arms’, for 
short), we retain a structure frequently used in many areas of eco­
nomics and we are thus in a position easily to compare the equilibrium 
allocations in the presence of appropriation with those that would 
emerge under competitive conditions. We find a general tendency for 
those who have a comparative advantage in useful production to re­
ceive smaller shares, whereas those who have a competitive advantage 
in arms production receive a larger share. Moreover, improvements in 
an agent’s efficiency of useful production or factor-augmenting tech­
nical progress reduce the agent’s share of income. In contrast, im­
provements in an agent’s efficiency of arms production and increases 
in an agent’s endowment raise the agents share of income.
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Let’s introduce a basic model of conflict where participants try to maximize 
their income given some initial resources. They must allocate these initial re­
sources Ri (that are inalienable) into production of a single good Ei from which 
utility is derived or into arms Fi which secure the output of production.
The production function contains constant returns to scale: f (E 1,E 2)\ fu  > 
0, fm  < 0 and fu  > 0. The participants can transform the initial resources into 
factors of production according to the resource holding constraint:
Ri =  aiEi -f- b{Fi (2-2)
where ai >  0 and b% >  0 (i =  1 ,2). Once the resources are allocated, they cannot 
transform them back to initial resources. The parameters a, and bi indicate how 
many units of initial resources are needed to produce one unit of Fi and
The resources dedicated to arms by each participant determine the probabil­
ities of winning according to a contest success function. Alternatively, assuming 
risk neutral preferences, it gives a share of the final output. This scenario also as­
sumes no cost of conflict, not cost of trade and perfect divisibility of the common 
good. Once produced, this good can be shared perfectly without loss of utility. 
This scenario, although seemingly unrealistic, helps us to understand the most 
important strategic features of efficient allocation of resources under conflict.
For any given allocation of resources to arms, the winning probabilities are 
p ( F i , F2) for player 1 and 1 —p ( F i ,  F 2)  for player 2. The contest success function 
has the following properties:
0 < p{Fu F3) <  1 V(F|, F2); p(Fu F2) =  1 -p {F 2, F,) V(F\, F2)
(2.3)
and p i  =  d p (F u  F 2) / d F i  > 0, p 2 =  d p (F u  F 2) / d F 2 < 0 V(F\, F 2).
The first line indicates that the probabilities of winning for both players are 
between 0 and 1, p\ -\-p2 =  1. In the second line we have a typical effect of arms 
spending. A positive increase in one’s own arsenal increases one’s probability of
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winning whereas an increase in the other participants arsenal decreases it.
The payoffs are a function of the final production and the probabilities of 
winning:
n  l (FuF2) = p (F 1 , =
— F2)f((R i  “  biFi)/a\, (R2 — b2F2)/a2)\
(2.4)
n 2(Fi, F2) =  (1 - p (F u F2) ) f (E l ,E 2) =
=  (1 -  p(Fu F2))f((R i -  &iFi)/al3 (R2 -  b2F2)/a2)
Szidarowszky and Okuguchi [47] provided a formal proof of the existence and 
uniqueness of a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium assuming that there is a limited 
number of player j  =  1 ,2 ,.. .n. The contest success functions are identical and 
take the form:
fi(Fi)
Pi = £"=1
The elasticity of substitution between inputs of production is a crucial concept 
defined as:
cr == S(EijE2)uj/5u)(E2/Ei))
where lj =  — P i/T V 3
Let the factor share of player i be 9 ~  FiTijT, 9\A92 — 1, and 9 e (0,1). 
It can be show that :
cr =  T\T2I T\2T
and
d 9 i <
Which means that a participant’s factor share is increasing in that partici­
pant’s contribution only if the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1. Then we 
can see the Nash equilibrium distribution of resources by maximizing the payoffs
13for simplicity we call = T  and
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with respect of arms expenditure.
dUl/dF? =  JF* -  < 0
dn2/3F* =  -p*2F* -  (1 -  p*)^J (62/ 02) < 0
If the marginal quantity of arms that players can produced is the same Rib\ =  
# 2^ 2? their respective share is inversely related to their initial resources, when 
these resources are valuated at the efficient point of production. Thus the higher 
is a player’s marginal product, the lower is his equilibrium share. This result 
contradicts the postulates of marginal theory under perfect competition and it 
was coined the Paradox of Power by Hirshleifer.14 We do not want to extend 
further our analysis in this direction because we are also concerned with the 
effects that cost and imperfections in the negotiation process may have in the 
final equilibrium of this models.
However it is worth mentioning briefly some of the consequences of changes 
in the main parameters of the model. According to Skaperdas and Syropoulos:
1. The role of useful productivity
® The effect of changes in the technology of production in the final in­
come can be of two different types. One is the nature of the production 
function f (E i,E 2) and the second is the effects of the parameter ai 
which determine the efficiency with which the initial resources can be 
converted into inputs of productions.
® For the case of the production function they studied the share equilib­
rium under an alternative production function g(E\, E2) =  /(A £ j, E2) 
where A > 1 for all a > 1 and A < 1 for all a < 1. With some restric­
tions in the elasticity of substitution a and the production functions
14Note that in the absence of other influences, this should produce a convergence between 
rich and poor.
CHAPTER 2. FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT 41
they show that increases in player 1 productivity produces a lower 
share of income for himself.
• The effects of changes in (the efficiency parameter in 2.2) in the 
equilibrium shares operate in an identical way to increases in the pa­
rameter A in the production function. Thus an improvement in player 
l ’s input production through an increase of a* reduces the allocation 
of resources into arms of player 1, reducing its power and final share.
2. The role of factor endowments
• Player 1 increases her levels of arms investment F\ for any given F2 as a 
result of an initial increase in her initial resources Ri. An increase in Ri 
increases player l ’s marginal benefit from investing in arms because it 
increases production, but also reduces the opportunity cost by forcing 
her marginal product to decline owing to diminishing returns.
3. Change in the efficiency of arms production
® The effect of changes of b{ in 2.2 is ambiguous. For high enough 
elasticities of substitution, increased efficiency of arms production is 
favourable to the player who undertakes it.
We can see that the elasticity of substitution plays a crucial role in determining 
the changes in final shares brought about by changes in the key parameters of 
the model. The exception being the case when players experience an increase in 
their initial resources, which produces unambiguously increases in the final share.
Risk aversion
Different attitudes can have a drastic impact in the outcome of conflict. There 
are two kind of attitudes that should be considered with respect to the economics
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of conflict.15 These are expressed by risk aversion and reference-dependent utility 
functions. There is abundant empirical evidence of both cases in the literature.16
Risk aversion is a common feature in economic models that have some degree 
of uncertainty. In wars and other types of conflict it is very difficult to predict 
with certainty who will be the winner. Therefore one would expect that risk 
averse preferences would affect the allocation of resources to arms investment.
Skaperdas [49])looks at the effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities 
under two different settings, conflict and settlement. We look at the particular 
scenario when settlement is possible. We suppose that the two parties are able 
to communicate and can divide the prize in two different shares s and (1 —  5), 
0 < s < 1.
If we assume that both parties are risk averse 17, the two parties will face a 
bargaining problem with the threat point represented by the outcome of conflict 
and a bargaining possibility frontier represented by the share interval
U (sf(E u E2) = p U (f(E 1,E 2) 
k[U(l-a ) / ^ , ^ ) ) ]  =  (1 -p )k {U f{E u E2)).
Where s corresponds to the minimum utility expected by player 1 and s to the 
minimum level of utility expected by player 2.
Under the assumption that both players divide the prize according to their 
respective winning probabilities, attitudes toward risk do not have any influence 
on the strategic choices of the two parties. Deriving the first order conditions
16This is an important question. When we model economic conflict, by definition we are 
concentrating in parties that only care about economic gains or losses. In real world conflicts, 
preferences of actors can included not only economic factors but also political, social, and 
cultural influences. Preferences might be hard to capture by simple utility functions, however 
the strategy of conflict shouldn’t be affected by it.
16See Tversky and Kahneman [48].
17Assuming that a party is risk loving and the other is risk neutral may reduce the bargaining 
set until it disappear, not having any possibility of settlement
[s, s] such that <
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that maximize income we get:
U,{p f(E 1,E 2)\pl {E1,E 2) - p ( E 1,E 2)\ =  0
Which does not depend on the utility function. However, in case of conflict, both 
parties (being more risk averse) invest more in arms. In the settlement case they 
behave as if they were risk neutral, which makes settlement more efficient even in 
the absence of cost. The effects of risk-loving-aversion preferences is ambiguous. 
It can induce participants to spend more or less in arms according to the type of 
scenario.
Konrad and Schlesinger [50] examined the effects of risk aversion for two types 
of expenditures in rent-seeking contests.
© Rent-seeking expenditures, which improve the probability that the rent is 
obtained, and
® Rent-augmenting expenditures, which increase the size of the rent that a 
player might be awarded.
They found that, in the first case, the effect of risk aversion on rent-seeking 
expenditures is indeterminate. They also follow the marginal theory to found 
their propositions.
In a reference-dependent utility function, the utility is determined not only 
by the final outcome, but also by the relationship between this outcome and a 
reference point. Experimental results on a wide range of games show clearly that 
a large proportion of players offer “fair” allocations, and “unfair” allocations are 
systematically rejected. The reference point affects directly the disagreement or 
threat point which is relevant to the outcome of the problem.
These reference-dependent utility functions may be successful in explaining 
many deviations from the equilibrium outcome of other models. Shalev [51] anal­
yses the relation between loss aversion and reference-dependent utility functions.
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The most striking result of the investigation of reference-dependent 
utility functions is the existence of loss aversion. Experimental works 
in both the psychological and the economic literature suggest that 
people are motivated to minimize losses (relative to a reference point) 
much more than they are motivated to maximize gain.
A reference-dependent utility function contains as additional elements the 
loss-aversion coefficient of the players Ai E 9ft+ and a reference point r% E 9ft. 
Given a basic utility value X{ E 9ft, the reference-dependent utility function takes 
the following form:
V i ( x i , r i ) =  < Xi if Xi > n (2.6)
— Ai(7*i — a?i) if Xi < r<.
if Ai =  0, player’s i utility function is not reference dependent. Otherwise it 
retains the main aspects of the risk averse utility functions which is steeper for 
losses (relative to a reference point) than for gains.
Huclc and Oechssler [52] offered an explanation of this behaviour using the 
“indirect evolutionary approach” which is based on the assumption that players 
behave rationally for given preferences but that their preferences change through 
an evolutionary process. They showed that a preference for punishing participants 
that make unfair offers is an evolutionary stable strategy despite anonymous 
interaction.18
The cost of conflict
The cost of conflict also affects the final outcome of the conflict game by changing 
the threat point. It also introduces a fundamental difference in the concept of 
expected utility. When conflict is costly (even if we have symmetric risk-neutral
18A more developed approach into the concept of fairness and game theory can be found in 
Binmore [53]
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players), the partition of the final outcome cannot be done by agreeing to take 
a share equal to the respective probability of winning. Since conflict is costly, a 
participant could increase (decrease) its share by exploiting (being exploited by) 
the high (low) cost that conflict would produce in the other side.
In many of the previous models of conflict, there is an opportunity cost, which 
is the consumption foregone by allocating resources into unproductive activities. 
But few models contemplate one of the most crucial facts of appropriating tech­
nologies: their destruction power.19
The cost of conflict can be decomposed into two main components, the oppor­
tunity cost and the destruction cost. 20 Neary [54] argues that the opportunity 
cost may be in fact much higher than the actual cost of fighting.
However, while actual wars and conflict are costly, it is not war itself, 
as (Hobbes [55] observed, but the disposition to war and to the use 
of force, that is the main concern. Losses incurred in actual conflict 
are the tip of an iceberg; it is the vast stock of otherwise productive 
resources held frozen in the world’s arsenals that is the more rele­
vant pointer to the social cost of self-enforcement in a world without 
Leviathan. For example, world-wide military expenditures in 1992 
equalled the income of 49% of the world’s population (UNDP), [56],
There is a great variety of studies that look at the opportunity cost of military 
expenditure. They have proliferated in recent years and this effect is also known 
in the literature as the peace dividend.21
19The literature of the nuclear arms race tries to offer a rational explanation to why the 
destruction power exceeds the value of the resources in contest. Otherwise, it is normally 
consider to be less than the value of the initial resources
20There is also an extra cost (considered part of the destruction) that is very important but 
difficult to account for. This is human cost. It is very difficult to put a price to a human life, 
to historical patrimony that may be irrecoverable, to the cultural trauma for a generation and 
the benefits of a peaceful society.
21See Gleditsch et al. [57].
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However, the behaviour and equilibrium outcome in a model with destructive
power differs qualitatively from previous models. According to Neary, [58] costly
conflict creates a region of strategy space in which it is not individually rational
for players to fight. If participants allocate resources into arms in stage 1 and
redistribute in stage 2, when conflict is cost-less they will always try to use force.
Consequently, conflict always occurs and normally initiated by the poorer player. 
22
Destructive conflict has also implications for the interpretation of private 
property:
A second area in which the costly conflict model extends its prede­
cessor concerns the interpretation of property. In both models the 
players’ consumption stocks are aggregated into a common pool that 
is at risk of being redistributed by force. Since force is always used in 
the cost-less conflict case the model can be interpreted as a theory of 
the right access to common property, but not as a theory of private 
property. In contrast, in the costly conflict model, whenever conflict 
does not occur the players do not in any sense share an aggregate 
consumption stock; rather, each one consumes the consumption stock 
that he has individually created. In this way the possibility of private 
property exists because conflict is destructive.
There are several ways to introduce cost in models of conflict. The most 
straight forward case is by deleting a fraction (1 — 7 ) of the final payoffs for 
available consumption (1 — 7 ) [ /f /(£ ’i, Ej). The conflict best reply functions are 
independent of the value of 7 and therefore the destructive power of conflict does 
not affect the allocation of resources but introduces a deadweight loss. 23 The 
cost parameter 7 can also be made endogenous by making it dependent on the
22This is another case of the conflict paradox; Hirshleifer [12].
23 In models where players can bargain over conflict this scenarios changes radically because 
participants can gain (lose) bargaining power.
CHAPTER 2. FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT 47
total arms stock but given the complexity of thoroughly accounting for all the 
factors, we will assume that it is a fraction of the final outcome.
In our models of conflict cost will feature as one of the key variables. This is 
a distinguishing factor between political models of conflict and economic models. 
While politics concentrates in the study of power and the probabilities of success, 
from an economic perspective, we concentrate in the expected value of every 
possible strategy. The cost of fighting may have a greater influence than the 
power to impose a given outcome by military victory. This will bring some 
drastic changes to our models.
2.4 Models of Bargaining
Game theory is becoming one of the most common methods of analysis in social 
sciences. It is no longer confined to economics. There are plenty of examples of 
game theory models of conflict in political science.24 For the study of the micro­
foundations of conflict, bargaining theory seems to be one of the most useful 
tools. In this section we are going to review some of the models of bargaining 
with a clear application to conflict modelling.
When two parties are confronted with the problem of splitting a resource 
(more often known as splitting the pie), negotiations increase the welfare in com­
parison to any non-agreed outcome. This happens independently of the compli­
cations proposed by the parties or how much energy they spend in analysing the 
other’s side offers. This is especially true, in those case where disagreement can 
lead to costly conflict.
To the extent that agreement is not immediately reached in some models of 
bargaining, this process is socially wasteful. Rasmusen [60] models a negotia­
tion as a two period auditing game concluding that negotiations raise welfare, 
rather than reduce it. According to Rasmusen, much deal-making, rather than 
concentrating in the classic problem of splitting the pie, is about the process of 
setting the terms of agreement. This is certainly true, regarding international 
conflicts, where setting the agenda of negotiations is the most important part of 
any settlement process, Burton [61].
2.4.1 Rubinstein Model
The basic bargaining model is studied following Rubinstein [62] strategic ap­
proach:
Two participants have to reach an agreement in the partition of a homoge­
24see Peter Ordeshoolc [59].
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neously divisible pie of size 1. Each participant has to make a proposal of how 
it should be divided in turns. If they agree on a partition of the pie at time t, 
t =  1, 2, 3, . . each receives the share of the pie agreed at that time.
The game is played following these rules. The first player is Country l,ci. 
He proposes a share, sici of a given Income which gets accepted or refused. 
In case of refusal Country 2, c2, proposes another share s2c2- The game goes on 
until one of the two countries accepts.
The participants preference relations are defined by the pair (s, i), where 
0 < s <  1. This preference relation is assumed to be complete, reflexive, and 
transitive, on the set S x T U {(0, oo)}, where T is the set of natural numbers 
and S is the set of all possible offers.
These preferences satisfy five assertions described in appendix B.l.
The equilibrium
In this model a Nash Equilibrium is a weak concept. The bargaining equilibrium 
sharpens the Nash equilibrium using the concept of subgame perfectness. This 
equilibrium concept is based on the ordering of moves and the moves along the 
equilibrium path without accepting equilibria which deviates from this path. The 
game has a unique solution if the players are impatient and prefer to receive a 
given share at time t rather than t +  1. If there is no discounting, Country 1 (ci) 
gets all the income I  (assuming that it makes the last offer). It offers sti =  1 at 
every round and Country 2 (c2) can accept or reject at any round.
Suppose that there is a discounting factor 6 E (0,1). The total value of I  in 
the first period is 1 . In the second period it is <51, and so on.
First, we consider a finite bargaining horizon with 3 periods T — 3. The 
bargaining ends with an imposed settlement (s, 1 — s). For simplicity let’s assume 
that both participants have the same discounting factor <5 =  (5i =  <52. We can 
derive the equilibrium strategy by backward induction. In period 2 c2 offers a
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share (s2, 1 — s2) that is accepted by ci iff s2 > 5s. Country 2 would offer s2 =  5s 
iff (1 — 5s) >  5(1 — s). Since 1 > 5, this is true and the equilibrium offer for 
period 2 is:
(si, 1 -  sj) =  (5s, 1 -  5s)
In period 1 Ci offers (si, 1 — Si). For c2 is acceptable iff 1 — sx > 5(1 — s|) =  
5(1 — 5s). Subsequently, the lowest offer that ci can make is 1 — Si =  5(1 — 5s). 
Since 1 — 5(1 — 5 s )> 5 2s the equilibrium offer is:
=  1 -  5 +  52 -  52s
For 2n +  1 periods is
8* =  1 -  5 +  52 -  53 +  • • • +  52n -  52ns (2.7)
and when n —» oo:
*  =  l h ' ( 2 -8)
Proof of this equilibrium is in appendix B.2.
In this model Ci has a clear advantage by moving first. There are two possible 
solutions. Countries could agree to choose who starts the game by a random 
draw. Alternatively, we can show that as the time in between periods goes to 
zero the advantage disappears. This is best illustrated by the next model.
2.4.2 The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky [63], developed the previous model in two 
directions. On the one hand, they established the relation between the static ax­
iomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach. On the other 
hand, they introduced two source of incentives to reach agreement. One is the
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time preference and the other is an exogenous risk of breakdown in negotiations. 
The Nash bargaining solution
In any bargaining problem, by definition, all payoffs in the bargaining set are 
plausible. This is far too general. Nash [64] derived some properties that should 
be satisfied in any bargaining problem so the equilibrium can be clearly anal­
ysed. He established five axioms that any payoff should satisfy in any bargaining 
problem. Then he proved that only one payoff satisfies those conditions. 
Binmore [24] expressed these criteria as follows
1. The final outcome should not depend on how the players’ utility 
scales are calibrated.
2. The agreed payoff pair should be always in the bargaining set.
3. If the players sometimes agree in the payoff pair si when s* is 
feasible, then they never agree on si when s* is feasible
4. In symmetric situations both players get the same share.
In figure 2.4, the shaded region, X , is the bargaining feasible set. The threat 
point is U — {Ud, Uc2). The Nash Bargaining solution U* =  (U*±, U*2) depends 
on the threat point and the bargaining set.
We can also define the five axioms as:
1. To say that the final outcome does not depend on the utility scale can be 
expressed, given any strictly increasing utility function T  by this equality:
i r [F (u ) ,F (x ) }  =  [u * (u ,x )}
2 . If the agreed payoffs are always in the bargaining set then,
{Ucl,u c2) > i r  =* {ucUuc2) i  X
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Figure 2.4: The bargaining feasible set.
The bargaining feasible set is limited by Uc\ on the x axis , Uc2 on the y axis and 
the threat point U.
C2
3. If we drop some possible payoffs pairs, reducing the set X  to Y, then, if U* 
wasn’t one of the dropped pairs, U* does not change.
U*(U,X) E  Y C X  => U*(U,X)
4. This axioms indicate that for the bargaining solution it doesn’t matter 
which participant is labelled C\ and who is labelled c2. Let p be a func­
tion defined as p{UcX,Uc2) =  (U&, UcX) that swaps the participants’ payoffs. 
Then:
T(p(U ),p(X )) =  p (F (U ,X ))
If U* satisfies these four conditions, then JF is a generalised Nash bargaining 
solution such that:
u ' = u% i&  (uci -  u ci)(u C2 -  u c2)
This approach describes the bargaining problem by using only the information
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contained in a pair of utility functions, (Uci, Uc2), which represent both partici­
pants preferences over all the feasible pairs of payoffs in the set X  and a pair of 
utility levels that is the threat point U — (Uci, Uc2).
There is some additional information depending on the modelling choices. An 
example is the choice of the utility functions (risk aversion, absolute or relative 
risk, reference dependent, etc). Another modelling choice is concerned with the 
threat point and deciding what happens in case of no agreement. Whether partic­
ipants bargain for ever or there is an imposed settlement should be reflected in the 
threat point. In this way any other element such as the environment or history 
of the game is abstracted in the axiomatic approach. In this article they study 
the insights of this approach in selecting the appropriate static representations 
of the bargaining games in strategic forms.
This Nash product can represent the underlying strategic approach in many 
bargaining situations. In order to demonstrate this problem Binmore et al. de­
scribe first the main bargaining features explicitly and then show that the Nash 
solution coincides with the limiting perfect equilibrium outcome of the dynamic 
strategic model when the length of the bargaining periods approaches zero.
They presented two types of model according to the underlying force that 
drives participants to reach an agreement. In the first model the parties’ incentive 
to agree is the discounting factor. Both give more value to present resources. The 
second incentive is an exogenous probability of breakdown of negotiations, and 
in this case, both participants will lose the benefits of an agreement. In their 
original model, this takes place because they could lose the resources in contest 
to a third party. In a model of internal or interstate conflict, these benefits are 
clear, since war is costly.
In each period of bargaining there is an exogenous risk of ending the process 
in war. Geopolitical models of conflict show certain areas of the world where 
this exogenous risk tends to be higher. Certain places like Switzerland would 
have a very low risk but others , like the Middle East, are areas of high tension.
Given the difficulty of accounting for all the factors that might influence conflict 
situations, we might think of this as a example of exogenous risk.
At each period of time of length A, there is a positive probability of breakdown 
of negotiations.
p =  p(A) =  X — e~AA
In that case the outcome will be the threat point for each participant w = 
( U c u U c2) .
Assume that the preference orderings satisfy the following assumptions: 
Assumption 1 There is a conflict of interest 
Assumption 2 There are mutual beneficial agreements
Assumption 3 The preference orderings can be represented by the expected val­
ues of continuous utility functions Ui : X  —» R.
These are the von Neumann-Morgensten [14] assumptions
Assumption 4 The participants are risk averse. For every
x ,y  £ X ,a  6 [0,1], ax 4- (1 — a)y  > ax © (1 — a)y
where ax  ® (1 — a)y is a lottery with outcomes x and y with probabilities respec­
tively a and 1 — a.
Suppose that the bargaining process does not break before time tA, concluding 
with agreement x. Thus (tA, x) is the lottery:
(tA, x) —  (1 —  pflx ©  (1 —  (1 —  pY)w
and the preferences of both countries are represented by imposing this lottery in 
the strategic approach:
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(1 -  p{A)YUd(x) +  [1 — (1 — ^(A))4] ^ ^ )  i -  1,2
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The preferences can be also represented by:
When the length A is sufficiently small, the probability p( A) of breakdown is 
also small A —> 0 and its solution will maximise:
x* =  &YgxeXmax[(Uci(x) -  Uci(w)][Uc2{x) -  Uc2(w)]
Which is equivalent to the Nash Bargaining solution given by
max (Uci -  Uci)(Uc2 -  Uc2)
Ucl,Uc2^S
Proof: See Binmore [65]
In the literature of conflict, the strategic approach has been used more often 
than the axiomatic one. One of the reasons is that war produces high cost and 
therefore, the dynamic aspects of conflict are considered very important. The 
Nash Bargaining solution is used more often in models of power politics and 
reallocation of resources. We will see some applications of these models in the 
next chapter.
2.4.3 Models that include no agreement equilibria
In this section we are going to review some models of bargaining with incomplete 
information. The breakdown of hostilities in conflict processes can be explained 
by this type of model. Given that agreement produces a superior outcome, in 
order to explain the lack of it, we have to look closely at possible information 
asymmetries. These information asymmetries must be, directly or indirectly, 
related to the payoffs of participants.
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It is not difficult to see the informational asymmetries at the source of con­
flict in the real world. Societies are complex hierarchical systems of decision 
making. This decisions must be decentralized which in turn leads to what Is- 
ard and Smith [17] call a hierarchical pattern of decision making nodes. These 
patterns depend, amongst other things, on several informational problems:
1. Information Collection Cost
2. Information Processing Cost
3. Information Transmission Cost
To model the mechanism by which this informational problems are translated 
into the perceived payoffs of different participants in a bargaining game is one of 
the most challenging parts of the research in the microeconomics of war. Many of 
the following models have been designed in a rather general form. The applica­
tions of those models have been directed into explaining problems of buyers and 
sellers and conflicts between unions and firms. Therefore, some of the assump­
tions might not be the most appropriate. Bearing this in mind, these models 
give a handful of techniques and principles that can be translated into the field 
of defence economics and in particular into the study of rational wars.
A first model of bargaining with incomplete information
In a seminal paper Fudenberg and Tirole described a simple two-period two- 
person bargaining game with incomplete information. This captures one of the 
main facts about bargaining: the participants do not know the value to others 
of reaching an agreement. In their model, there is a buyer and a seller. They 
try to agree the price of a good. In this scenario the seller makes the offers and 
the buyer accepts or rejects. Therefore there are not alternating offers as in the 
Rubinstein (1982) model. We will use the first part of their paper in our approach 
of bargaining and war and also discuss the implications of these assumptions for
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the equilibrium. For the moment we are concerned with the techniques they use, 
in as much as they prove that when the buyer knows the valuation of the seller 
but has private information about its own valuation, there is a set of unique 
equilibria that is fully characterised in their paper.
Both players are risk neutral and the good is non-divisible. The value of the 
good is s for the seller and b for the buyer. The buyer knows both b and s. 
The seller doesn’t know the valuation of the buyer -but he has some probability 
distribution of it, which is also common knowledge.
In this model the uninformed player, the seller, moves first. He makes an offer 
and if it gets rejected, updates his believes over the distribution of the valuation 
of the buyer by a Bayesian updating process.
Bargaining takes place in two stages only. If at the second stage the seller 
refuses the offer, there is no sale. Both players have a discounting factor defined 
as 5S and The valuation of the seller is s, and we assume that there are two 
kinds of buyers25, a tough buyer with a low valuation (6), and a soft buyer with 
a high one (6). The seller’s prior probability distribution over { 6, 6}  is assumed 
to be ( } , { ) .
We must define the actions of the seller and the buyer at every period. Let 
Pi(s) be the offer of seller in period 1 and P2(s,pi) the offer in period 2. The 
actions of the buyer are either accept or reject. He accepts pi with probability 
r(pi, 6). Since there are only two periods the only relevant conditional probability 
arises in case of a rejection in the first period. Given the strategies of a soft buyer 
and a tough buyer [ri(pi), ZLi(pi)], in case of rejection we compute the posterior 
probability by Bayesian updating [q^Pi), q^Pi) =  1 -  tfi(pi)].
In order to find the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium we proceed as usual, elimi­
nating non-equilibrium strategies by backwards induction. First we find out the
25 Another interpretation is that the bargaining takes place between a seller facing a contin­
uous distribution of buyers. The two types of buyers can be interpreted as different fractions 
of the population.
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strategies for a one period game. It is clear that the seller will make offers only 
in the set {b,b}. Note that the buyer will accept any price p2 < b regardless of 
his type, but this price is dominated by b, which will be also accepted. Any price 
P2 £ ] b, b ] is only accepted by a buyer type b and this price is also dominated 
by b.
The solution to the two period model can be derived from the solution to a
one period one. There are two scenarios. When s > b, the seller sets the price
always to be equal to 6. When s < b, he offers b if he is soft and b if he is tough.
We calculate the expected payoffs for both strategies (offer 6 or 6) and then,
the seller uses the one that maximises his payoff. If he offers b, the expected 
payoff will be ^6 +  =  b. With offer b the expected payoff is |(6 -f s). Then if:
i >  ^ (5 + s )
the seller offers26 6.
In the two period game, the second period strategies are identical to the one 
period game described above. A tough buyer will accept any offer in period 2 
which is smaller or equal to her valuation, px <  6, with probability Li(pi) =  1. 
Therefore, only the strategy of a soft buyer, Fi(pi), needs to be consider.
The Bayesian Equilibrium of the second period subgame is as follows:
1. For the Seller
P2 — k with probability 1 if b > r\(pi)b +  Li(pi)s
P2 — b with probability 1 if6 < ri(pi)b +  rx(pi)s
2. For the Buyer
She accepts any offer providing that p2 < b  (of each type)
26For simplicity they ignored the borderline case where b =  | (b + s)
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The next step is to calculate the Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium for the two 
period game. First we have to define b as the highest first period offer that buyer 
b will accept if she knows that in the second period the buyer will offer b.
b ee (1 — 5b)b -f- 5bb
And we must also define r as the value of the probability of accepting first period 
offer by a soft buyer. This leaves the seller indifferent between offering b or b in 
the second period.
Assume that the seller is soft. When the first offer is rejected, he updates the 
probability of facing a tough buyer, q(pi) > \ which implies that seller will play 
soft in the second period, (see appendix 4.7 for a proof).
1 - 1  _ - b > -6  +  - s  => b > q(pi)b +  q(pi)s
jL Zi
A  soft buyer, anticipates the second period offer and accepts the first period one 
only if
b — pi > 5b(b — &) pi <  6bb -I- (-S b)b =  b
If the seller is tough, he can offer b in the second period. Regardless of this 
offer, a soft buyer will accept any offer in period 1 that is greater or equal to b.
For any offer exceeding b, if a soft buyer, b, accepts with a probability bigger 
that f, the seller will play b in the second period, because f  is the probability 
that makes him indifferent between b and 6. In that case, the buyer would be 
better off waiting for the second period.
If the buyer accepts b with probability ri(pi) < r, then, the seller will play 
tough in the second period and a soft buyer b will be better of accepting the offer 
in the first period. Therefore the only equilibrium strategy for the soft buyer is 
to play f.
Finally, in order to play f , the seller must be indifferent in the second period
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between proposing price b and b. If <j2(pi) is the probability of the seller playing 
soft in the second period, he would be indifferent if it takes the value:
/ \ b - p i
a2(pl) =  ^ T )
Once that we know r and <j, we can calculate the final payoffs.
7t(6) =  b
< 7r(b) =  \b +  |Ssb 
 ^7r(6,r) =  |6,f +
This model with one-side incomplete information shows that for any set of 
initial parameters, there is a unique equilibrium that is described by any of the 
above strategies.
However, the models contradicts the case of complete information in some 
important aspects. Bargaining does not necessarily stop at the first period and 
there is a probability of disagreement when the seller is tough. The solution 
is not necessarily Pareto-Optimal. Other differences with the model of perfect 
information derives from the fact that if the buyer discount factor decreases, 
this can lead to a higher payoff for him, because the probability of accepting b 
increases. This is the contrary to what happens in the complete information case.
General topics in bargaining with incomplete information
Rubinstein’s (1982) model of bargaining reflecting a dynamic process of offers 
and counter offers under complete information has been modified to reflect many 
different bargaining situations. These models introduce inefficiencies into the 
original model using different assumptions about the bargaining process. Rather 
than a complete theory of bargaining, they represent a collection of different 
modelling choices, giving a broad picture of the different equilibria that can arrive
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in non cooperative games.
This highlights two problems concerning the strategic approach of bargain­
ing. First, in both complete and incomplete information models, the equilibrium 
outcome is very sensitive to the choice of extensive form. The shares obtained by 
bargaining change if we change the form of bargaining. For instance, there is an 
strategic advantage to the country that makes the first offer. This is even more 
crucial when we add some cost of fighting. Second, incomplete information games 
may produce multiple equilibria, thus bargaining does not offer a unique solution 
and therefore sometimes it might be impossible to predict the final outcome. At 
the moment, we would like to say that this problem can be tackled using some 
prior assumptions or equilibrium refinements. There is a vast literature in game 
theory about these refinements.
There are some alternatives to the two period models with one-sided asym­
metric information in strategic form games. Fudenberg and Tirole analyse the 
problem of two-sided incomplete information. Myerson and Satterthwaite [66] 
analyse the general conditions in which the equilibria of a bargaining game is 
inefficient when the valuation of both participants is unknown.
There is no clear explanation why both parties should stop bargaining when 
they reach the end of second period without agreement. Fudenberg Sz Tirole 
, [67] explained the existence of a finite horizon by introducing a fixed bargaining 
cost per period, or by giving the participants the opportunity to bargain with 
someone else if they become too pessimistic about the gains from trade with the 
current partner.
Sobel and Takahashi [68] presented a multistage model of bargaining with 
one-sided offers between a seller and a buyer. The seller’s ability to make com­
mitments affect the outcome and there are different equilibria with and without 
commitment. Cramton [69] presented also an infinite horizon model with two- 
sided information uncertainty. He explored how timing and information affect 
the behaviour or rational agents when they cannot commit to a given strategy.
CHAPTER 2. FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT 62
Incomplete information may not be the only source of inefficiency in bargain­
ing. Fernandez and Glazer [70] addressed this question. Their model is based 
in a wage negotiation between a union of workers and a firm. The union has to 
decide whether or not to strike in each round for the length of the negotiations 
in that period. They show that there exists subgame-perfect equilibria in which 
the union engages in a succession of strike periods until agreement is reached at 
time T.
In previous models, strikes or delays in agreement worked as signalling devices. 
But in this model, there is an old wage that the union will loose if it chooses to 
strike, and the firm will loose its profits. Thus the decision to strike is costly for 
both parties. Some of the equilibria are Pareto-inefficient. This occurs when the 
union starts with a very high wage demand, to which the firm responds with a 
very low wage offer. Both parties reduces their claim in successive periods until 
they reach an agreement. In every period the union strikes, however, even if both 
know the outcome, and would be willing to avoid the cost of industrial action, 
no one can deviate from the equilibrium path. Otherwise, any attempt to reach 
an early agreement would affect negatively the deviating party.
The Folk Theorem
The case above is an example of how conflict can occur without informational 
asymmetries. It is worth to say that, somehow, the model implies an infinitely 
repeated game with no discount factor after agreement is reached. Although we 
concentrate in the effect of asymmetric information in the likelihood of conflict, it 
is worthwhile to look briefly at the effect of infinite repetitions in the equilibrium 
outcome of these games.
Suppose that we repeat infinitely a game such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
all the actions from previous stages are observed in the present stage. Summing 
all the discounted payoffs does not provide a useful equilibrium concept because
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any number of initial rounds can be easily sacrificed in order to ensure future 
cooperation.
The implications of this problem are better explained by the Folk Theorem, 
Rasmusen [71].
In an infinitely repeated n-person game with finite action sets at each 
repetition, any combination of actions observed in any finite number of 
repetitions is the unique outcome of some subgame perfect equilibrium 
given
C ondition 1: The rate of time preference is zero, or positive and 
sufficiently small: and
C ondition 2 : The probability that the game ends at any repetition is 
zero, or positive and sufficiently small; and
C ondition 3 (Dim ensionality): The set of pay-off combinations 
that strictly Pareto-dominate the minimax payoff combinations in the 
mixed extension of the one-shot game is n-dimensional.
This may have many implications for the study of conflict. If participants 
perceive the conflict as an infinitely repeated game, the expectation of future 
gains may encourage players to take some costly actions in the present. It can be 
also used to explain the origins of cooperation since the fear of future retaliation 
can deter a player from using other than cooperative strategies.27
2.4.4 Bargaining with cost
One of the main characteristics of conflict or war is that it entails very high 
costs. Rubinstein refers to two sub-families of models in his’ original model of 
bargaining.
27We have already mentioned some papers where punishing greedy players can be viewed as 
an evolutionary stable strategy.
CHAPTER 2. FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT 64
1. Fixed bargaining cost: i’s preference is derived from the function y — Cit, i.e. 
every player bears a fixed cost for each period,
2. Fixed discounted factor: i’s preference is derived from the function y • S-,
i.e. every player has a fixed discounting factor.
Most developments in bargaining don’t include the cost per period. These 
models of bargaining have normally one main type of cost which is the cost of 
delaying agreement. War could be understood as a costly negotiation process. In 
this case the Coasian properties of these models would cease to work. We have 
also seen in the previous models that Pareto-inefficient outcomes are possible. 
We would expect (as will be shown in following chapters) that introducing a new 
type of cost would affect these strategies.
Accounting for the cost of conflict is a task that has largely escaped to 
economists. It is difficult to account empirically for all the factors that can be 
classified as absolute or relative; direct or indirect. Accounting for the indirect 
cost of war is the most problematic issue. During war, the population suffers not 
only from casualties in battle but also from diseases during mobilisation, war- 
induced famine, epidemic and decline of birth rate. There is a direct destruction 
of capital and labour by military action, destruction of markets and foreign trade, 
displacement of resource, hysteresis and other supply side effects. Finally there 
is a loss of public liberties and an accumulation of power in the government that 
may have long term effects in the internal politics.
However, this problem shouldn’t be difficult to solve in theory. We are going 
to review a couple of models that have introduced cost in a bargaining game 
scenario.
Bargaining and Destructive Power
Bargaining procedures tend to ignore the possibility that participants may take 
actions to affect the bargaining by destroying part of the feasible set. Dasgupta
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and Masldn [72] explore the destruction power in a model of bargaining between a 
union and a firm, in which each party is capable of inflicting some damage to the 
other party. The workers can neglect the firm’s equipment and in turn, the firm 
can replace its technology for a technology less favourable to the workers. This is 
an interesting point. In damaging the other party, one does not need to damage 
oneself. Conflict can take many shapes, and the technology of conflict should 
take into account this kind of destructive power. Unfortunately, most part of the 
research in conflict success functions has been directed to the formulation of some 
formal relations between inputs into conflict activities and output expressed as 
a probability of winning. The ability to direct the cost asymmetrically has been 
neglected by most part of the literature on ‘contest success functions’ .
The model of Dasgupta and Masldn considers a union of workers and a firm 
have to negotiate over hours of work (L) and wages (IT). The vN-M utility 
function for the union is:
U =  W 5( 1 -  L)* where 0 < L <  1 and IT >  0, 
and the firm utility is:
V — 'K — W
Where 7r is the firm’s revenue. It is determined by labour hours and installed 
capital (A") such that
'  L i i L < K  
K i i L > K
where K  is given initially. If A  > 1, the set of efficient pairs (U,V) is given 
by the straight line
V  - 1 - 2 U
If no agreement is reached after the negotiations between the union and the 
firm, each party earns zero utility. This is the threat point which is represented
CHAPTER 2. FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT 66
at the origin of figure 2.5. The horizontal axis corresponds to the utility of the 
union (U) and the vertical axis to the firm (V ). The bargaining set is delimited 
by the straight line (A -B ).
Both the union and the firm, can engage in destructive activities that affect 
the bargaining set by deleting a part of it, where it is more favourable to the other 
side. For example, by not maintaining equipment, the value of K  can fall to a 
level where L > K.  The result of this action is the deletion of the top corner of 
the bargaining set in figure 2.5. The firm can also engage in similar activities by 
replacing its technology which will delete an area favourable to the union. The 
bargaining set reduces and the new efficient frontier is delimited now by the line 
(C-D).
Call Rq the initial bargaining set delimited by v — 1 — 2U, Rt the feasible 
set of utility pairs before move t(t =  0, 1, 2 .. .)  and (u, u) a pair of utilities that 
belong to R0.
The players move alternately. A move consists of deleting a portion of Rt of 
any size or shape up to a maximum area <5, and simultaneously proposing a point 
in the remaining set of utility pairs. The proposal is either accepted or rejected 
by the other party. Negotiations end when one of the participants accepts and 
offer or when the bargaining set reduces to zero utility.
Under perfect information, this game has a unique equilibrium in t =  0. More­
over, when the capacity to delete a portion of the bargaining set 5 is relatively 
small in relation to the set, the equilibrium offer (u*,v*) divides Ro in two equal 
areas.
Since we have seen some of the characteristics of the subgame perfect equi­
librium of the strategic approach in the previous models, we turn our attention 
to the axiomatic development.
Given a utility representation for each participant that satisfies the von Neumann-
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Figure 2.5: Bargaining with Cost.
The agreement between both participants is a point in the feasible bargaining set 
(Graph A) in the triangle (OAB). Both parties can reduce this set by imposing 
cost into the other side. This changes the efficient set from (AB) to (DC). Partic­
ipants can take a portion up to 5 of the bargaining set in each successive round. 
The bargaining set reduces to the rectangle RT in Graph B where R t-i  is the 
last deletion. The bargaining equilibrium is at the top right hand side corner of 
the set, (u*,u*). In Graph C we present a symmetric solution where <5i =  82. If 
participants have different deletion power <5i > 52 the solution would depend on 
the relative power of each participant (Graph D).
V
G raph C Graph D
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Morgensten axioms 28, let (u0, v q ) be the status quo or threat point and a feasible 
set of utility pairs called R. The solution will be a function F  of [R, (uQ, o^)] 
that gives a point in R.
F[R, (u0,u0)] =  (%v).
This solution requires several axioms. We have seen already in section 2.4.2 the 
criteria that should be satisfied in order to guarantee the existence of a Nash 
bargaining solution. In this model of bargaining with cost, the third axiom -  
also called the independence of irrelevant alternatives -  is substituted by another 
axiom called the deletion axiom.
The four axioms in a model with costly conflict that guarantee the existence 
of a Nash equilibrium are as follows:
A l  Invariance: Let [jR, (wo5^ o)] and [R! , (uo,^o)l be two versions 
of the same bargaining game; that is, they differ only in the 
units and origins of the utility function. Then [R, (wo,uo)] and 
[i?', (i£q,u')] are related by the same utility transformations.
A 2 Weak Pareto Efficiency: There is no («, v) € R such that u > u 
and v > v.
A3  Symmetry: Suppose that [R, (w0) ^o)] satisfies the properties:
1. U q =  V q
2. (u, v) E R if and only if (v,u) E R 
Then u =  v.
A3 Deletion: Let [R , (0,0)] be a bargaining game. If R is what re­
mains of R  when horizontal and vertical strips29 of equal area
28See appendix B.4
29Horizontal and vertical strips refer to a specific deletions of the bargaining set that have the 
properties of affecting the shape and size of the cake directing the destructive power towards 
the other participants.
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have been deleted, then neither component of F[R, (0,0)] exceeds 
the corresponding component of F[R, (0,0)].
The solution that satisfies axioms (A1-A4) bisects the bargaining set in two equal 
parts. It can be viewed as a generalisation of the conclusion of the strategic game. 
This suggests that there are many negotiation procedures that can support the 
same solution as long as the axioms are satisfied.
If the size of the cake(<5) that can be deleted at any time is small enough, and 
there are simultaneous demands, there is a symmetrical solution. The solution is 
quite robust to the timing of the game. This is based on the fact that strategic 
deletions reduce the feasible utility set to a rectangle. This is also responsible for 
the uniqueness of the game. Otherwise, weak discounting wouldn’t be a sufficient 
condition to guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium.
Finally, on many occasions parties differ in their destructive power. The rela­
tive power to damage the interest of its rival at each player’s disposal influences 
the outcome of the negotiation moving the equilibrium outcome toward the area 
that benefits the participant with more destructive power.
In Dasgupta and Maskin the destructive power is exogenous. They don’t 
consider either the destructive activities that would damage the bargaining set by 
an overall reduction of its size. And finally, although the intuition is different, the 
bargaining procedure and its features are quite similar to Rubinstein’s bargaining 
model. This could be eventually exploited by adapting the discounting factors 
of Rubinstein to account not only for impatience but for the extra resources 
destroyed at each period.
Markov perfect equilibrium in a model with destructive power
A condition for the use of destructive strategies by rational players is that this 
activity leads to increases in the expected payoffs of the players using it. In the 
next model, although the decision to harm is endogenous, harming power is given
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exogenously. This is one of the missing features of this model. As far as conflict 
modelling is concerned, we should also design a mechanism for the allocation of 
resources to the increase or decrease of destructive power. The following model 
applies to wage negotiations between firms and unions, where unions can reduce 
the profits by striking. This kind of activity does not require any investment in 
appropriation technology.30
Manzini [73] proposes a model of bargaining between a union and a firm over 
the firm’s profits. The union can affect the size of those profits by engaging in 
destructive activities. The union commitment to a specific destructive action 
affects the equilibrium outcome increasing its payoff according to its harming 
power.
Manzini focuses on Markov strategies. These imply that that at each node a 
player chooses the action independently of the history of the game except for the 
immediately preceding action and depend only on the state of the game.
In this model the state of the game is defined as the size of the pie TTn after a 
number of deletions n. If cn is the amount of damage that can be imposed at any 
n time, then Kn =  1 — ]C£o cm - The state of the pie reveals how many times 
the union has struck in the past.
In a bargaining game of alternating offers in which the worker can 
harm after every rejection of the firm, if cn < 5 cn+j+i52i V n, 
there exist two m.p.e, which I  will call “harming equilibrium” and 
“Rubinstenian equilibrium”, respectively, in which agreement is reached 
immediately either on the “harming” equilibrium partition:
30Alternatively, both parties can engage in costly activities that require different levels of 
investment. Typically the firm could resort to bribing local police and politicians, use the Mafia 
to intimidate workers and run expensive advertising campaigns to influence public opinion and 
workers against their representatives. The union can in term set up picket lines, demonstrations 
and actions of sabotage. The legal framework normally prevents this kind of activity which 
would produce such high cost of society. However, in these thesis we have decided not to tackle 
situations with exogenous commitment
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1 / infty \ r / irc/iy
1 1 - - ^  ~2i I 0 / n  ^ X2i
i=0 / \ i=0
or on the C{Rubinstenian,> equilibrium partition:
tuyere in each partition the first entry is the share received by the 
union, and the second entry is the share received by the firm
There are two equilibria. In the (‘Rubinstenian equilibrium” the union chooses not 
to harm. However, in the “harming equilibrium” the union achieves its maximum 
payoff which is directly proportional to its harming power. The harming equilib­
rium must satisfy two conditions: a) rule out deadline effects and b) a credibility 
constraint. In order to satisfy the first condition the union can alternate any 
sequence of harms of any size as long as it does not exhaust the whole pie. The 
second condition is more restrictive since -in order to be credible- any harming 
structure at any time must be less than the present discounted sum of all future 
damage.
Given the existence of a credible harming structure, this model shows that 
the ability to destroy part of the pie can be exploited in a negotiation process 
since it increases the cost of rejection to the other participant. Compared to the 
bargaining model of Rubinstein, the harming power acts as if we increase the 
other participant’s rate of time preference. Compared to repeated bargaining 
games, which predict a continuum of equilibria, this models produces only two 
equilibria.
This shows how the ability to inflict cost on the other participant affects bar­
gaining power. This should be taken into consideration when looking at models
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of rent seeking activities. That is to say, given that the ability to damage the size 
of the pie produces some advantage in bargaining, how much power should we 
have, and how many resources should we dedicate to it? These are the questions 
that we will try to answer in the next chapter.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have explained the background theories that constitute the 
main focus of this thesis. That it to say, the allocation of resources to conflict 
(destructive and non productive activities) and the negotiation process that takes 
place in order to distribute these resources.
In section 2.2 we have presented the main strategic considerations and prin­
ciples guiding behaviour in conflict. In section 2.3, we looked at the allocation 
of resources to non-productive activities and in section 2.4, we studied models of 
bargaining and negotiation. The papers reviewed are found mainly in the litera­
ture of political economy, public choice and game theory. Although this is not an 
exhaustive review of the latest literature in these fields, when brought together, 
they lay the foundations for the theories of conflict that we are going to present 
in the next chapters.
Chapter 3 
Conflict with complete 
information
Game theory models have been used to explain the strategic interactions of two 
countries involved in arms races and other strategic situations. They have also 
been used in political science to explain the causes and determinants of war. 
However, in most part of these studies, security doesn’t have micro foundations. 
It depends directly upon the amount of weapons or military capability that each 
country in dispute have. For example, In Levine and Smith [74] security for a 
single country depends directly on the excess of weapons that this country has 
in relation to what is the minimum amount needed to successfully defend from a 
potential attack. Combining both security functions with the respective budget 
constraints for each country, we can draw a feasible mutual security region. Two 
reactions functions can also be drawn. Those functions are derived from the 
optimal allocation between consumption and arms given the budget constraint 
and the security functions that we have already mentioned. If the resulting 
equilibrium lays on the security region there is a peaceful outcome.
However, although security is one of the key factors in conflict analysis, it will 
be a concept of marginal relevance in our approach because the decision to fight
73
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will be derived endogenously.
In this chapter we examine the strategic interactions of two countries that try 
to maximise their respective incomes and the subsequent equilibrium of resource 
allocation between conflictive and productive activities. We introduce bargain­
ing theory into a well know framework of conflict whose initial development was 
produced by Haavelmo [75] and has been further developed by the work of Hir- 
shleifer [44] and Skaperdas [45, 46].1
Assume that two countries are confronted by a basic incompatibility which 
is the partition of a desirable scarce or limited resource. In order to have some 
understanding of the strategic interactions of those two agents other assumptions 
about the characteristics of the conflict must be made.
We shall concentrate in the economic aspects of conflict in order to simplify 
our models. Assume that the contesting states, despite being subject to internal 
struggles react in a uniform way under external threat.2
Every game will have some basic elements. The first element is the players. 
We are going to refer to independent countries not involve in any sort of alliances. 
The fundamental assumption about the players in a game concerns rationality 
and common knowledge. Rationality in this context means that players maximise 
their utility and all players are aware of the rationality of the others. In many 
economic models of conflict this utility is given in terms of income or consumption 
only. For some models of arms races utility depends on consumption and another 
variable called security. This is a perfect example of how those assumptions 
can be modified in order to explain some form of conflict. We can extend our 
model introducing many other variables such as power, glory or revenge into our 
utility function. However, since it is our purpose is to study the general strategic 
considerations of a model of conflict, it is better to keep the assumptions as 
simple as possible. Our countries will only be concerned by maximisation of
1See chapter 2.2.
2For a model of internal and external linkages see Simon and Starr [76]
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their respective incomes.
The number of players in a conflict is normally two. Game theory mod­
els can cope with more than two players, however empirical evidence suggests 
that before a conflict takes place, there is always a complex system of alliance 
formation that typically produces a two player situation.
The second element of a game is the strategy space. Players facing different 
strategies choose one that strictly dominates the others. In a model of conflict the 
most basic strategy space consists of a war strategy and/or a deterrence strategy. 
This is a principle by which players allocate resources into the production of 
goods and services and military procurement.
The third element is a payoff function. This function gives a utility value 
for each combination of strategies.
Finally, there is the environment and structure of the game. Games can 
be one-shot game played at the same time or not. There can also be different 
moves before the payoffs take place and it can have a dynamic structure or be 
a repetition of the same game. A very important element of the environment is 
the information set. This is the knowledge available to each player.
Different combinations of these elements will result in a equilibrium out­
come.
According to the kind of environment game theory models have been classified
as:
© Static games of complete information
• Dynamic games of complete information
• Static games of incomplete information
® Dynamic games of incomplete information.
Most part of the literature describes conflict as a contest in which non pre­
play agreement can be taken. Therefore some of these games are also described as
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non-cooperative games. In this article we will not distinguish between cooperative 
or non cooperative situations. We will use, instead, the concept of cooperation 
developed in Skaperdas work. We start with a non cooperative situation and find 
the necessary conditions that make cooperation the optimal strategy.
Information plays a crucial role in conflict. Due to the assumption that 
player’s utility comes only from income maximisation, in a game of complete 
information, there is no possibility of war since it is dominated by any negotiated 
settlement. The rationale is that war imposes such a high cost in the loosing side 
that it would be better to surrender and obtain some income that the winning 
side will give away in order to also avoid its cost. However, we can always con­
struct a model similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma where given the payoffs and 
strategies, the equilibrium outcome is to fight even if both players could gain 
from committing themselves to a peace strategy. It is important to understand 
the distinction between the concept of equilibrium of a game, when both play­
ers have no incentive to deviate from their strategies, and crisis stability. These 
crises can have a variety of forms such as war and arms races which might be the 
equilibrium outcome of a game.
3.0.1 Skaperdas concept of full cooperation
Assume that players do not have any specific structure to coordinate their play or 
in other words, there are no pre-play binding agreements. But before strategies 
are chosen players may communicate costlessly. In many cases, it is rational for 
players to cooperate by coming to an agreement. This is one of the main features 
of conflict in human societies3 .
Skaperdas [45, 49] shows that cooperation is possible in a model of resource 
allocation in the absence of property rights. The main aspect of this model 
is that it doesn’t assume any specific functional form for conflict technology.
3 See Ridley [77] or Axelrod [20].
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Skaperdas restricts his model to the analysis of the signs of the derivatives of 
conflict technology and production technology. In that situation the result can 
be applied to many different circumstances.
In his model we have two player that must divide a unit of resource between 
production and contest.
1 =  xi +  2/1 and 1 =  x 2 +  y2 ;
The resources dedicated to productive activities and to conflict are respec­
tively, Xi and t/j. By allocating more resources to conflict we might increase the 
probability of winning, but we are also decreasing the amount produced with 
those resources. Therefore, the payoffs are a function of common production and 
probabilities of winning:
For player 1;
V 1{yh y2) =  p((yi, y2)C {1 -  y i , l  -  y2)
and player 2;
V 2(yu 2/2) =  [1 -  p((s/i, y2))C(l —  2/1,1 —  y2)
where p(-) is the appropriation technology and C(-) is the production technology. 
The production function has constant returns to scale and is twice differentiable. 
The signs of the derivatives for production function are:
C — C(x 1, £2); ^ >  0; cn < 0; — ^  0 and finite.
c2
The context success function gives the probability of winning related to players 
respective fighting efforts.
P(y1, 2/2) +  P(V2, 2/i) =  1 or p(yu y2) =  1 -  p(y2, yx)
where p is the probability of success. And pi and pn are respectively the first
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and second order derivatives of the winning probabilities of player 1.
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Pi (2/i, 2/2) = -P2(?/2,Pi);
P n iv u V i )  =  - £ 22(2/2 , 3/1 );
£ 12 (3/1 , 2/2) =  - £ 12(3/2 , 3/ 1 );
There are some necessary assumptions about the signs of the derivatives for 
the existence of a unique equilibrium other than (yl3 y2) =  (1, 1), which means
that players spend all their resources in fighting. Those assumptions are based
on the following form that the first and second derivatives should take:
1) 0 < pi < 00 and — 00 < p2 <  0;
2) pu > 0 as yi < y2 and p il < 0 as yx < 0
3) P11 < pf
4) p (l -  p)pi2 +  (2p -  l)pip2 =  0 ;
This not only guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium but also is consistent 
with some conventional beliefs about the importance of strategic advantage in 
various contexts. For example, the winning probability increases in each player’s 
own strategy and decreases in the other player’s strategy. Also, it is easy to 
increase one’s power when is lower than the opponent’s and more difficult other­
wise.
A point of full cooperation happens whenever s*(yi: y2) =  (0,0), is the optimal 
strategy. It means that neither party allocates resources to conflict technology. 
By maximisation of the payoff function he derives the following condition for full 
cooperation or in another words the condition for a non armed equilibrium,
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2p1(0, 0) < C i(0, 0) 1 - 2^  (0, 0)
l - 2 Pl(0,0) -  C2(0,0) “  2Pl(0,0)
This condition states that a non armed equilibrium is more plausible 
the closer the ratio of marginal products of two countries and the more 
inefficient is the conflict technology.
In many cooperative games it is taken for granted that players can write what­
ever contracts they choose and that these contracts will be totally binding on 
the players (this is a basic condition for a cooperative game). In International 
Relations there are only a few cases in which such contracts may take place. For 
instance, a hegemonic country may take the function of sanctioning and moni­
toring those agreements. For this article we assume that countries do not have a 
precommitment mechanism, these contracts do not take place, and therefore we 
use the idea of cooperation suggested by Skaperdas.
3.0.2 The model of Hirshleifer as a long run equilibrium 
model
One of the most simple and at the same time elucidating models of conflict 
is Hirshleifer 1995. He introduces a framework to model conflict with micro 
foundations and specific functional forms.
We have already said that games consist of some basic elements. Following 
this classification Hirshleifer presents the following analytical choice: There are 
two players, Country 1 and Country 2, each contesting a common resource that 
it is normalised to unity. The decision facing each country is how much of that 
resource should they convert into fighting effort and how much into productive 
effort. The difference in fighting effort determines the probability of each party 
winning the conflict. The function that relates fighting effort to the probability of
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winning the conflict is called the contest success function (CSF). This is central in 
an economic theory of conflict. The CSF together with the production technology 
generate the set of payoffs from which the players make their choices. In order to 
maximise income we have to decide how many resources we dedicate to production 
and how many to conflict.
In a more general framework the optimising strategies can be of two kinds: 
A war strategy, in which we have a competitive advantage from maximising our 
fighting effort, or a deterrence strategy in which we maximise the production given 
a security constraint. In equilibrium the marginal profit of capital investment and 
the marginal profit of fighting effort have to be equal to their marginal costs. This 
is the utility maximising condition when utility is only generated by income.
According to Hirshleifer there are only two forms of CSFs. In the first one 
the outcome depends upon the ratio of fighting efforts.
P i  =  f P i ) m 
P2 \F2J
i.e., since pi +  p2 =  1, we have:
J-j'TTb JfpTTt
Pl =  F™ +  F2m and P2 =  F{n +  F2m (3-1)
Equivalently, in the second form of CSF, the outcome depends upon the difference
Pl =  l  +  e x p I i ^ - F i ) ]  and P2= 1 +exp [ k f r - F ? ) }  ^
This can be interpreted as a resource control rule. The proportions of a 
common resource that each party achieves is given by px and p2 . The aggre­
gate resource is R =  Rx +  R2 and the resource partition equation is Ri =  piR. 
Therefore, each contender divides the available resources between fighting and 
productive effort R4 =  a^Ei +  biFi
The ai and b{ can be interpreted as unit conversion cost (assumed constant) of 
transforming resources into productive effort or into fighting effort, respectively. 
Hirshleifer (1995) works out the fighting and productive intensities using the first 
form of CSFs.
Normalising with respect to resources.
E ■ F-
/ , - £  (3.3)
£hi
Using first form of CSF, then from 3.1 and 3.3 and Ri — piR we have:
pi =  / w r
P2 \ f 2 R 2 )  \ f 2 P2 J
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,/W(.-™> /M
— = 1  — 1 or m =  —rr—
V2 \ h )  or P1 =  7 F T W  ( 3 '4)
where, for convenience, define ro /(l — ro) =  M.
The player i chooses the fighting and producing intensities in order to max­
imise income Y , given the production function,
Vi =  F ?  =  (eiRi) hj h <  1 (3.5)
and subject to
cnei +  hfi — 1 (3.6)
For Country 1 we then have:
max Yi =  E'l =  (e1Rl)h =  (ei p,R)h =  (3-7)
The reaction curve for Country 2 is calculated in the same way. Assuming that 
h =  1 (constant returns to scale), the first order conditions for this optimization
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problem lead to:
M
Reaction Curve for Country 1 RC\ =  -Aj — j—z—  (M  +  1)
h  b i n
f M MReaction Curve for Country 2 RC2 — - j =  j—z—  (M  +  1) (3.8)
Ji b2j 2
The solution of / i  and f 2 for a symmetrical conflict equilibrium is : 
and
1 / v 1 f ,  m \  2 /I - m\ s .d  =  e +  2 =  -(1  — bf) =  -  (1 —   J =  -  (   j (3.10)
a a \  2 — 771/ a\2 — m/
In the symmetrical conflict both probabilities axe equal to a 1/2. Direct 
substitution leads to:
Y' =  ^ h = { - ^ n ) R) k (3'U>
From the result of equation 3.9 we conclude that the fighting equilibrium de­
pends upon two parameters m and 6. For an interior stable equilibrium the values 
of 77i must be between 0 < m <  1. The larger is the decisiveness coefficient and 
the smaller is the logistics cost coefficient the bigger are the fighting intensities. 
An increase in technology that affects both a, the production cost coefficient and 
b, the logistic coefficient produces a higher income and a higher fighting intensity.
There are two important assumptions. The first one is that resources are 
constant. And the second one is that there is perfect information so conflict 
never takes place.4 Rather than explaining conflict, this model explain which are 
the necessary but not sufficient conditions for conflict not to occur. If we relax
4Hirshleifer establishes two sufficient but not necessary conditions for sustainability. The 
first one is dynamic stability: m < 1. The second one is the minimum amount of resources 
required to sustain life or integrity for an individual or a group.: Y, >  y, 7 = 1,2
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those assumptions - constant resources and perfect information - we will have 
to deal with situations in which actual fighting occurs. According to Hirshleifer 
fighting takes place in three circumstances.
First, whenever we have some utility in conflict. This can be a very realistic 
situation, nevertheless, more appealing to sociological or political science than 
to economist. Second, conflict may arise when there is incomplete or imperfect 
information about the pay-offs of the game. This is a very important case and 
we will dedicate to it a specific chapter of this article.
The third circumstance happens where there is a possibility of conflict arising 
from disharmonious opportunities . For instance when no sharing is allowed, the 
winning player takes the whole prize, and therefore there can be more incentives 
for war. There is nothing intrinsic in the structure of the game that induces to 
believe that this is the case. However we can always build a model of a specific 
game contemplating this kind of scenario.
The equilibrium outcome produced in Hirshleifer’s model can be understood 
as the steady state or long run equilibrium of allocation of resources between 
fighting and productive efforts. We are going from now on to be concerned with 
what happens in the short run, before a given allocation between fighting effort 
and productive effort can be altered.
Hirshleifer tries to describe a non-cooperative game without formalising the 
negotiation procedure. This is our starting point for our model of bargaining. 
We use the methodology developed by Rubinstein [62] and Binmore [65].
3.1 Bargaining
Our model of conflict is a development of these models of Hirshleifer and Skaper- 
das describing the optimal allocation of resources between fighting a producing 
activities. However, we make a distinction between two different situations. The 
first case is war. Any party can start a war without a previous agreement with
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the other party. But this scenario produces a high cost. (We also incorporate cost 
in a different way). The second scenario is agreement which requires a bargaining 
mechanism.
We tried to introduce bargaining theory into conflict in the simplest possible 
manner. In order to simplify we have to introduce some assumptions. Once 
the allocation of resources is produced, this creates a commitment so during 
the bargaining period parties cannot change this allocation. We assume that 
resources cannot be transfer from production to conflict technology once they 
have been allocated. Given this irrevocable allocation, the Nash static equilibrium 
provides a solution for this game. The situation is irrevocable until the next game.
Another element of our bargaining process is that agreement may take some 
time. (In some cases agreement may never take place). Neither Hirshleifer nor 
Skaperdas contemplate this possibility. But there is some historical evidence 
that in the case of war there are some previous negotiations. It is very normal 
that before war each country sends its ambassadors just before hostilities begin. 
There are also a number of spontaneous wars, generally more often in the case 
of internal war. But we do not know of two countries agreeing to share resources 
without a negotiation process. Diplomacy is a discipline that has been developed 
with the specific purpose of dealing with this issue in a rational manner.
Hirshleifer and Skaperdas never explain how the negotiation process takes 
place. For those authors, the winner of the context receives the total product as 
prize, or both players divide the prize according to their respective probabilities 
of winning.
In order to introduce a model of bargaining, we assume that there is a differ­
ence between winning the whole pie with probability ” p” and taking a part of it 
that corresponds to the proportion expressed by the probability of winning. The 
reason is that to get a partition of the pie, agreement of both parties is necessary. 
A party can delay agreement as long as he pleases. On the contrary, in order to 
get the whole pie with probability “p” , agreement is not required. However the
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pie reduces in size due to the consequences of fighting. The reduction is mainly 
due to a externality cost imposed by fighting.
In a model of bargaining conflict the two players must agree to share the unit 
of resource as in the previous models . In periods 1,3,5,... player one proposes 
shares (si, 1 — si), (s3, 1 — s3) .. .  and player two can accept or reject. In the 
second period player two makes and alternative offer. The game continues until 
one of the players accepts one offer.
Following Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky [63], we think of two basic mo­
tives that may induce parties to reach an agreement instead of bargaining indefi­
nitely. The first is that parties are impatient to reach the fruits of an agreement. 
So they prefer to have a given share now, rather than in next period. Each player 
has to weight the consequences of waiting for a possible better offer against ac­
cepting the existing one now.
The second motive for an agreement is that parties might prolong the period 
of negotiations indefinitely. It might be impossible to reach and agreement at all. 
In that case the unit of resource could be either enjoy by a third player or players 
might end up loosing the opportunity of jointly exploit the resource . This is a 
situation where there is a exogenous risk of breakdown of negotiations.
We are going to present a model of bargaining with fixed externality cost of 
conflict and a utility function that reflects preferences over time.
3.1.1 Time preference model
In the time preference model we construct a static problem that reflects a bar­
gaining situation. The status quo or threat point correspond with Hirshleifer 
model. But we have a choice of utility functions ux and u2 that reflects countries 
impatience. The set of possible agreements is given by
X  =  {(si, s2)\su s2 > 0, si +  s2 < 1} .
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This game cannot be represented only by the choice of X . We need some 
utility function with extra information about the preferences (impatience or risk 
aversion). For instance, in a international environment where countries have con­
siderable ongoing economic transactions conflict might also stop those activities. 
This might be a reason to be impatient. Later we will see how a country that 
has an economic advantage also has a stronger bargaining position by exploiting 
the others country’s time preference.5
S =  {(ul (si),u2{s2)) : s £ X }
We can specify the preferences over agreements and their timing. Each player 
can have a discount factor . The next task is to define the players bargaining 
strategies that take place in a determined way. A strategy f for a country is 
a sequence of rules where each rule f t  describes each player’s move at time t. 
Moves are made at points in time t =  1, 2, 3 . . .  n. As we mentioned above at any 
period 1,3,5 . . .  player 1 makes the offer so player 1 is starting the game.
The strategy might also depend on the entire history of the game up to period 
t. In period 1 player one offers a share of the pie (si, 1 — Si), Player two might 
accept or reject. In period two player two makes an offer and so on.
Finally, there are also a basic set of assumptions for the existence of a unique 
equilibrium:
1. There is a conflict of interest
2. There are mutually beneficial agreements
3. There are time indifferent agreements. For each player exists an agreement 
that represents the status quo agreement
5Note that in this model countries preferences are neutral towards other countries. For 
friend or enemies, the preferences could be represented as S = {(«i(si, s2),U2(s2, si)) : s € X }
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4. There is stationarity and monotonieity in time
5. Compensation is concave.
First, we are going to establish an arbitrary time limit of three periods. This 
idea of the time limit can have two alternative explanations. The first one is 
that there is a time preference frontier. This frontier could be established by 
discounting the value of expected income of a negotiated outcome up to the value 
of the expected income in case of fighting. Parties cannot expect to negotiate so 
long that they loose more utility than the externality cost of war.
A more simple approach is to think of an exogenous risk of war. Countries 
can look at past history and calculate the probability of war. We suppose that 
bargaining takes place for three periods with a settlement imposed by the respec­
tive probabilities of winning the war. Remember that dedicating resources to war 
is a long term commitment. If the bargaining period is long enough to change 
this commitment we will have to model another game.
The general model of bargaining by Rubinstein will take the following form:
Period three settlement (si, 1 — Si)
Period two. Country 2 offers a settlement (s2, 1 — £2)- For player 1 s2 is 
acceptable iff s2 > 6s i , where 6 is the discounting factor. So the equilibrium 
settlement for period 2 is: (sj, 1 — sj) =  (tfsi, 1 — 5s 1).
Period one. Player 1 offers a settlement (s , 1 — s). For player 2 (1 — 5) is 
acceptable iff:
1 -  s > 6(1 -  *£) = 6(1 -  * 1)
Then for three periods:
s* =  1 -  6 +  52sl (3.12)
So far there is no exogenous probability of breakdown. Therefore, we can 
extend the model to an infinity bargaining process.
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For player 1
1 -  =  - L - .  (3.13)
1 1 +  5’ 1 1 +  5 '
The final partition of the pie is independent of the fighting effort.
Does it mean that players should not expend any resources in fighting? The 
discounted value of getting sx at any time cannot be smaller than the expected 
value of a war strategy. It is this assumption that means conflict will not take 
place.
The problem now is that the solution is not a Nash bargaining solution. If 
player 1 does not invest any resources into fighting, player two can improve his 
expected payoff by building up an army and making a war that he will win for 
sure, getting the whole pie as a prize. Realising this problem, player one must 
invest some resources into fighting effort in order to prevent player two from 
attacking.
Consider, now the 3 period bargaining model followed by a conflict similar to 
the one explain by Hirshleifer. This model is more realistic because it encompasses 
two kind of models, on the one hand we have a period of negotiations, if a 
negotiated settlement does not take place, then , we will have to divide the 
resources by going into war.
This is a simplifying assumption. It can be argued that countries set up their 
expected last period of bargaining based on past history for similar conflicts. 
Gleditsch and Hegre [78] constructed a table of probabilities of breakdown of 
negotiations between different types of regimes based on the percentage of dyad 
years at war. 6
Those correspond in our model to the probabilities of breakdown in a single 
period providing that we normalise the length of the period to be equal to a year.
6We will review in the last chapter some models for estimating these probabilities
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The expected length of the bargaining would be equal to :
OO 1
(3.i4)
T — 0 v
for simplicity we assume that the probability of breakdown, q, is 1/3, and there­
fore the expected length of bargaining is 3 periods.7 
The sequence of events is:
• Period 0: Players commit resources to fighting and productive efforts.
(Ei,Fi ) and (E2,F2) independently.
® Period 1: Player 1 proposes shares Si and 1 — si for herself and player 2 
respectively . Player 2 either accepts ending the game or rejects.
® Period 2: Player 2 proposes s2 and 1 — s2 . Player 1 accepts or rejects.
• Period 3: War takes place due to lack of agreement leading to incomes 
p j ( l  -  7 ) and (1 - p i ) I ( l  -  7).
In this case pi corresponds to Hirshleifer Contest Success Function 3.1 for 
player 1. The externality cost, 7 , is expressed as a proportion of resources I  
destroyed by fighting. There reason of calling it a externality cost is that normally 
wars are not only problematic because of material destruction, but also because 
the human tragedy they bring about. Therefore we use Hirshleifer (1996) context 
success functions, production function and resource constraint.
1 =  A(E\/a+  E\,a) a(3.15)
Comparing to equation 3.5 income is jointly generated and there is no cost of trade 
or transactions. This function exhibit ‘constant returns to scale’ and contains
7We could make the model more realistic by using the probabilities of real conflict calculated 
by Gleditsch and Hegre
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other well known production functions according to the values of the parameter 
a .8 The contest success function is:
Pl =    h ryn  (3-16)
and the resource constraint: Ri ~  Ei +  Fi \ i =  1,2 Where F\ and F2 are
military expenditure and Ei and E2 production effort.
The model is solved by backwards induction ;
Period  3: Expected outcome imposed by the probability of winning the
conflict.
=  p j (  1 -  7 ) and s2 =  P2-I(l -  7 )
Period 2: Player 1 accepts s2I iff
S2I > 6pJ(l - 7)
Player 2’s optimal offer is s2 =  (5pi/(l — 7) iff
l - ^ > ^ ( l - p 1) ( l ~ 7 )
Period  1: Player 2 accepts 1 — Si iff
1 -  sx > 6(1 - si)
5* =  1 — <5(1 — S2) =  1 — <5(1 — <5pi.(l — 7 ))
Therefore the settlement is (s*, 1 — si).
In period 0 player 1 will commit some levels of Ex and T\ that maximises s\I
8In the range —00 < ^ < 0, as ^ approaches -0 0  the production function get closer to the 
Leontief technology. In the case that ~ approaches 0 the production function gets closer to a
Cobb-Douglas technology. For most part of the examples we will assume that a = 1, so both
inputs of production (E\,E2) are perfect substitutes.
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. We now derive the first order conditions for players 1 and 2. Both players try 
to maximize their income given the probability of winning the conflict Pi and the 
resource constraint Ri.
( l - S ) A ( E ^  +  E ^ ) a +  (3.17)
P(1 -  - y ) ~ F ^ A ( F a +  F a) a +  A(iJi -  Fx -  E0  
1+vFJ
max 1 - s \ I  =  5 A (E { la+  EHa) a -  (3.18)
V).r.t.E2,F2 1 V * )
“  7) — /\ ywA +  E y a\ +  \(R2 — F2 — E2) 
1+ ( n )  V '
which we can solve for the reaction curves RCX and RC2
Rci =  —L =  T   -^ —  f ------------------ (3.19)
' + f t )+*r] c*r + f t )
2 F T  [ ( - F T *  +  F F )  -  j p ’f * ( 5 ( l  -  7) ) ]  ( F f  +  '  '
There are no analytical solutions for the asymmetrical case. We can obtain
an analytical solution only for the symmetric case . This requires some prior
assumptions. Rubinstein model of bargaining is asymmetric in nature. The player 
moving first has always some advantage. Therefore, even if initial resources are 
equal, the outcome will always be different.
In order to arrive to an analytical solution some kind of symmetry must be 
introduced. This is done by assuming that both parties have equal chances of 
starting the game. In this case player 1 maximises:
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Then, we get two identical reaction curves with the following form:
Fi =  F2 — —mE
£J
52( 1 -  7 ) + (5 (1 -7 )1(1 — 5) +  52(1 — 7 ) 2 -  (5(1 - 7 )
where E — E\ =  E2. Lets call for simplicity
52(1 -  7) + 5(1-7)1(1 - 5 ) +  52( l - 7) 2 - 5 ( 1 - 7 )
Then, putting E — R — F,
F  = mRr]2 +  m rj
(3.21)
You can easily check that if we make the time preference parameter 5 =  1 
and the ratio of resources destroyed by conflict 7 =  0, we get the same solution 
as Hirshleifer(1996). i.e., 77 =  2 and
F = mR
1+771
Also we can do some analysis of the influence of 5 and 7 . Taking the derivatives 
of F with respect to both parameters we get
AmRdF
85 (4 +  2mr]y +L[2(l -  5) +  <52(1 -  7 )] [2 -  5(1 -  7 ) f  J
which is > 0, always positive
4 mR8 F
d'y (4 +  277177)2
—252(1 — 5) + -25L [2 (l-5 ) +  52( l - 7)]2 [2 - 5 ( 1 - 7 )]
which is < 0, always negative
A very simple conclusion of this model can easily be explained from the sym­
metrical case: the smaller is the discounting factor, the smaller the expenditure in
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arms. In other words, the more we value future consumption the more we invest 
in weapons. And also the higher is the fixed cost of war the lower is expenditure 
in fighting power. Thus, military expenditure has many similarities with capital 
investment. We do not get utility out of it, but we can get future consumption.
In this model we have introduced a fixed cost of fighting and a time preference 
mechanism that enforces agreement. If there is no time preference, people would 
be bargaining forever.
Now we turn to the asymmetric case, where one of the players enjoys the 
advantage of playing first. In order to consider the behaviour of the key variables, 
we run a few simulations using different values for a specific parameter while 
holding the rest of the parameters constant. These simulations use different 
versions of the Matlab program set out in appendix C.l.
By setting <5(the discount factor) and 7 (the externality cost) equal to zero 
and one respectively, we produce the same Nash equilibrium as in the Hirshleifer 
model.
If players have 100 units of initial resources the allocation to military capa­
bility will be Fi — F2 — 50 and the corresponding income for both parties also 
equals 50. We report simulations varying some of the parameters in the model. 
We plot different values on the x axes of the following parameters: 6, the time 
preference, or discounting factor: m the combat decisiveness parameter, and 7 
the cost of conflict expressed as a proportion of resources.
Resources are expressed on the y axes. We perform simulations with sym­
metric resources; i.e, initial resources for player 1 =  player 2 — 100, and with 
asymmetric resources, player 1 =  100, player 2 =  200.
The plotted values correspond to the optimal allocations in fighting Fi and 
F2, and the resulting equilibrium incomes.
Figure 3.1 shows how increases in 6, the time discounting factor, affect expen­
diture in arms positively and so reduce the equilibrium income of both parties. 
However the relative ratios of income of both players are constant.
Table 3.1: Baseline Parameter Values
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Country 1 Country 2
a — 1
m =  1
So h-* II h-i O o R2 =  100
0 <  St <  1 0 < 62 < 1
-2 II o to 7 =  0.2
Sheet2 Chart 2
The cffocts of time preference changes
eft tinges In l(d d ta )
Page 1
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium outcomes: The effect of the discounting factor (delta)5.
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ShoeM Chart 1
Conflict and Combat declslvlno33
—♦—FI 
—«~ F 2  
—'>*'incom©1 —i^-'lncom©2
m
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium outcomes: The effect of combat decisiveness 0 < m <  1.
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In figure 3.2 combat decisiveness has no ambiguous interpretation. For income 
maximising agents the bigger the difference needed in fighting capability to win 
a war, the lower is the investment in weapons and the higher is the resulting 
income. This result might have some implications in order to analyse efficient 
procurement policies. Those policies that invest heavily in R &; D might be 
biased toward a military concept of security in detriment of economic efficiency 
and security. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the effect produced by an increase in
Sheets Chart 1
Page 1
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium outcomes: The effect of 7
cost. This gives very interesting results. If the externality cost is very high, 
the party that has the advantage of starting will take most part of the resulting 
income. According to this graphs we need to reconsider the role of context success 
functions in the allocation of resources.
The strategies consistent with conflict are of two kinds:
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Conflict with Asymmetric Resources
0 0.1 02. 0.3 0.4 a s  0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Cost of conflict
2
In comot 
- lncomo2
Figure 3.4: Asymmetric Resources. Player 1 starts the game with twice as much 
resources than Player 2. Ri =  100 and R2 — 50.
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® Bargaining 
• War
CSF map expenditure in fighting resources with the probability of winning a 
contest. However, the partition of resources not only depends on the outcome of 
conflict but also in the cost of it. When we focus on the economic aspects, the 
key question about conflict might not be what is the probability of winning, i.e., 
deterrence is important for defence. Instead, it could be how much damage can 
I inflict on my enemy and how much bargaining power can I derive from it. This 
is fundamental in every conflict and we should pay more attention to it.
We should use a new concept of security that is directly related to economic 
optimisation or to a cost-benefit analysis.
3.1.2 Models with risk of war
We have already introduced the idea of the existence of exogenous risk of break­
down when we decided the expected length of the bargaining period. The bar­
gaining process can be also be modelled so this exogenous risk is the driving force 
towards settlement. The model is essentially the same. We complement the time 
preference parameter 5 by a constant probability of breakdown which is equal to:
q( A) =  1 — e-AA
Settlement takes place determined by their respective probabilities of winning 
the war pil. This game can be represented by the following lottery:
(pi, At) =  (1 -  q(A)YpiUi(I) © [l -  (1 -  q(A)Y] piui( /) (  1 -  7 )
We have to developed a model where the final stage is not predetermined. 
The procedure is exactly the same, however, this time we introduce the constant
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probability of negotiation breakdown into the model. In the first simulation we 
excluded 7 , the proportion of the pie lost due to the externality cost. Then we 
redo the models including both the cost of fighting and an exogenous risk of 
breakdown..
We calculate the outcome of the game using backwards induction for two 
hypothetical cases, when the game finish in period three and period four and 
then we extend it to an undetermined number of periods. In the table 3.2 we can 
see the share in a three period game.
To solve for the equilibrium of this game we proceed by backward induction. 
Starting with:
Time Player 1 Share Player 2 Share Offers
Period 3 s 1 — s imposed settlement
Period 2 s2 1 — 52 offer by player 2
Period 1 Si 1 — Si offer by player 1
Table 3.2: The bargaining process
Period 3, The outcome is imposed by war or settlement (5, 1 —  5)
Period 2 is equivalent to Rubinstein’s bargaining game. We follow the same 
procedure. Player 2 will offer no more than s2 >  5s. This offer, s2 =  5s, will be 
acceptable for Player 2 iff 1 — 5s >  5(1 — s). This is true because 1 > 5. Therefore 
§2 =  5s. There is no probability of breakdown q because they know for sure that 
period 3 is the last one.
P eriod  1 corresponds to an offer by Player 1. She wouldn’t offer more than 
the discounted valued of what player 2 can get in period 2, therefore:
1 — si >  (1 — tf)5(l -  s2) +q5(l  — s). Or, 1 — si =  (1 -  q)5(l — s2) +  q5(l -  s) 
It is acceptable to player 1 iff si >  (1 — q)5s2 +  q5s. Since
Then, the condition becomes:
1 >  (1 — #)(5(1 -  s2 +  52) +  q6 (s +  1 -  s)
That is,
1 > (1 - q ) 6  +  6 q
which is true because 1 >  <5
The bargaining equilibrium offer equals to:
si =  l -  (l -  q)S( 1 -  6s) -  q6( 1 -  s) (3.22)
It is easy to check that:
► taking us back to Rubinstein’s solution
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if q =  0;
=  1 -  5(1 -  5s)
We now extend the game to 4 Periods. Table 3.3 shows the offers at every 
period.
Time Player 1 Share Player 2 Share
Period 4 s 1 — 5
Period 3 s3 =  l — <5(1 — s) 1 — s3 =  (5(1 — 5)
Period 2 s2 =  (1 -  q)6s3 +  q6s 1 -  s2
Period 1 S\ == 1 -  [(1 -  q)6( 1 -  s2) +  #<5(1 -  s)] 1 -  5i
Table 3.3: The bargaining process
The optimal offer in period 1 from player 1 is :
s* =  l - [ ( l - q ) 6 ( l - s 2) + q 6( l - s ) ]
=  1 -  (1 -  q)6( 1 -  (1 -  q)6(l -  6 (1  -  s))) -  (1 -  q)q62s -  q6 ( 1 -  s)
=  1 — (1 — q)6  +  (1 — q)262 — (1 — g)2(53 — #d>(l — s) +  (1 — q)q62s
(3.23)
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Now we can extend the number of periods to an infinite number of periods as 
follows:
Period 1:
Period 2:
Period 3:
si =  1 -  [(1 -  q)8 ( 1 -  s2) +  qS( 1 -  5)]
s2 =  (1 -  q)8ss +  q8s
s3 =  1 -  [(1 -  g)<5(l -  s4) +  g<5(l -  s)] 
by substituting period 2 offer s2 into period 1 equation, we get:
Si =  1 -  [(1 -  q)5( 1 -  {(1 -  q)8s3 +  q8s}) +  qS( 1 -  s)]
and for any given period t, we get the general expression
st -  a  +  (1 -  q)262st+2 (3.24)
Where
a  =  1 — (1 — q)5 — <?<5(1 — s) +  (1 — q)q82 
— 1 — (1 — q)S — q5(l — s — (1 — q)Ss)
Then, we can solve forwards for period 1:
(3.25)
Si =  a +  (1 — q) 5 a  +  ( 1 — q) 8 a H-----
. = £  1 -  (1 -  q)S -  g^(l -  £ -  (1 -  q )S s ) ,0
1 1 — (1 — g )252 1 — (1 — (
Equation 3.26 is the equilibrium partition of resources. We can check that if we 
make the probability of breakdown equal 0 we go back to Rubinstein equilibrium.
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{if q — 0 s* =  as requiredif q =  1 s* =  1 — 5(1 — s) as required
3.1.3 Proof of SPE for finite horizon.
To prove that
„* _  «  1 -  { l - q ) 6 -  q 5 ( l -  s -  ( l - q ) 8s)
Sl 1 -  (1 -  q)2621 -  (1 -
is a unique perfect equilibrium we follow Fudenberg and Tirole (1995)
We obtain an upper bound and a lower bound on each player’s equilibrium 
payoff using the stationarity of the game. Then we show that those two bounds 
are equal. In order to exploit the stationarity of the game, we define the con­
tinuation payoffs of a strategy profile in a subgame starting a t to be the utility 
in time t units of the outcome induced by that profile. This corresponds with 
the time discounting factor and the probability of breakdown. In other words, 
waiting one more period each player is confronted with (1 — q)5x +  q8s lost of 
utility. Where x is the expected payoff and s is the outcome in case of conflict 
breakdown.
The lower and higher bounds for player 1 and player 2 are respectively
Hu v u  v 2, v 2
For player 1 at any subgame starting with his offer <
k Hi
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Also;
for player 1, at any subgame starting with player 2 offer < 
The upper and lower bounds for player 2 are equally defined,
W i
Mi
For player 2 at any subgame starting with his offer < ^2
—2
W 2
for player 2, at any subgame starting with player 1 offer <
M2
The minimum that player 1 can expect in each subgame started by player 1
is,
Hi < 1 — [(1 -  q)8v2 +  5#(1 — 5 )] 
H2 <  1 -  [(1 -  +  Sqs]
(3.27)
(3.28)
and for player 1 when player 2 offers is: W\ — [(1 — q)6v 1 +  5qs]. A similar 
equation can be found for player 2.
Player 1 highest equilibrium offer is:
Vi >  max[l — {(1 — q)Sv2 +  5c;(l — s)}; 5(1 — q)wi +  qs]
Vi >  max[l — {(1 -  ^)5t;2 +  ^ (1  -  5)}; 5(1 — <?){(! -  q)5vi +  5qs} +  5qs]
as neither 5 nor v 2 can exceed 1:
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max [1 — {(1 — q)5v2 4- <h?(l — s)}; <5(1 — <?){(1 — q)5vi +  <5gs} +  <5gs] =
1 _  [(i _  q)Sv2 +  6q(l -  s)]
The upper bound for player 1 is therefore:
Vi =  1 — [(1 — q)6v2 +  6q( 1 — 5)] (3.29)
by similar reasoning, the upper bound for player 2 is:
v 2 =  1 -  [(1 -  q)6vi +  6q( 1 -  5)] (3.30)
We have already establish the upper and lower bounds corresponding to both
players. Combining the four equations ( 3.27) (3.28) (3.29) (3.30) we can solve
for all the upper and lower bounds.
For player 1:
Hi >  1 ~ [(1 -  2)<5{1 “  [(1 “  q)6vi +  6qs]} +  Sqs]
U — 1—(1—g)2<52
o) >  i-(i-g)tf-fgri-«-(i-g)fa1
Since Ui < v i  =$■ Then Hi =  Vi □ (3.31)
3.1.4 The Reaction Curves
Finally, we proceed to find the reactions functions of both players by maximising 
with respect to expenditure in production effort and fighting effort,
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For Player 1
 X -  (1 -  g)S -  5g[l -  - ( 1  -  g)5aj r
1  -  ( 1  -  2
Where
and Player 2
s
subject to Ii =  Ri +  Ei (3.32)
T p m
—— i  =  A(Ep rn  p m  > V 1 2 J
max
1 -  ( 1 - ? ) i - 5 « [ 1  -  s - ( 1 - « ) £ s ] \
1 -  (1 -  ?)2<52 )
subject to I2 =  R2 +  E2 (3.33)
Where
Tpm
s = 7 = A [ E l  +  E l  r
The solution to the maximisation exercise is given by Matlab in figure 3.5: 
We can see that the omission of cost produces a completely different result. 
When no cost occurs, and there is no fixed last period, the higher is the probability 
of breakdown the closer we get to the Hirshleifer’s symmetrical equilibrium. This 
happens because the first party can exploit second players’ discounting factor. 
The game becomes, de facto, an ultimatum game.
Finally, we reproduce this model introducing the cost of war. We follow 
backward induction as before. In this case, for any period t, the offer from player 
1 will be:
St =  1 _  (1 -  q)S +  (1 -  q)252st+2 +  (1 -  q)qS2s( 1 -  7 )  -  y<5(l -  s )(l -  7 )  (3.34)
Let
a =  1 -  (1 -  q)5 -  qS( 1 -  7) +  s( 1 -  7) ((1 -  q)qS2 +  qdj
CHAPTER 3. CONFLICT WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION
Sheet) Chari J
Probability of breakdown In conflict and equilibrium outcomes
Series 1 
••J5«Series2 
— :“ Sori©s3 
♦**X**Sorios4
Pago 1
Figure 3.5: Exogenous risk of conflict.
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Then,
Solving forward,
st =  a +  (1 -  q)252st+2
=  a +  a(l — q) 5 +  a(l ~ q) 5 +
The equilibrium offer from player 1 in period t — 1 is therefore:
s , =1 1 - (1 -
The reaction curves for Country 1 and 2 are found by maximizing: 
For Country 1
max . .
w.r.t:Ei,Fi \^1 — (1 — q) 52
subject to Ri =  Fi +  Ei
and for Country 2
max f 1 -    ) I
w.r.t:E2,F2  ^ 1 — (1 — q)262 J
subject to R2 =  E2 +  E2
This gives the following reaction curves:
F, =
_  w££F£E^_(E? +  £ff)
( _ £!l 1 f prn j_ Pm\‘
V c F™+F™ j  1 *1  +  2 .)
(3.35)
(3.36)
(3.37)
(3.38)
(3.39)
(3.40)
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Where:
a =  1  — ( 1  -  q)5 — g<5(l — 7 )  +  s(l -  7 )  ((1  -  q)qS2 +  qct)
b =  1  — ( 1  — q)8  — — 7 )
c =  (1 -  7) ((1 -  q)q82 +  q8 j^
we also solved this problem numerically. The result of the simulation is pre­
sented in figure 3.1.4. The risk of breakdown has a similar effect to the effects 
produced by the cost of fighting. But if we compare this results to figure 3.1.1, 
we can easily appreciate that cost has a stronger impact on the final outcome. 
Basically, the strategic advantage of moving first is less important when there is 
some exogenous probability of breakdown of negotiations. Therefore, while most 
part of the literature concentrates on the probability of success, we still main­
tain that the cost of conflict is the parameter with the strongest influence on the 
strategic decisions of rational players.
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Figure 3.6: Exogenous risk with cost of fighting
A model with exogeneous risk of breakdown
Values of the probability of breakdown
3.2 Conclusions
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Introducing a model that allows parties to negotiate over the possible outcomes 
of an underlying conflict gives us some interesting results. The possibility of 
negotiations introduces a completely new scenario into the study of conflict, arms 
trade, and efficient allocation of resources.
When parties are allowed to negotiate, the corresponding equilibrium of mili­
tary expenditure is much lower compared to situations where negotiations cannot 
take place. The traditional idea that military security is a public good that de­
pends on the respective stocks of arms of two potential enemies may not apply to 
every conflict. In these cases where the cost of negotiating is very low, and coun­
tries have perfect or near perfect information, the concept of military security 
should be replace by economic security.
This model also introduces some interesting developments into Hirshleifer 
framework. The possibility of negotiating gives countries different allocation of 
resources than the ones predicted by the original models. This happens due to 
the fact that in the earlier models the cost of conflict has no strategic effect 
on the optimal allocation of resources. However, when countries are allowed to 
negotiate, the country that has an strategic advantage can exploit the amount of 
potential damage in his favour, producing different optimal strategies.
Finally, despite the obvious problems with the classification of the stylised 
facts, this model is consistent with some of the regularities that other authors 
have found.
• The decline of Major Wars, and the revolution in telecommunications to­
gether with the massive increase in productivity that some countries have 
experienced in the last decades is consistent with the optimising behaviour 
predicted by the model.
• The stylised facts about the probabilities of war between different kind of
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regimes, classified according to the free circulation of information is also 
consistent.
® The fact that not a single war has broken out between nuclear powers (due 
to the high cost) can also be explained if we introduce some negotiation 
procedure into our models of conflict. So far, the closest that we have 
been to the nuclear holocaust has been always due to information-related 
problems.
9 Some of the regularities about conflicts is that countries never go into war 
because of new militarized disputes. This indicates that countries try to 
avoid the cost of conflict by finding a negotiated settlement.
@ During the last period of high uncertainty in the international system, con­
flict seems to be at its peek.
• The amount of ethnic conflict, identity struggles, religious war and other 
problems that cannot be negotiated easily seems to be higher than conflicts 
related to disagreements about the partition of scarce resources. All these 
facts are consistent with the model that we have just introduced, and the 
one that will be presented in the next chapter.
We have presented a model with perfect information and optimal allocation 
of resources to appropriative and productive activities. At the moment, we have 
only presented an outlined picture of the importance of imperfect information. In 
the next chapter we are going to present a development that takes into account 
this problem. We are going to produce a model with endogenous conflict.
There are two obvious developments in relation to the study of conflict. First, 
we can introduce some changes to our production function
I  =  A(E\/a +  El/a)a.
CHAPTER 3. CONFLICT WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION 112
as explained in section 3.1.1. We did our simulations fixing the parameter ’’ a?” 
to be equal to 1. That give us an Income Frontier that takes the shape of a 
straight line. By increasing ” a ” we can easily introduce a concave Income Fron­
tier. That is the scenario that Hirshleifer calls “complementary and harmonious 
opportunities” .
The other aspects are players’ preferences. In our model players utility comes 
strictly and uniquely from the level of income obtained. People do not get any 
positive or negative utility from other players’ income. That is represented in 
onr model by two straight lines crossing the equilibrium point. Negatively sloped 
indifference curves reveal a degree of benevolence on each side. Also, positively 
sloped indifference curves would give a degree of malevolence, a country could 
get some disutility from increases in other country’s income.
Our extension of Hirshleifer model that includes a bargaining process comple­
ments the model in some aspects. First, we have allowed for an externality cost 
of fighting. Hirshleifer’s analysis derives mainly from the analysis of asymmet­
ric resources. His Paradox of Power is clearly a result of analysing asymmetric 
resources. If we introduce bargaining we arrive at very different results using a 
very similar model. Basically asymmetric resources do not explain at all the final 
outcome, whereas the externality cost of conflict plays a much more important 
role.
Chapter 4 
Conflict with incomplete 
information
4.1 Introduction to conflict and information
In this chapter we are going to present asymmetric information as the source of 
conflict. We must assume that players are rational. Some of the most deadly 
conflicts can be portrayed as highly irrational if we use the common or popular 
meaning of the term. We know that this concept depends in the information 
available. Therefore, the study of information and rationality are strongly linked.
There are two different kinds of explanations of war offered by political science 
rational models 1. This first one studies a scenario in which leaders are rational 
but overestimate their chances of military victory. The second argues that states 
may lack information about their adversary’s willingness to fight. This is directly 
linked to possible informational asymmetries in the cost of fighting. Our approach 
is closest to this second strand. We confront the problem from an economic 
perspective. The literature from which we draw includes public choice models of 
economics and conflict which focus on directly unproductive activities.
1See Fearon [79].
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We have already established the optimal allocation of resources between fight­
ing effort and productive effort. We have also shown how the model behaves when 
we introduce some changes to some of the parameters.
In graph 4.1 we have several figures representing different situations that 
may explain the sources of conflict from different forms of asymmetry. Figure
Figure 4.1: Asymmetric information: 1
(a) shows settlement when both parties have perfect information. The thick 
line shows all the possible combinations of outcome in case of settlement. It is 
the maximum outcome that can be obtained when both countries allocate their 
resources optimally. We will call it the Income Frontier. As we increase F\ and 
F2 , this line shifts to the left. Income for Country 1 is represented on the x ’ axis 
and income for Country 2 on the y ’s.
We have already shown how much the size of the triangle changes according to
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some different values of the parameters that we have studied in previous diagrams.
The point E is the threat point which depends directly on 7 , a parameter 
not present in Hirshleifer model. Here it is fixed and exogenous. This point 
reflects the externality cost of war. It is not only the value of destruction of 
material things but also lives, and other non material things. However, it also 
influences the amount of resources that both parties dedicate to war, reducing or 
augmenting Fi and F2 , the initial resources dedicated to fighting effort.
Increases in 7  -the externality cost of fighting- are shown in figure a as per­
pendicular movements in relation to the Income Frontier. Increases or decreases 
in 6 correspond to movements along this line. Finally, we simplify figure a by 
assuming that point G\ already takes into account the influence of 5, the time 
preference parameter..
Using this kind of diagram we can explain some cases of asymmetric informa­
tion. In our analysis we considered only asymmetric information about the cost 
of conflict, but there are other sources of conflict such us asymmetric preferences, 
opportunities, malevolent preferences or limited bargaining sets.
In figure (b) we have represented a special case of asymmetry. Country 1 
perceives a bigger externality cost that Country 2. That is represented by an­
other threat point, closer to the origin of the diagram. There is also a second 
Income Frontier to the right of the one perceived by Country 2. The bigger is 
the difference of distance ” a” to distance ” b” the high the prospect of achieving 
a peaceful solution.
Figure (c) and Figure (d) show a different kind of asymmetry. They do not 
perceive different magnitudes of 7 , but they think that cost is not symmetrically 
distributed. In this scenario one country perceives that the opponent bears much 
higher cost.
In figure c the asymmetry is not big enough to eliminate the Potential Settle­
ment Region. Both countries can adjust their shares on account of the potential 
gains of an agreement. In figure d there is not possibility of agreement; both
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countries will fight.
We must introduce incomplete information. However, one of the problems 
of games with asymmetric information is that the equilibrium outcome can be a 
result of the chosen assumptions regarding the bargaining procedure and infor­
mational asymmetries. The equilibrium concept changes whether there is a single 
country that makes offers or both. The equilibrium will change if the bargain­
ing process is extended to more than two periods. The valuation of the cost of 
fighting can be introduced in many different ways. Countries can be represented 
either as tough with low externality cost or soft with high cost. These factors 
feature prominently in our model.
Fudenberg and Tirole [80] draw the following conclusions about the effects of 
valuations and discount factors on the strategic behaviour of buyers and sellers 
in a model of bargaining with incomplete information.
First, a decrease in the buyer’s discount factor may make him bet­
ter off in spite of the fact that, being more impatient, he becomes 
more vulnerable to a high demand. We explained this phenomenon 
by the impossibility of commitment to take given actions (here to ac­
cept a compromising offer) which is required by the concept of perfect 
equilibrium. Second, increasing the contract zone (E.g., by making 
the seller more eager to sell) may increase the possibility of disagree­
ment. Third, if the buyer has complete information about the seller, 
the seller may charge a higher price in the second period than in the 
first; the buyer may nevertheless refuse such a first-period offer since 
there is the possibility that the seller is soft and will charge less in the 
second period. Fourth, increasing the number of periods may have 
surprising welfare effects: it can decrease efficiency even when the 
one-period game has an inefficient solution.
The message from Fudenberg and Tirole (henceforth F&T) is clear. We have
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to be very careful about general assertions about parameter changes and the 
effect on conflict. The solutions have to be treated within a specific context 
and the conclusions of our work should be interpreted carefully. Despite these 
caveats, models of game theory and conflict can give us important insights into 
the decision making process leading to the outbreak of war. They can also give 
us some indication of what would be consider optimal policies if we were facing 
an ideal world of rational players, even if rational behaviour is accompanied by 
problems of incomplete information.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
model and the set up for the game. Section 4.3 sets out the Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium for a given total income and a given end-of-bargaining settlement. 
This section is a generalisation of F&T to allow for any priors on the part of the 
less informed country. Section 4.4 closes the model by making output dependent 
on the allocation of resources to production and the settlement after bargaining 
(i.e. following a conflict) dependent on the allocation of resources to fighting 
(as in Hirshleifer [12]. Analysis in this section relies on numerical simulations. 
Section 4.5 provides conclusions and suggestions for future work.
4.2 The Model
Our model integrates two other models. The model of efficient allocation of 
resources of Hirshleifer [12] the model of bargaining with incomplete information 
by Fudenberg and Tirole [80]. It will set out to explain the foundations of conflict 
behaviour assuming rational income-maximising agents.
We consider two abstract players that have to divide a common scarce re­
source. We call those players Country 1 and 2, but it could be any other abstract 
players. We assume some change in the environment that breaks the previous 
equilibrium of forces. For example, assume that a new resource is found and it is 
arbitrarily distributed. Country 1 has found the resource and takes possession.
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Country 2 thinks that there is some potential to make some economic gain and 
makes a claim for a new redistribution of resources. Since Country 1 would be 
happy maintaining the status quo it has some strategic advantage. Therefore we 
give Country 1 the advantage of having the initiative (making the offers).
Both countries are rational and before fighting takes place, they will try to 
find a settlement avoiding the cost of war. Prior to the bargaining process, 
they have to decide in advance how to allocate their respective initial resources 
into production effort and fighting effort. This allocation is irreversible until the 
discovery of new resources.
After the allocation of resources, a new equilibrium takes place either by war 
or by settlement. Countries share the resources obtained in a common produc­
tion process and the output is distributed according to this new situation.2 Each 
participant balances between productive exploitation of the current resource base 
and acquisition of the results of production. Correspondingly, there are two sep­
arate technologies: a technology of production and a technology of appropriation, 
conflict and struggle.
Consider first the technology of production. We adopt a common CES func­
tion and the technology of conflict follow exactly Hirshleifer Production and Con­
test Success Functions.
I  =  A(E? + E ^ ) 1/a ^ f ( E 1,E 2)(4.1)
say, where I  is the jointly generated output, A is a technological constant and 
Ei and E2 are the inputs of production. This CES production function has 
an elasticity of substitution e =  and takes a variety of shapes depending
2Countries at war do not normally trade with each other. Some authors have studied the 
relation between trade and war. They found that countries with very high levels of trade do not 
normally make war, but once the war takes place it is normally longer and more devastating. 
For a review of those issues see Mansfield [81] and Gowa [82].
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on its value.3 In the case where a — 1 the production function is a simple 
linear function. As a  approaches to zero, e tends to unity and we have a Cobb- 
Douglas production function. As a approaches —oo, it gradually transforms into 
a Leontief technology.
The participants have an initial resource constraint given by:
Ri — FiA- Ei\ i -  1,2 (4.2)
for Country i where Fi is devoted to fighting and to production. A distinctive 
feature of our set-up is the inclusion of costs of war which are quantified differently 
by different countries. For Country 1 the cost of war in monetary terms is a 
proportion 7 of output I  and 7 is common knowledge. Country 2 may be one of 
two types, a ’tough’ country for whom the utility loss 7 is relatively low, and a 
’soft’ county for whom the utility loss is 7 where 7 > 7 . Country 1 does not know 
which type it faces and adopts priors v0 and 1 — t>0 that Country 2 is soft and 
tough respectively. In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE, these probabilities 
are revised as bargaining proceeds in accordance with Bayes Rule.
The two types of Country 2 will in general choose different allocations of total 
resources between production and fighting effort. Let the soft and tough countries 
choose E 2 and E2 respective. Total output is then given by the production 
functions I  =  f ( E i , E 2) and /  =  /(E i ,E ?) if Country 2 turns out to be soft or 
tough respectively, where f (E i ,E 2) is given by (1).
Now let us turn to the technology of appropriation which takes the form of 
Hirshleifer’s Contest Success Functions (CSF)3.4. Let the probability of Country 
1 winning the war be denoted by p =  g(Fi, F 2) and p =  g(Fi,F2) respectively for 
the two types of Country 2. Country 1 does not know for certain which type it is 
confronting and adopts an initial probability p — v0p +  (1 -  vQ)p. The functional
3 See Varian [83].
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form g(Fi,F2) of the appropriation technology follows the ratio variant,
F.M F™ ( a n\
Pi F^+Fff ’ F, 1 FF  ^  ^ ' '
The parameter M 4 is called the decisiveness coefficient and affects the degree to 
which greater fighting effort translates into battle success. The function captures 
how expenditure in fighting effort, (jF\, F2), translates into a certain probability 
of victory. For Country 2 the probability of victory is given by 1 — p and 1 — p 
for the soft and tough respectively.
The sequencing of events is first, countries commit to the allocation of their 
factors of production to output or fighting. This then determines the probabilities 
of winning a war for the two types of Country 2 and for Country 1 conditional 
on the type of Country 2 it faces. Second, bargaining takes place. As we have 
mentioned, we assume that Country 1 is the less informed player and makes the 
offers. After two offers either agreement is reached or a war ensues which Country 
1 can win with an updated probability p. In detail, the game in extensive form 
is given by the following sequence of events.
1). Country 1 has prior vq that Country 2 is soft. Countries simultaneously 
commit themselves to the resource allocation (Fi, Ef); i — 1,2 which determines 
expected output for Country 1, F[/|u0] =  v0I  +  (1 — w0)/, actual output I  and /  
for the two types of Country 2, and probabilities p, p and p.5
2). It is convenient to consider offers in the form of shares of output given by 
I  — I  if Country 2 is soft and I  — I  if Country 2 is tough. At the first stage of 
the bargaining process, Country 1 claims an amount Sil which corresponds to an 
offer of (1 — si)I  to the soft type of Country 2 and of I  — s il  to the hard type. 
Alternatively we can write the claim as an amount SiL which corresponds to an 
offer of I  — s i f  to the soft type of Country 2 and of (1 — Si)/ to the hard type.
4This parameter is defined for compactness asM  = m / (l-m ) following Hirshleifer [44]
5F 2 and F_2 are n°t observed by Country 1.
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(We confine ourselves to pure strategies for Country 1).
3). Country 2 accepts the offer with probabilities ri(si) and fi(s i)  for types 
7 (tough) and 7 (soft) respectively. Acceptance ends the game with single-period 
payoffs s i l  for Country 1 and (1 — si)I or /  — sN  for Country 2 of types soft and 
tough respectively. Otherwise we proceed to:
4). Country 1 updates its probability from v0 to 17.
5). Country 1 claims an amount s2I  which corresponds to an offer of (1 — s2)I  
to the soft type of Country 2 and of X — s2I  to the hard type.
6). Country 2 accepts the offer with probabilities r2(s2) and r2(s2) for types 
7 and 7 respectively. Acceptance ends the game with single-period payoffs s2I  
for Country 1 and (1 — s2)I  or I  — s2I  for Country 2 of types soft and tough 
respectively. Otherwise we proceed to:
7). War ensues which Country 1 wins with probability p =  vxp +  (1 — vx)p. 
Soft Country 2 expects to win with probability 1 — p and the tough country with 
probability 1 — p. Expected single period payoffs are
(1 -  j ) [ v i p l  +  (1 -  L>i)pl]
for Country 1, and (1 —p)(l — 7)1 and (1 — p)(l  — 7 ) /  for tough and soft Country
2 respectively.
4.3 The Equilibrium for a Given Allocation Be­
tween Output and Fighting Effort
The full equilibrium is described by (Fi ,F2]F 2,s i ,r i ,s2,r2) and depends upon 
cost of war parameters 7 , 7 , 7 , the prior v0, discount factors <5i, S2, S2 and func­
tional forms /(•) and #(■). In this section we solve for the equilibrium of events
3 to 6 above for a given allocation (Fi ,F2, F 2) which then determines E[I\vq]
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and the probabilities of winning for a given t>o- This corresponds closely to the 
game with one-sided incomplete information described in F&T, except that we 
generalize the game to one with any prior Vq. The PBE of this game is based on 
the following five elements:
Range of Possible Offers
This is based on the solution to the complete information game. In bargaining 
period 2, a soft country is guaranteed a payoff of say (1 — 7)(1 — p)I =  (1 — s2)I. 
It follows that any claim by Country 1 s2I  < s2I  will be accepted by the soft 
country. Similarly any claim s2I  <  s2I_ will be accepted by the tough country 
where s2 =  1 — (1 — 7)(1 — p). Therefore only claims in the interval [s2I , s 2T] 
or [s2I, £2/], depending on whether s2J < s2I  or s2/  > s2I, will be accepted by 
Country 2 in bargaining period 2. In the rest of this section we assume that 
s2L < s2I f  ie, if the claim by Country 1 is less if the Country 2 is tough. This 
may in fact not be the case if F 2 > F 2; that is if the soft country devotes more 
resources to fighting activity. However the details of the equilibrium are very 
similar in both cases.
Under complete information, Country 1 facing a tough adversary will only 
claim s2I  and agree to a settlement without war if
(1 -  7)pL < s2I  (4.4)
Using s2 =  1 — (l — t )  (1'— P) , condition 4.4 holds if p < 1, which, of course, 
is always the case. Similarly, Country 1 facing a soft adversary will only claim 
s2I  and agree to a settlement without war ifp  < 1, which again always holds. In 
bargaining period 1, soft Country 2 will accept any offer
(1 ~  si)I 2^(1 ~  s2)I.
eAppendix A considers the case where s2I  >  s2I.
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Thus Country 1 can claim up to s i l  where Si — I — S2(l — s2) if it confronts the 
soft country. Similarly Country 1 can claim up to srI_ where — 1 — £2(1 — s2) if 
it confronts the tough country. As for period 1, we assume that s±L < s±I. Then, 
only claims in the interval [s^/, sil] will be considered by Country 2 in bargaining 
period 1. By similar reasoning as before, under complete information Country 1
will offer (1 — s ^ I  to the tough country and (1 — Si)I to the soft country, and
the offer will be accepted.
Tough, Soft Country 1 Distinction
Consider a one-shot game where Country 1 has priors v0 that Country 2 is soft. 
Define a ’soft’ Country 1 that prefers to make a low claim s2I  with certain 
agreement to making an offer s2I  which is only accepted by a soft Country 2. 
The condition for this is
s2I  > VqS21 +  (1 -  v0)(l  -  7)p l (4.5)
Otherwise the country is ’tough’.
A Threshold Intermediate Share s
Define (1—s)I  as the lowest offer that soft Country 2 will accept in the first period 
of bargaining when it expects a generous low claim s2I  in the second period. If 
62 is the discount factor of soft Country 2 then s is given by
(1 -  5)7 =  S2( I -  s2I) (4.6)
Bayesian Updating of Uo to t>i 
By Bayes Rule
=  prob(7 =  7 | Si refused)
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prob(si refused | 7  =  7)prob(7 =  7 )
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prob (si refused) 
(1 -  n(s i ) )vQ
(1 -  ri(si))vo +  (1 -  r_i(si)))(l -  vQ) 
A  Threshold Probability r
(4.7)
Define f  as the value of 77 which makes a tough Country 1 just indifferent between 
playing soft and tough in the second period when 77 (si) =  0. Then
17 =  prob (7 =  7 | si refused) 
_  (1 -fl(si))7/0
(1 -  fi(s i))u 0 +  (1 -  -Uo) (4.8)
and
Hence from (5)
where
S.2I  =  v i s 2 l +  (1 - V i) (1 - 7) p l
r = Vq -  V l v0(l - V i)
V l —
£2! -  (1 - i ) p L
(s2/  -  (1 -  7 )pl)
(4.9)
(4.10)
(4.11)
Lem m a 1 If Country 1 is tough then 0 < f  < 1.
proof Using 4.10 and 4.11 we have that
r = vpsil + (1 - t>0)(l - 7)pJ - s2I  
vQ(s2I  -  s2I)
(4.12)
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Since s2I  > s2I_ the denominator of 4.10 is positive. From the definition of a
tough Country 1 the numerator is also positive. Hence r > 0.
After some algebraic manipulation of 4.10, we find that r <  1 iff
(1 -  7)PL < s2I  (4.13)
which is precisely the condition 4.4 above. □
Proposition  1 Consider the strategies in table 1. In a PBE, a soft Country 1 
chooses from strategies 1 or 2 depending on which strategy maximises the expected 
payoff given in table 2; a tough country 1 chooses from all three. If strategy 3 is 
chosen, then, if Country 2  turns out to be tough, war ensues
Proof When equation 4.5 holds, Country 1 is soft, and will play s2I  in the 
last period. Recall that Country 2 (tough) will refuse any offer in the first period 
smaller than (1 — Si)L If the first period offer is rejected Country 1 will update 
its beliefs according to B.3 . Since zii(si) =  0 that implies that r;0 > tq. Knowing 
what Country 1 will offer in the second period, Country 2 will accept any offer 
in period 1 if s is lower than:
s =  l -  (414)
Now, we assume that Country 1 is tough. It will play any strategy in table 4.1. 
A soft country will accept any offer bigger than (1 — s). If any offer smaller than 
(1 — s) is made by Country 1 in period 1 and country soft would accept it with 
probability fi(s i)  > f, then -  using equations 4.10 and 4.11- it can be shown 
easily that
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Table 4.1: Three Strategies for Country 1
Strategy Period Country 1 Country 2 (Soft) Country 2 (Tough)
1 1 Sil r — 1 f  — 1
2
2 1 s i  r =  1 r — 0
2 s2I  - r — 1
3 1 s i J  r =  r r =  0
2 s2I  r =  1 r  = 0
Table 4.2: Expected payoffs for the Three Strategies
Strategy Country 1 Country 2 (Soft) Country 2 (Tough)
5.11  I  — s1;r
v0sl+ (1 - vo)Sis2I_ (1 - 3)1
vo[rsiI +  (1 — r)6irs2I] f (1 — si)I+
+(1 -  uq)(1 -i)6ipl (1 -  f)<52(1 -  s2)I
(1 —i)—
—2(1 —2)— 
& ( 1 - 7 ) ( 1  “ P)I
That is, Country 1 will be soft in period two, which is a contradiction, since 
Country 2 (soft) will be better off refusing first period offer fi(si)  — 0. Simul­
taneously, if Country 2 (soft) will accept an offer in period 1 with probability 
Fi(sl) < r then Country 1 will be tough in the second period and Country 2 
will be better off accepting offer in period 1. Thus the equilibrium strategy for 
Country 2 is to play f j (s l )  =  f . 7
7For Country 1, in order to be indifferent between playing tough or soft in second period, 
Country 2 must play a mixed strategy. It must also be indifferent between accepting and 
refusing first period offer. Therefore, Country 1 first period offer must satisfy this condition. 
The probability of making a tough offer in second period must be:
os (!)
s 2I
which makes Country 2 (soft) indifferent between the payoff in period one and the expected 
outcome of period two. According to Rasmunsen [60], strategy 3 in this models have one 
equilibrium offer but multiple equilibria of acceptance probabilities. This is due to the fact that 
Country 2 must mix between accepting and rejecting and Country 1 must also mix between 
playing tough and soft in second period. We assume that country soft will accept when f j(s l)  — 
r without ruling out the multiple equilibria because at this value is the largest probability of 
Country 2 accepting immediately avoiding the loss of utility in delay.
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____________Table 4.3: Possible equilibrium outcomes__________ _
No war Strategy 1 Acceptance in first period
Strategy 2 Soft country accepts in the first period and 
tough in the second.
Possible war Strategy 3 Soft country accepts sometimes in period 1, 
always in period 2.
Tough country never accepts
Consequently, there is a unique perfect equilibrium in this game with three pos­
sible strategies which depend on the particular values of the parameter of this 
model. According to these parameters, Country 1 can play any of the strategies 
in table 4.2. The result of the choice of strategies by Country 1 is summarised in 
table 4.3.8 □
4.3.1 Numerical computation of the 3 strategies
In order to analyse the equilibrium properties of the model we first carry out 
a numerical computation allowing for some variation of the key factors, whilst 
holding others constant. In this section we hold (JF\, F 2, F 2) constant thus keeping 
fixed the probability of winning a potential war after disagreement in period 2. 
We choose Fi =  F 2 =  F 2 thus setting the probability of either country winning 
at p =  1/2. Other parameters are as given in table 4.4 unless stated otherwise.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3, show graphs of expected payoffs given in table 2 associated 
with changes in parameters a and v0 from their baseline values. All the results 
are intuitive. First, a war equilibrium in our model might happen when Country 
1 finds optimal to play strategy 3. This is more likely to happen when Country 
1 thinks it is facing a soft country; i.e. when vQ is high. In figure 4.2 we choose
8In our simulations we considered the case s2I  >  s2I  and/or stI  >  Sil which occurs when 
the soft Country 2 allocates much higher resources to fighting than the tough Country 2. The 
table of payoffs for this case is given in appendix D.l.
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Figure 4.2: The production function parameter a  and the resulting outcome when 
investment in war is fixed.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION UNDER DIFFERENT VALUES OF a IN CES FUNCTION
Figure 4.3: The change in the initial priors v and the resulting outcome when 
investment in war is fixed
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INCOME UNDER DIFFERENT VALUES OF v Q
vq — 0.5 and vary a  in the range [-1,1]. Then for the parameter values shown 
strategy 1 is chosen and settlement always occurs in period 1. The parameter 
a  is a measure of interdependence and consequently as it increases so does the 
payoffs for both countries.
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Table 4.4: Baseline Parameter Values
Country 1 Country 2 soft Country 2 tough
V q =  0.5
M  — 1
a =  1
<5i =  0.9 62 =  0.9 62 =  0.9CQOII
7  =  0.15 7  =  0.1
i?i =  100 r 2 =  100
00t—(IIA?
A more interesting result is obtained by varying the initial priors, see fig­
ure 4.3. When Country 1 believes that there is a probability of facing a soft 
country, vQ >  0.8, then it uses strategy 3. Although, there is a general loss of 
income, given the high probabilities of facing a soft country, the expected income 
is increasing toward what would be the perfect information optimal offer. There 
is an increase in the income of Country 1, since E[J|i>0] increases with the proba­
bility of facing a soft country only when it plays strategy 3. For Country 2 (soft), 
there is a loss of income and a gain for Country 2 (tough).
Under imperfect information the resulting outcomes are more realistic than 
the models of costly conflict with perfect information presented in chapter 3. 
Country 2 enjoys some strategic advantage from its private information and this 
diminishes the strategic advantage that Country 1 has by making the offers. 
Another interesting result is that a high prior can produce a war outcome inde­
pendently of the resource allocation process. Given certain values of Vq , Country 
1 will find optimal to play strategy 3. However this threshold value depends also 
on the magnitudes of 7 and 7 as the next result shows.
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Figure 4.4: Conflict outcomes with fixed allocations.
In graphs A,B,C,D,E,F the difference between 7 and 7 is located in the horizon­
tal axe (cost of war A7 ) and the prior belief about facing one of the two types 
of Country 2, v, in the vertical axe (Probability of facing soft). Different 
combinations of v and A 7 produce two scenarios (PEACE and possible WAR). 
The investment in fighting (F\, F 2F 2) is fixed.
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In figure 4.4, there are several graphs, all of them, with fixed allocations 
to fighting efforts, representing the relation between the informational problem 
measured as the difference perceived by Country 1 about Country 2 cost of war, 
A y =  7  — 7 , and the prior wo- It produces two regions: the region ‘PEACE’ 
corresponds to the use by Country 1 of strategies 1 or 2 in table 4.3. This gives 
a settlement without war. The region call ‘WAR’ is the result of Country 1 
playing strategy 3 in table 4.3. The probability of war is conditional on Country 
1 choosing strategy 3. It means that Country 1 prefers to face a situation of war 
with some probability rather than using strategy 1 that is always accepted in the 
first round.
In graphs A ,B , and C Country 1 has less fighting power that Country 2. In 
graphs D,E and F, Country 1 has a higher fighting power. In order to test the 
effect of arms races, the same simulation was carried out for low and high levels 
of arms expenditure. In each graph there should be two loci that plot the frontier 
between peace and war strategies. One for low fighting effort and one for high. In 
Graph A there are two war areas. The one on the left correspond to the scenario 
were s2I  > s2I  and the one at the bottom corner corresponds with the inverse 
situation. This occurs since we exogenously fixed F 2 > F 2.
We also contrasted cases where Country 1 is less likely to win the war than 
Country 2, represented by the graphs on the left, and simulations where Country 
1 has a greater probability of winning the war, on the right side of figure 4.4. An 
overall increase in arms expenditure has a negative impact on peace for those cases 
where Country 1 had a disadvantage in military power with respect of Country 2. 
Alternatively, increases in fighting expenditure has a positive effect when Country 
1 had a positive advantage in fighting capability. These results are consistent 
with the empirical results about arm races and war. This seems to support 
the conventional conclusions about the effect of deterrence, risk uncertainty and 
ambiguous effect of arms races in political models of conflict, specially the case 
were arms races have a positive effect on peace when they increase the advantage
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of the leader and negative otherwise.9
In figures 4.5 and 4.6, the allocation of resources is fixed as in figure 4.3.1 
and 4.3.1. In the first case there is a large difference in the perception of the 
externality cost that Country 1 has about Country 2 (7 =  soft and 7 =  tough), 
and in the second case the externality cost of war is small for all types (7 =  
0.2, 7 =  0.15, 7 =  0.1). In figure 4.5, the probability of facing a soft country 
is relatively small for all types ('i>0 =  0.3). Given some equal probabilities of 
winning the war, the effect of asymmetric information is quite significant in this 
figure. For values of 7 higher that 0.5, Country 1 is better off playing strategy 
3, which is reflected by the jump in the payoffs curves. Figure 4.6 is a special 
case. This figure shows how unstable the equilibrium can be when investment 
is fixed and the soft country has a higher expenditure in arms that the tough 
one. Fixing allocations to fighting capabilities can have a roller-coaster effect 
in conflict. When countries can allocate resources optimally, the soft Country 2 
never spends more resources in fighting capabilities, producing a greater system 
stability. The war probabilities in figure 4.6 are more complex, although it has 
the same probabilities of winning the war than Country 2 soft, the fact that it 
faces a tough country (low cost of war) with a military disadvantage, creates 
many opportunities for conflict.
9However we must be careful with the fact that our model chooses Country 1 and the private 
information of Country 2 in an arbitrary manner. So far there is no a consistent empirical study 
of the influence of asymmetric information about the cost of war. Regarding the effects of arms 
races and war that provide similar stylized facts to the ones found by our simulation read 
S.Sample [84], Huth et al [85] and Huth et al [86].
Figure 4.5: The effect of changes in the cost of a soft Country 2 when investment 
in war is fixed
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DIFFERENT COST FOR COUNTRY 1 dq=0.7
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Figure 4.6: The conflict roller-coaster.
When the tough country invest significantly less than the soft, the condition 
(1 — 7)(1 — p) > (1 — 7)(1 — p) does not hold. Consequently, Country 1 plays 
strategies in appendix D.l. when 0 < vq < 0.4 Country 1 uses strategy 2. From 
0.4 < vq <  0.5 it uses strategy 1. From 0.5 < vo < 0.85 it uses strategy 3 and for 
vq > 0.85 it uses strategy 1 again. Under this circumstances, the probabilities of 
war increases when Country 1 is not sure about what type of adversary is facing.
Ft=50 FgH=50 FgL=25 y=0.2 Yh=0.15 yl=0.1
4.4 The Full Equilibrium
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The previous section studied out-of-equilibrium strategies with respect to the 
initial allocation of resources. The next step is to decide what would be the 
optimal allocation of resources given the nature of the game. One important 
remark is that in our model we assume a tie-breaking rule in strategy 3 by which 
Country 2 (soft) plays f(si) — f. Otherwise we will have scenarios where partici­
pants update their beliefs in an arbitrary fashion which causes multiple equilibria. 
Therefore, the possibility of finding which is the optimal allocation of resources in 
this framework should be ruled out. This could be tackled introducing some equi­
librium refinements, which would be more interesting in a two-sided asymmetric 
information framework.
In order to find out the optimal strategy, we form a three player Nash game 
for any of the three strategies.
4.4.1 The Nash equilibrium in Initial Allocations
Consider first the case where Country 1 adopts strategy 1. Then Country 1 
chooses Fi according to:
max Sil s.t. Ri =  Fi +  Ei (4.15)wrtFi ~  i i i  \ j
Country 2 (soft) chooses F 2 according to:
max (I — Sil) s.t. R2 =  F 2 +  E 2 (4.16)
wrtF 2
and Country 2 (tough) chooses F 2 according to:
max (1 — SjJ/ s.t. R2 =  F 2 -r E 2 (4.17)
We substitute the linear constraint into the objective function and take the
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derivatives with respect of Fi F 2 F 2. This maximisation problem produces 3 
reaction curves that can be solved simultaneously in order to find the Nash equi­
librium.
Rci:S ti + § £' - °  <4-is>
(419»
R C 1 (tough): d(1dFf ) l  +  ^ ( 1  -  2.) =  0 (4.20)
For the other strategies, every player maximizes its payoff according to ta­
ble 4.2. It also produces three reaction curves in each strategy which every 
country solves simultaneously. Then, Country 1 compares the outcomes of these 
3 strategies and chooses the one that has the highest payoff.
4.4.2 Numerical Results
Once Country 1 knows what will be the equilibrium allocation of resources, it 
can play the game in the same manner that we presented in section 4.3. We 
developed this game in a Matlab algorithm that finds the unique equilibrium for 
any parameter in the game. In figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 we present the outcomes 
of this simulation.
In figure 4.7 the externality cost for Country 1 was 7 =  0.7 and for Country 2 
(soft and tough) was 7  =  0.3 and 7 =  0.2. The strategy 3 was played for 17 >0.9  
which gives a very low probability of war. When the values of the cost of fighting 
were low (7 =  0.2, 7 =  0.15, 7 =  0.1), the probability of war nearly disappears 
and tends to the perfect information solution (see figure 4.8). The difference 
between the cost of Country 1 and Country 2 affects the expected income, but 
not the probability of war. The highest probability of war occurred when we
CHAPTER 4. CONFLICT WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 138
Figure 4.7: The payoffs effect of changes in t>0 when investment in war is optimal: 
Case a.
In this figure the difference between j  and 7 is not high, (7 =  0.7,7  =  0.3,7  =  0.2) 
and the cost of conflict for all players is very low. This produces war with a small 
probability represented by the jump in the three curves for values of v0 > 0.9. 
Naturally, the three curves are horizontal as long as Country 1 does not choose 
strategy 3, which is the only one that depends on t>0.
THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN PRIOR BELIEFS
Priors u0
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Figure 4.8: The payoffs effect of changes in i>0 when investment in war is opti­
mal:!).
In this figure, the cost of war was very low for Country 2,(7 =  0.3,7  =  0.2) 
Country 1 chooses always strategy 1, which produces peace. Compared to the 
previous graph, we can see that asymmetric cost between Country 1 and 2 has 
little effect in the choice of strategy (but affects the expected income).
Y= 0.7 yu=0.3 yh = 0.2 and different values of u0 in CSF
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Priors u0
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Figure 4.9: The payoffs effect of changes in vq when investment in war is optimal 
:c.
When the difference between 7  and 7 is very large (7 =  0.7,7  =  0.6,7  =  0.1) , 
the probability of war increases drastically. Unless we have strong believes that a 
country is soft, we cannot get a war scenario which in this models is represented 
by the decision of Country 1 to use strategy 3 in table 4.2
THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN PRIOR BELIEFS
Priors
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Table 4.5: Values for the baseline calibration of optimal allocations
Country 1 Country 2 soft Country 2 tough
O' =  1
M  =  1
5 =  0.9 S2 =  0.9 52 =  0.9
II 0
COOIIft- C<]OIIcH
So II 1—»
 
0
 
0 r 2 =  100
oorHII<3
introduced a high difference between 7 and 7 .
The rest of the parameters in the model took the values as in the table 4.5
These results indicate that priors and cost of war work in a complementary 
manner. In a model of one-sided incomplete information war outcomes are the 
result of a combination of high probabilities of facing a soft country with large 
differences between the cost faced by soft and tough participants. Finally, unless 
Country 1 decides to follow strategy 3, the expected income is constant in relation 
the priors i;0- The point where the income curve jumps for all the countries in 
figures 4.8 and 4.9 corresponds to a change from strategy 1 to 3.10
Finally we show in figures 4.10 and 4.11 the ratio of resources dedicated to 
fighting effort under optimal allocations.
In 4.10 we plot the ratio of resources against the probability of facing a soft 
country t>0. When this probability is larger than 0.7 Country 1 plays tough. 
Paradoxically, despite facing some probability of war, it reduces its military ex­
penditure. This is due to the change of strategy. In this scenario, the probability 
of facing a strong adversary is so low that Country 1 decides to take a gamble, 
plays tough and reduces its expenditure in arms at the same time. While both 
types of Country 2 are forced to increase the expenditure in arms to compensate 
for the risky behaviour of Country 1.
Figure 4.11 is also interesting. In most part of our simulations, the expendi­
10High values of 5 ruled out strategy 2.
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ture dedicated to fighting effort experiences little changes with changes in other 
parameters. However, differences in the cost of war have a great impact in the 
optimal allocation of resources. This is also the case in previous models with 
perfect information where the cost of fighting is one of the main factors in deter­
mining optimal allocations. In this graph, the probability of facing a soft county 
is: Vp =  0.5. The cost of fighting increases with the asymmetric cost. This is due 
to some constrains that we put previously in the model.11 Therefore, figure 4.11 
shows that the tougher is the adversary, the more one should spend in fighting 
effort.
Figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 represent the relation between war(or peace) and 
the informational problem -the difference perceived by Country 1 about Country 
2’s cost of war, A 7 =  7 — 7-  and the initial probability (t;o) of facing one type 
or the other. It produces two regions. As in figure 4.4, the region PEACE 
corresponds with the use of strategies 1 or 2 in table 4.3 by Country 1 and WAR 
is conditional on Country 1 playing strategy 3 in table 4.3. For instance, in 
figure 4.12, when A 7 is between 0.3 and 0.4, the conditional probability of war 
equals 0.2. (The probability of war was never bigger than 0.5 per cent when 
participants allocate their resources optimally).
The peace area in the graph produces always a peaceful outcome. However, 
the war area should be read carefully. For any combination of A7 and Vq that falls 
in the area, there is a probability of war, which will take place only if Country 
2’s true type is tough p — (1 — v).
In figure 4.13, the simulation was carried out with very low values of the 
discounting factor for tough and soft participants. After an initial increase in the 
probability of war, it decreases for values of A 7 > 0.5 in the horizontal axe. The 
reason is that since the discounting factor is very low, facing the probability of
n 7 >  7 >  7. W e  have already shown that for the case where 7 <  7 <  7 Country 1 does 
not need to care about asymmetric information and plays the as if it had perfect information 
regarding only its own cost.
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Figure 4.10: Resources dedicated to fight and prior beliefs
The allocation of resources to arms.
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Figure 4.11: Resources dedicated to fight and cost asymmetry
The allocation of resources to arms with cost asymmetry
CHAPTER 4. CONFLICT WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 145
Figure 4.12: The probability of war: a 
This graph is similar to the graphs in figure 4.4. But we have used optimal 
allocations The probability of using strategy 3 is positively related with increases 
in A7 and v.We can see that the probability of war is positively related to the 
probabilities of facing a soft country and to the magnitude of the information 
asymmetry
Country 1 Country 2 soft | Country 2 tough 
M  =  1
a  — 1 
Ri =  R2 =  100
(5 =  0.9 (5 =  0.9 (5 =  0.9
THE WAR FRONTIER
(l-«o)
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THE WAR FRONTIER
D ifference in the cost of w a r Ay = f - y
Figure 4.13: The probability of war: Case b 
In this figure we show the contradictory effects of the discounting factor. The 
values of the discounting factors were set to a extremely low level. 5 «  6 «  5 «  
0.2. There is a point where the effect of impatience is more important that the 
possible gains of war. The more likely is Country 1 to face a tough country, the 
more likely is to play strategy 1.
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THE WAR FRONTIER
(l-Uo)
D ifference in the cost of w a r Ay =y-y
Figure 4.14: The probability of war: Case c 
After several simulations, we found out that according to our model, strategy 2 
is rarely played. For that to take place, we had to give low values to <5 — 0.05 
and high values to 8 =  0.95
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war makes strategy 1 more attractive in relative terms because both countries 
are very eager to reach an agreement in period one. Remember that in order to 
face a war, we must wait for period 2. So, with high probabilities of facing a 
soft Country 2, vq >  0.4, waiting becomes very expensive. But there is a point 
where the benefits obtained from the discounting factor, outweigh the benefits 
of exploiting the difference in the cost of war, producing a substitution effect in 
strategies.
In figure 4.14, we have three areas. In this occasion, the three strategies in 
table 4.2 are played by Country 1. When Country 1 believes that there is less 
than 0.6 probability of facing a soft country, it plays strategy two. This only 
happens when the difference between 5 and 5 is considerably big. For situations 
where a tough and soft country have the same degree of impatience, Country 1 
never plays strategy 2.
Although we cannot generalized, from our simulations we can concluded that 
first, those situations where Country 1 has a strategic advantage in both negoti­
ation and military terms, a peaceful settlement is more likely to occur —  that is 
to say, when the status quo is not challenged we have more probabilities of seeing 
a peaceful outcome. Second, an optimal allocation of resources is also optimal in 
producing peaceful outcomes.
There is an abundance of evidence in the literature of conflict showing that 
leaders are subject to limited information, which produces misconception and 
bias in the choice of policy. Uncertainty about the cost of war can bring together 
some aspects from the rationalist explanations of war and alternative theories 
that argue that leaders are sometimes irrational. Asymmetric information about 
the cost of war could produce a pattern of behaviour from leaders that, although 
being rational, could act as if they would neglect the costs of war or enjoy the 
benefits without paying the costs.
Optimal allocation of resources doesn’t guarantee a more peaceful situation. 
However, since changes in some of the factors can produce ambiguous results, it
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seems more obvious, from the perspective of the public choice, that interventions 
directed to reduce the informational gap, are likely to have a better result than 
those directed to control the allocation of resources into fighting activities.
4.5 Conclusions and Developments
This paper presents a model of conflict that differs from other models of war 
in that we combine incomplete information with an endogenous probability of 
winning the war, which for most part of the literature of bargaining over con­
flict is exogenous. We allow participants to establish a negotiation process over 
the possible consequences of endogenous allocations to production and fighting 
efforts, absent in the old literature of conflict. Participants always try to avoid 
costly conflict which takes place in some extreme circumstances.
The main conclusions of the model are:
® The likelihood of war with endogenous optimal allocation of resources were 
significantly lower than the probability of a war under a fixed initial alloca­
tion of resources. This indicates that the optimal prior allocation of fighting 
and productive activity on the negotiation process has a more significant 
impact in the outcome of war than other factors traditionally considered 
more important such us the military strategic advantage or the probabilities 
of victory in contest.
® We have experimented with variations in all exogenous parameters. The 
parameters that have the most influence are a) prior beliefs, and b) 
the difference between the externality cost of the soft and tough countries 
(7 —7). This difference moves the break point of strategy 1 to strategy 3 for 
Country 1 to a lower value of v0, increasing the difference between the final 
payoffs of Country 1 and Country 2 (soft and tough). The war decisiveness
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parameter m and the degree of integration a affect the expected income for 
both countries but have little role in determining the outbreak of war.
• In this model, the probabilities of winning the war and the size of the final 
outcomes are endogenous. Although war is not an efficient outcome, it is 
sometimes a PBE due to the effect of asymmetric beliefs about the cost of 
fighting. We conclude that if the first casualty of war is truth we should 
add that the ultimate victim of asymmetric information is peace.
A  number of directions for future research are suggested by our results. The 
obvious question is what happens when both countries have incomplete informa­
tion. F&T found that not strictly separating equilibrium can exist when the two 
participants are uniformed. Bayes rule places no restriction on Country 2 poste­
riors. The choice of conjectures and additional restrictions may lead to pooling or 
separating equilibria. Separating equilibria works as a restriction to the optimal 
allocation of resources, which will provide a higher probability of war outcomes.
It would also be interesting to study the effect of long-term war. Our model 
assumes a once-for-all war. There are some models where participants can decided 
in each period if the take part in war or not. This would allow us to design new 
conjectures and signalling mechanisms, increasing the probability of war in the 
short run but reducing the long run-cost of war.
Chapter 5 
Empirical Analysis
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we have studied the foundations of conflict from an 
economic perspective. It takes place at two distinct but interrelated levels. On 
the one hand, conflict exists because resources are limited. Given this limitation, 
different actors competing for these resources will allocate their efforts into a) 
appropriation of these scarce resources and b) transformation of those resources 
into goods and services. On the other hand, given this allocation of appropriative 
and productive efforts, actors need a mechanism of distribution.
In this chapter, we look at the second level of conflict with application to 
inter-state conflicts. We focus on conflict versus trade as means of distribution.1 
Conflict is an exchange mechanism for restoring the equilibrium in the absence 
of agreement. The main characteristic of this mechanism is that induces high 
transaction costs. Therefore trade and agreement are always influenced by the
1 Given some balance of power, preferences and a specific environment (institutional con­
straints, access to information etc.), countries will eventually find an equilibrium between ca­
pabilities and share of resources. When some external factors (say technological innovations) 
break this equilibrium, countries will reallocate their resources by two different mechanisms: 
one is trade, based on common agreement, and the other is conflict, which does not require 
agreement.
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shadow of conflict and both activities can be regarded as the two faces of the 
same coin. This rather theoretical concept will be helpful in understanding the 
relations between two different traditions 2of empirical research on conflict.
We will focus on inter-state war for several reasons. Wars are the most costly 
and significant form of conflict. In the absence of an economic taxonomy of 
conflict, we choose war because there is a great number of theories and data 
against which we can contrast our theories. And finally, although states are 
members of an international system, they mainly interact in a purely strategic 
manner 3 in the sense that they have full sovereignty and they are not subject to 
the control of higher institutions.
One of the characteristics of empirical research about war is that data is 
grouped according to different levels of actor interaction. The level of analysis 
in international politics was first raised by Waltz [90] and Singer [91]. According 
to these authors, we can derive explanations of war based on the analytical level 
of the unit of observation from the level of the state, dyad5, region and finally, 
international system. Since our study focuses on the micro-economic foundations 
of conflict we will concentrate on the state and dyad level.
2 Of course conflict can take place in many different situations and it is also affected by 
non-economic factors. It is a very heterogeneous phenomena that can be approached in many 
different ways. There is an absence of a scientific taxonomy of conflict that clearly establishes 
the stylized facts, although several researchers have approached its classification from different 
perspectives. Any scholar that reviews the empirical studies of war will face a great disparity 
of studies, based also on a great disparity of theories, disciplines and assumptions that go with 
them. It has also produced a great disparity of results. After a careful review of the literature, 
the impression that one gets is that, as far as conflict analysis is concerned, there is a lack of 
consensus.
In the words of Geller and Singer [87] . . .  for every investigation devoted to the search for 
war’s correlates, there are thousands of studies that hope or claim to identify its causes or 
origins or roots.
See appendix E.l for other studies of conflict.
3Although we will mainly focus on the empirical analysis of rational choice models, there 
are also some implications of our theories for system analysis.4 In this chapter we don’t review 
these main families of empirical studies. However we will mention some of the main conclusions 
in order to establish whether our theories about optimal allocation of resources and the role of
information are compatible with these models or not.
5A dyad is an interaction between two countries for a given period of time
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As well as the different levels of actor interaction, we have other caveats. The 
empirics of war show that there are also different levels or intensities of conflict. 
In our models we assume a once-and-for all war, whose intensity depends on the 
level of militarization. But we can also assume non-optimal allocations which 
will produce out of equilibrium levels of conflict. Barringer [92] investigates the 
factors that contribute to the transition from one stage of conflict to a higher 
level. He defines a dispute as a “felt grievance by a party capable of waging war”. 
But every party can engage in different levels of hostility, starting from military 
mobilisation to full use of its military power. However we are concerned in our 
study with the outbreak of hostilities.6
Therefore, from all the set of possible conflicts we will concentrate in dis­
pute dyad interactions which are closer to the strategy of bargaining procedures. 
Gochman and Maoz [93] define Militarized Interstate Disputes as “A set of inter­
actions between or among states involving threats to use force, display of military 
force, or actual uses of military force” . Once we have defined a set of disputes, 
we hope to find some empirical evidence of the significance of our variables to the 
outbreak of hostilities, notwithstanding the level of hostilities which we assume 
to be endogenous.
In the next section we will focus on the liberal peace paradigm and expected 
utility theories of war, which are closely related to our models. In section 5.3, we 
review the available data on conflict, especially data sets and variables. Finally 
in section 5.4 we carry out some empirical analysis, taking into account some of 
the features of both traditions. We will interpret the results in the light of our 
simulations of bargaining and conflict of previous chapters. Given the difficul­
ties to capture the true cost of conflict, our empirical analysis won’t estimate an 
econometric model but will concentrate in one aspect: We will use some modi­
fications suggested by our theoretical models to develop our own explanation of
6We have already mention in our models the possibility of introducing some level of war 
which will function as a signalling process in a bargaining procedure
the trade-conflict debate. Thus, we will defend the empirical applicability of our 
previous research.
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5.2 A  survey of empirical research
Given the complexity and heterogeneous nature of conflict, we can find many dif­
ferent empirical approaches. During the eighties, the main theories concentrated 
at the systemic level of conflict and power, as the force driving international re­
lations. This is more closely related to what we called the first level of conflict 
which is related to the distribution of resources and capabilities.
In the nineties the research has concentrated mainly on the dyad level. At 
this level there are two main approaches that can be regarded as complementary. 
The first one is relevant to the democratic peace theories. It looks at the effects 
of democracy and interdependence while controlling for systemic and realist fac­
tors. On the other hand we have the rational or utility models of war which look 
at the relation between status quo, balance of power and the utility derived by 
different kind on international interactions, while controlling for factors such as 
the democracy and the levels of trade. In section 5.4 we will try to analysed how 
these two branches are highly interconnected when accounting for the microeco­
nomic foundations of conflict as set up in the theoretical models of conflict of 
previous chapters.
5.2.1 Testing the Liberal Peace Paradigm
The relation between democracy and peace has been studied thoroughly in po­
litical science. There is a broad consensus that at dyadic level, more democratic 
dyads are less likely to get involved in wars. In fact, there are no examples of two 
democratic countries7 fighting each other. At the systemic level, Gleditsch and 
Havard [78] analyse the impact of democratisation of the international system. 
The numbers of wars at the global level is a parabolic function of the increase in 
numbers of democratic countries in the system. A democratic development in the
7We refer to a definition of democracy in terms of high scores in the democracy index by 
the POLITY III [94] project.
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 155
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 156
global system produces a reduction of wars only at higher levels of democratisa- 
tion. There is otherwise, considerable consensus amongst researchers about the 
positive effects of democracy.
Oneal and Russett [95], [96], [97], [98] expand the analysis of the democratic 
peace incorporating the influence of trade and joint membership in international 
organizations.8
The hypotheses maintained by these authors are:
® Democracies will use force less frequently, especially against other democ­
racies
• Economically important trade creates incentives for the maintenance of 
peaceful relations
• International organizations constrain decision makers by promoting peace 
in a variety of ways.
Their statistical methods pooled BCSTS (Binary Cross Section Time Series) 
data of dyads observed annually. They determine the likelihood of conflict as a 
function of differences across thousands of pairs of states.
On the dependent variable side they use the MID (Militarized Interstate Dis­
putes) data set. Disputes are defined as those interactions in which one or both 
states threatened the other to use force, made a demonstration of force, or actu­
ally use it. The variable equals 1 if the dispute was ongoing and 0 if not. They 
include all disputes whether they are the initial one or not, with all independent 
variable lagged one year to ensure that they are not affected by the dispute to be 
explained.
On the right-hand side of the equation they include three main categories 
of variables. Variables related to measuring the effects of democracy, trade and
8Since have the intention of concentrating in measurement problems of different hypothesis, 
we refer to this articles for a comprehensive review on the subject.
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 157
alliance membership; variables to control for rational explanations of war and 
variables to control the effect of system interaction. It is important to control 
for realist variables. Take, for example, countries that are so far apart that they 
cannot reach each other with military effectiveness, it seems reasonable to include 
a variable for contiguity. System variables are important since power theorists 
argue that prior to 1945 the world was a multi-polar system, bipolar during 
the cold war and presently is understood to be multi-polar. The effects of the 
Kantian9 variables are considered under these three types of regimes.
In Russett and Oneal(1999)(Henceforth R&O) the variables that correspond 
to the liberal democracy hypothesis are several indices of democracy as measured 
by the POLITY III project. Economic interdependence is measured by dividing a 
country’s sum of exports and imports with its partner by its GDP. International 
organizations membership counts the number of these organizations in which a 
country takes part as reported by the Yearbook of International Organizations.
Although the levels of democracy and alliance membership seem to have a 
undisputed positive effect on peace, the effects of trade are more contradictory. 
Beck et al. reassess the liberal peace paradigm taking temporal interdependence 
into account. Their analysis corrects for duration dependence by using a set 
of dummy variables or fitting a natural cubic spline in a variable capturing the 
number of peace years. It accounts for the number of peace years before the 
current observation. For observations with no previous disputes, this variable is 
simply t — 1: following a disputes this variable is t — tO where tO is the time index 
of the most recent dispute. The results contradict the hypothesis that trade has 
a significant influence in the reduction of conflict 10.
R&O [99] took this problem into consideration and reanalysed the model using 
different theoretical specifications and measurement for trade variables. They 
used GEE methods for controlling temporal dependency, introduce alternative
9Also known as the democratic liberal peace hypothesis.
10See Appendix E.5
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measures of interdependence and proximity and estimate some observations for 
unreported trade. They reported significant effects from trade dependency for 
the set of all politically relevant dyads. However, the case is not so clear under 
the logit estimation method for the set of all dyads as reported in the appendix 
table E.2.
Therefore, there is a general belief that democracy has a positive impact on 
peace. Although there has been extensive research on the effects of trade, and new 
estimation methods have been developed, there is no unquestionable evidence of 
a significant relationship.
5.2.2 Testing utility models of War
Rational choice applications to war initiation begin with the assumption that 
states interact with each other in order to maximize the utility generated by 
these interactions. Decision makers are assumed to evaluate the costs and benefits 
of their actions and choose those strategies that produce higher utility. Utility 
models of war assume that these decision makers behave in similar manners when 
faced with an interstate crisis.
The origin of expected utility theories of war can be traced to Bueno de 
Mesquita’s The War Trap [100]. In posterior work, Bueno de Mesquita and 
Lalman [101] expand the strategic nature of decision makers interactions to a 
game theoretic framework.
The course of events leading to or away from international conflict 
is always diverse and complex in its details. Thus we would not ex­
pect any two historical events to be identical, certainly not in their 
specifics. No account of an event, no model, no history, is complete 
in its representation. Learning from an understanding of general phe­
nomena, whether for the historian or for the social scientist, requires a 
concentration on essential features -  in this case, the structure rather
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than the specifics of interstate actions. Our model is an attempt to 
delineate interrelated decisions around international military crises, 
highlighting the opportunities for peaceful relations, which are juxta­
posed against the sometimes great dangers imposed by negotiating in 
the presence of a potential resort to arms. We incorporate a number 
of aspects of international disputes, ranging from concern over the 
military costs if an action precipitates an attack by an antagonist to 
concerns over domestic political opposition. In addition, once we have 
explored the non-obvious, unanticipated implications of our model 
under the assumption that both players are fully informed about the 
preferences and the intentions of the opponent, we turn to an analysis 
of the game under the condition of imperfect information.
Figure 5.1: The conflict subgame
Figure 5.1 represents the crisis subgame of War and Reason. In node 5 Coun­
try A faces the choice of whether it uses force against B or not, F A and N F A 
respectively.11
At node 9, Country A did not resort to arms, and Country B can in turn, 
choose from using force or not. If it doesn’t use force it leads to a negotiated
11 We concentrate only in the dispute outcomes of the international interaction game. This 
games starts by a nature move by which Country A makes the offers in node 1. There are 
other equilibrium outcomes— such as making no demands or acquiescence to other’s player 
demands— which, for simplicity, are not shown here.
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outcome. If it uses force, it can expect to be counterattack or not, which leads 
to two possible outcomes, Capitulation by A or War initiated by B. At node 10, 
Country B is attacked by A. It faces again two options, retaliate or capitulate.
The game in itself is of a simple nature. The complications start when one 
tries to assess the equilibrium outcome by evaluating the preferences of both 
players over all the possible outcomes. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman made a 
series of assumptions in this respect.
They assume common rationality in a similar fashion to game theory. The 
outcome of war is uncertain and therefore the evaluation of war outcomes are 
based in expected values. The probability of winning the war for country i is 
Pi. On the other hand, the outcome of capitulation is certain. Both countries 
prefer to settle the dispute by negotiation rather than conflict. Measures from 
the status quo (SQ) are U% (A$) —the utility from obtaining one’s demands— 
and Ul(Aj) —  the utility from acceding to the other country’s demands.
The concern about the cost of conflict is one of the fundamental parameters in 
the evaluation of all the violent outcomes. We have already mentioned in section 
5.3.2 the different costs assumed in M&L’s models.
Each outcome has a set of potential benefits and/or costs appropri­
ately associated with it. We make restrictions on the various costs 
such that a;, T,ry,(j)> 0; and r  > a.
Given these assumptions, the formulas of the expected values are provided 
in table 5.1. Bueno and Lalman provide a series of restrictions concerning the 
preferences, payoffs, the status quo and the informational structure of the game.
There are two main problems with the empirical evaluation of these models. 
One is of a theoretical nature: Critics of rationality have highlighted a series of 
problems that must be taken into consideration. 12 The other problem concerns
12Many authors have reviewed extensively the rationality assumption in relation to interstate
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Table 5.1: Outcomes and expected utilities for nation i 
SQ (Status Quo); Acqj (Acquiescence to i’s demands by j) ,Acqi (Acquiescence to 
j ’s demands by i) ,Neg (Negotiated Outcome) , Cap A (Capitulation by Country 
A), W ars  (War initiated by Country B), Cap B (Capitulation by Country B) 
and War a (War initiated by Country A).
SQ U*(SQ)
Acqj U^Ai)
Acqi
Neg P'[C^(Aj)] + (1 -  P*)py(A,)]
Capj l/^A,-&(/*)]
Warj P‘(C/*[Aj -  &(P*) -  Oi(l -  P*)])+
(1 -  Pi)(U’[A, -  U P 1) ~  «i(l -
Capi i r i A j - u i - p * ) ]
Warj ?*(!}%A ; -  U P ‘) ~  7i(l -  **)])+
(1 -  P0(IP[A j -  U P j  -  Ti(l -  P ‘)])
Source: Bueno and Lalman
the utility calculations. Even if international decision makers are rational, it 
is very difficult to know the correct functional forms to calculate the payoffs of 
different actions for players that may have highly heterogeneous preferences and 
perceptions.
If we control for the utility of conflict, we should be able to estimate rational 
choice models. We have already mentioned that one of the main obstacles is the 
absence of data about the cost of conflict. Nevertheless, many authors have found 
considerable empirical support for this kind of models.
Bennett and Stam [102, 103, 104] test the utility theory of war. They ran 
some test for different time periods and sets of dyads. They found that the 
set of politically relevant dyads produce more robust results that the set of all 
dyads. They also explore the effects on preferences and decision structures of 
regional differences in culture, learning and domestic policies finding substantial 
differences across regions and time on how expected utility correlates with conflict
conflict. In this chapter we only address the empirical difficulties.
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occurrence.
Their expected utility calculations are based on the eight possible outcomes 
from the international interaction game (IIG). Given state A as a potential chal­
lenger and state B as a target these outcomes are:
1. A status quo outcome
2. A challenge resolved by negotiation
3. A challenge resolved by state A acquiescence (Giving in to B’s demands)
4. A challenge resolved by state A capitulation (Giving in to B ’s demands 
after the threat or use of force)
5. A challenge resolved by state B acquiescence
6. A challenge resolved by state B capitulation
7. A war initiated by A
8. A war initiated by B
Utilities are unique to each member of the dyad and each interaction AB is dis­
tinct from BA which leads to different equilibria.13 Thus, there are 16 relevant 
utilities: U^SQ), Uj {SQ), Ul(.Acqi), U^Acqj), U^Acqi), W{Acqj), U^Neg), 
U\Neg), U^Capi), U^Capj), W {CaPi), U\CaPj) ,Ul(W an), U^Warj), U^W an) 
and Ui(Warj).
These utilities include all the parameters in the War and Reason equilibrium 
although there is no way to distinguish between r, 7 and 0. (See appendix E.6). 
The states’ utilities and preferences are operationalised using risk attitudes and 
similarity scores from their alliance portfolios. The subjective probability of
13 In previous chapters we have already explain the theoretical differences in outcomes from 
assuming different initiators
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winning is estimated using the Correlates of War’s national capabilities index 
and estimations of the probability of intervention by third parties.
Finally, under the realpolitik variant14 war is never expected under perfect 
information so it is not analysed further.
Then, the expected equilibrium can be estimated and compared with the ac­
tual events to assess how well the prediction correlates with the actual behaviour. 
Bennett and Stam[103] use the computer program Eugene to generate the data 
for each directed-dyad-year from 1816 to 1993. The dependent variable was re­
classified in an index that captures different disputes levels which approximate 
the equilibria of the war game. Level 1 represents the status quo. Level 2 is a 
threat. Level 3 represents a display of force from one state. Level 4 indicates the 
actual use of force by one state and level 5 is the mutual use of force or war.
Their model consists of a single decision amongst 5 different not ordered15 
choices. On the independent variable side, they include 3 dummies, covering the 
4 possible16 outcomes of the IIG. The model is estimated by multinomial logit. 
They also corrected for temporal dependence using Beck et al method[105, 106] 
of including a set of 4 spline variables that take into account the time that has 
passed in a dyad since a prior dispute.
The multinomial logit estimates the effects of the equilibrium predictions on 
whether the disputes ends up at each of the five previous outcomes. In order 
to assess how the game’s equilibria correlate with the initiation of disputes we 
can test if they predict any outcome but the status quo, level 1. However, it is 
difficult to predict whether the variables are statistically significant and what are
14The realpolitik variant treats foreign policy demands as emanating from a realist or ne­
orealist perspective of international affairs. The magnitude of these demands depend on the 
structure of the international system. National leaders are seen as professional decision makers 
that select policy goals by examining the external constraints and opportunities that arise from 
international interactions.
15Whether, for example, mutual use of force was chosen or not, doesn’t say anything about 
the intensity. However, most part of conflict follow an escalation process and it may be well 
justified to assume that these choices are in fact ordered.
16The logical restrictions of the game eliminates some outcomes.
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their specific effects. All the coefficients in each equation are given in relation 
to a base outcome. Individual t-tests indicate only whether the variable has a 
significant effect in distinguishing between the base category and the category in 
question.
Any statistically significant coefficient in any equation suggests that a variable 
is important in differentiating between base case and equation. This indicates 
in turn that the variable in question has some significant effect in the outcome. 
They use the likelihood ratio test to assess whether a variable has any significant 
effect on the overall model.17
Finally, they assess their model against different sets of countries and time 
periods. They found that their predictions fit substantially better in some areas 
and some times than others. In general, they interpret those results by suggesting 
that most part of this variation is due to potential differences in preferences or 
in how costs and benefits may be weighted by different societies. This is an idea 
supported by our simulations of conflict where asymmetric information about the 
costs of conflict and prior beliefs play a crucial role in the equilibrium outcome.
17See Bennett and Stam[103] for a complete description of the tests.
5.3 Data
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Any empirical analysis begins with the systematic collection of data. Unfortu­
nately, economists haven’t dedicated a lot of effort to producing a comprehensive 
dataset of conflict and economic variables. There are two main problems. On 
the one hand, no one has systematically collected those events where the nature 
of conflict was primarily economic. We have to deal with data sets that may 
include disputes where the underlying factor may be economic or not. This is 
particularly relevant to our models of expected utility because they do not nor­
mally include non-economic factors in the utility functions. On the other hand, 
the cost of conflict has never been carefully collected. We have recorded military 
expenditure. But conflict incurs an extra cost that goes beyond the opportunity 
cost of moving resources away from directly productive activities to unproductive 
ones. Conflict is an exchange mechanism with high transaction costs. But these 
costs have never classified and recorded systematically.
Since we rely on data produced by different projects on the field of politics, 
it is helpful to mention how this data is collected. The application of scientific 
methods to political events has been aided by the development of event data. 
According to Rummel [107], event data is “data for which the rules of inclusion 
and exclusion of political events are clear and consistently applied to all events.” 
Since data is collected, according to some political behavioural rules for a num­
ber of states, we can establish different profiles, and comparisons can be made 
between these states.
Data can also be collected in three other forms. First, behavioural flows, that is 
statistical aggregates measuring many kinds of uniformly occurring transactions 
such us trade, economic aid, tourists, migrants, and the like. Second, there are 
behavioural structures, “These are existing, formal behavioural relationships, such 
us a treaty, alliance, or common membership in an international organization” . 
And third, there are attribute data, “which measures or define the magnitude of
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a nation on some characteristic.”
In appendix E.3 we provide a review of the most important sources of data 
for the study of major conflicts. We focus on how much information is available 
in these data sets to establish some stylised fact of conflict and the importance 
of asymmetric information.
In the next two sections we are going to mention some of the problems that 
affect the collection of data for testing the models of rational decision making 
and war that we have developed in previous chapters.
5.3.1 Data on Expected Utility of War
We have seen that there are many ways of approaching the empirical study of 
conflict. It would be an overstatement to say that there are as many approaches 
as conflicts recorded, but the list goes certainly a long way. Bueno de Mesquita 
argues that the strategic approach developed in War and Reason should have no 
systematic cross-regional cross-temporal variation.
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s [101] theory of expected utility of war is 
some of the most widely cited research about international conflict that can be 
traced to the publication of The War Trap [100]. Bueno de Mesquita’s measure­
ments of interest, risk and utility are widely accepted in the literature. This is 
one of the most interesting developments because these theories are also decision- 
theoretic in nature and rely on the use of game theory models.
The process of deriving utility data can be quite complicated because it in­
volves many options regarding the representation of the initial parameters of these 
models. Testing strategic models requires a specific approach to generate the util­
ity data. One of the most interesting efforts in this field has been undertaken by 
Bennett and Stam [108] in the development of the EUGene project. EUGene is 
a program that serves as a data management tool for creating data sets. It cre­
ates output data sets with directed-dyad year, country year, and directed-dispute
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dyad units of analysis. It is particularly appropriate to test so-called expected 
utility theory of war and models of games-theoretic interactions between states.
The variables are described in appendix E.6 according to the unit of analysis of 
relevance. Some of these data come from well-known data sets that are described 
in this section. But most part of the data is calculated following the models in 
The War Trap or further extensions developed by Bennett and Scam [102, 103].
5.3.2 The cost of war
In order to test expected utility models, it is crucial to understand all possible 
benefits and costs of a given action or strategy. However, when we talk about 
international relations, these calculations might be hard to perform. This is 
especially true when it comes to the cost of conflict. In War and Reason the cost 
takes the same range of values, [0, 1], as in our models of bargaining and conflict. 
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman distinguish four different costs:
a is the cost born by the attacker for fighting away; r is the cost borne 
by the target in a war; 7 is the cost borne by a state that gives in 
after being attacked; and $ is the domestic political cost associated 
with the use of force.
There are several assumptions about these costs. They differ between ini­
tiators and target nations in terms of expected losses in life and property. It is 
justified because normally the initiator have a greater control over the venue of 
fighting. The expected cost is also a function of the probability of success and 
therefore, weak states facing strong rivals expect larger losses, all things being 
equal. The cost of giving in after being attacked, apart from the costs in life and 
property, includes psychological effects such as loss of face and loss of credibility 
and reputation. And finally the domestic political costs is assumed to be larger 
for big developed nations, since they have more instruments of international in­
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teraction and their populations expect their politicians to find other means of 
solving international disputes.
The large diversity of factors that may affect the expected value of the cost of 
war creates one of the main problems of any empirical analysis. Mostly, scholars 
use approximations for it. Assessing the effects of the value given to the status 
quo, Bueno de Mesquita defines the cost of war as the duration of the war in 
dyads and in terms of battle deaths per million population for each participant. 
This is based on the data found in the COW data set.
However, trying to estimate the expected cost for all the factors mention about 
is impossible since data would be difficult to collect and appropriate testing hasn’t 
been developed yet. The domestic cost, (j> in War and Reason is estimated using 
the probability of winning and the value of the status quo. The cost of life is 
assumed to be an inverse function of relative power. However, they do not devise 
a way to estimate a, 7 and r.
Clearly, our estimation of expected cost only scrapes the surface of 
the problem. These very limited approximations may introduce con­
siderable measurement errors into our analyses. Assuming that our 
operational procedures are not systematically biased on way or the 
other, we expect that, on average, the crudity of our estimation of 
costs suppresses rather than inflates our results. But we cannot be 
confident of this claim until better indicators are developed and tested 
in the future.
After a careful consideration, we can clearly see that the cost of conflict is 
a factor very difficult to estimate and the data sets on conflict contain weak 
approximations to it. Basically, we only have duration, the battle deaths and the 
value of the status quo before and after the war.
If data sets contain weak approximations of this factor, we face the same 
problem when we turn our attention to case studies. Most part of the time we
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rely on qualitative research. One of the few projects that tries to establish a 
comprehensive evaluation of all the cost of conflict was carried out by Michael 
Cranna et al. [109].
The book consists of seven studies of individual conflicts. The conflicts have 
been selected to represent the different kinds of conflict that occur, from wars 
between nations to guerrilla campaigns.
The costs incurred by the countries involved in these particular conflicts are 
analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively. The costs of development are 
studied looking at the impact of conflict in education and health. The economic 
costs is analysed by looking at macroeconomic indicators such us production, 
debt, inflation, etc. Other non-economic costs are analysed such the human costs 
of conflict and the cost to the environment. A general problem was finding the 
data to account for the impact of these factors, especially regarding the internal 
conflict. Cranna explains the limitations and assumptions of the project:
It has been difficult to find contemporary data about some of the con­
flicts. This is particularly so for the intra-state conflicts, like those in 
Kashmir and Sudan, where regions rather than nations are involved, 
and regional statistics are unavailable.
If we look at post-World War II patterns of conflict we can see a decline in in­
ternational conflict and an increase in intra-state conflict. A possible factor to ex­
plain it might be the increase/decrease of uncertainty at the national/international 
level. This can influence the cost-benefit analysis of conflict strategies by differ­
ent actors. In our previous models we show that asymmetric information about 
the cost of conflict may be one of the most important determinants of the occur­
rence of conflict. Unfortunately, for the time being, this claim is only speculative 
due to the lack of data on these factors in the empirical literature.
5.3.3 Other factors to take into consideration
For our purposes, which is the study of conflict from a economic perspective, we 
find several obstacles. Although there is a wide range of studies that produce a 
systematic compilation of all conflicts, both at the level of hostilities (the aspect 
of conflict that is normally recorded) and the dispute level. There is no a sys­
tematic compilation of all the factors that may affect conflict. At this level there 
might be diplomatic measures such as threats of military intervention, interna­
tional litigation’s or arms races. We would like to know all those circumstances 
in which despite the presence of incompatibilities of any kind, parties resolve 
their problems without the use of violence. Few data sets can provide a good 
description of the information structure. Since we assume that actors are rational 
and try to maximise expected utility, in war or peace, the problem is to establish 
what is the set of information in relation to what Bueno de Mesquita calls the 
relevant sources of uncertainty for a decision maker:
1. Marginal advantage or disadvantage in war capabilities of his nation as 
compared with the potential opponent,
2. how much he values the policies adopted by his own country in comparison 
with those of the potential enemy,
3. the capabilities of each other nation that might become involved in the war 
and,
4. the relative value or utility that these other nations may contribute to his 
nation, as compared with the value that they may contribute to his potential 
enemy.
In the presence of incomplete information problems one of the solutions is to 
assume that actors make rational choices based on subjective estimations of other 
actors military capabilities and expected utility. We can use rational expectations
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models and other method to deal with uncertainty. In this context there are 
several models or arms races. Since we cannot observe directly military capability 
(quantity and quality of weaponry and personnel18 ) we based our estimation on 
the level of military expenditure of the other country. Simon and Starr [76] 
developed a simulation model in which they calculate the probabilities of other 
actors having both the opportunity and willingness to initiate war or escalate 
rebellion.
The problem of unobservable factors is a fundamental one. There are many 
hidden influences that may precede the outburst of violence. How well those can 
be approximated by a few variables in a statistical model is a question yet to be 
addressed. As we mentioned before, scholars have put great effort in recording 
all different categories of violent events and disputes, but there has been little 
work done to account for all the relevant factors.
Bloomfield and Moulton [110] in a qualitative study of the causes of conflict 
produce a taxonomy19 of all the factors that may have been of influence in all 
types of conflict. They represent conflict as a dynamic process in the sense of 
passing through some or all of a sequence of distinctive and identifiable stages or 
phases. Only at the highest level- hostilities involving combat among organized 
military forces- they accounted for 10 different categories and more than two 
hundred factors of influence.
Within each phase there are a variety of influential events and 
conditions called factors, such as personalities, relationships, actions, 
events, perceptions, and other conditions. Some of these factors can 
generate pressures moving the situation toward ’’worsening,” that is, 
increased violence or its threat; or, conversely, pressures to move the 
situation in a more benign direction, that is, away from violence. In
18Not many countries keep a public and up to date register of arms and military personnel
19See Appendix E.7
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other words, ’’ factors” combine so as to worsen or improve the conflict 
and, thus, move the conflict towards or away from ’’ thresholds” be­
tween phases in the direction of greater or less violence. The factors 
in the model are all from the specific facts that have been identified 
as influential in particular historical conflicts. These case-specific fac­
tors were then grouped and restated in generalized terms to permit 
comparison across cases.
This affects seriously the statistical analysis of conflict. It is specially relevant 
with regard to international disputes and wars. Some of the problems are also 
related to the methodology commonly used. Widely used statistical procedures 
such us logistic regression need certain characteristics on the dependent vari­
able. But wars are very rare events. This has lead to very inefficient collection 
strategies. International conflict data sets contain more than a quarter million 
dyads with only very few wars. This has produced data with a huge number of 
observations and normally few and poorly measured explanatory variables.
King and Zeng [111] address the problem of logistic estimation and efficient 
variable selection in rare event data.
...we use all dyads (pairs of countries) for each year since World War 
II to generate a data set below 303,814 observations, of which only 
0.3%, or 1042 dyads were at war. Data sets of this size are not un­
common in international relations, but the make data management 
difficult, statistical analyses time-consuming, and data collection ex­
pensive. (Even the more common 5,000-10,000 observations data sets 
are inconvenient to deal with if one has to collect variables for all the 
cases.) Moreover, most dyads involve countries with little relation­
ship at all( say Burkina Faso and St. Lucia), much less with some 
realistic probability of going to war, and so there is a well founded 
perception that much of the data is “nearly irrelevant” (Maoz and Rus­
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 173
set, 1993:627). Indeed, most of it has very little information content, 
which is why we can avoid collecting the vast majority of observations 
without much efficiency loss. In contrast, most existing approaches in 
political science designed to cope with this problem, such as selecting 
dyads that are “politically relevant” (Maoz and Russett, 1993), are 
reasonable and practical approaches to a difficult problem, but they 
necessarily change the question asked, alter the population to which 
we are inferring, or require conditional analysis ( such us only contigu­
ous dyads or only those involving major powers). Less careful uses 
of these types of data selection strategies by others, such as trying to 
make inferences to the set of all dyads, are biased. With appropri­
ate easy-to-apply corrections, nearly 300,000 observations with zeros 
need not be collected or could even be deleted with only minor impact 
on substantive conclusions.
This data problem should be considered especially when we try to interpret 
the results of econometric models.
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5.4 A  synthesis of the liberal peace hypothesis 
and utility theories of war
In the last two sections we have reviewed two well known paradigms: the utility 
theories of war and the liberal peace. The utility models of war provide a better 
theoretical framework for the study of conflict but they are difficult to test because 
data is hard to collect and the basic components of these theories (such us the 
number of strategic actors, utility functions or information environment) may 
vary between conflicts.
Therefore we concentrate on the liberal peace hypothesis (section 5.2.1). But 
these models lack a theoretical explanation of why democracy and trade should 
have an impact on conflict. We rely on game theory models to explain the impor­
tance of these factors through asymmetric information about cost, restrictions in 
the bargaining set, the role of the status quo and other environmental factors 
that influence expected outcomes. But the amount of trade, should not influence 
the final decision to go to war. Of course, if trade represents a large proportion 
of a country’s GDP, the loss of trade should be added to the overall estimation of 
the cost. But it would only represent a proportion of the total cost and it doesn’t 
affect the informational problem.
At this stage we make a clear distinction. Trade is important because it 
affects the bargaining set. For instance, two countries involved in a sovereignty 
question will have problems finding an agreement because sovereignty is not a 
divisible concept. However, if both countries have mutual trade interest, the 
dispute could be solved by altering the terms of trade. Whether the terms of 
trade are beneficial for a country or not is a different question. It may be the 
result of an imbalance in military power as well as a result of compensation from 
another dispute. In order to clarify this question, we propose a development of 
Russet’s liberal peace that incorporates some aspects from the utility models of
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war.
We follow R&;0 specifications and methodology to study the effects on dis­
putes of democracy and trade. But we make two important changes. We change 
the dependent variable to account for actual fighting. We believe that it is an 
important change. Game theory or strategic models explain the outbreak of war. 
But the variable that previous models use accounts for every level of dispute, 
from a simple threat of use of force to a savage war to the end. Threats and 
displays of force should not be recorded as disputes20 as they indicate that some 
kind of bargaining is taking place. Secondly, we introduce the war equilibrium 
from the war trap (section 5.2.2) to account for those cases where beneficial trade 
can be a result of a given military advantage. Apart for these two changes, we 
use the same variables and estimation method as R&O’s paper.
We take all dyads from 1950 to 1992 focusing on the first year of a militarized 
dispute. Instead of using all disputes, we use the variable war for those disputes 
that involve the use of physical force using the data from Gochman & Maoz [93] 
MID set. The variable War takes the value 0 if the level of dispute is 3 or lower 
and 1 it it is 4 or higher. All the independent variables are lagged one period in 
order to assure that they are not affected by the dispute to be explained.
The set of all dyads can give spurious result due to the fact that the number of 
peaceful dyads with low level of interdependence is sharply increased. Therefore 
we include several measures to control for proximity between countries. The effect 
of distance have been studied by several authors. Some of the studies (Siverson 
& Starr 1991 [112] Goertz & Diehl 1992 [113] and Kocs 1995 [114]) show that 
proximity produces opportunities to fight while other authors also show that it 
produces opportunities for trade and alliances, (Tinbergen 1962 [115], Deardorff 
1995 [116] and Bliss & Russett 1998 [117])
In order to control for distance we use two measures that are common in
20We concentrate on the outburst of hostilities only.
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the literature: distance between countries and distance between capitals. We 
introduce the variable eq-wara which is the result of the Bennett & Stam [108] 
calculations of the international interaction game. Eq_wara is the war equilibrium 
started by ‘State A ’. The war equilibrium started by state b is meaningless in 
this case because we coded state a is the initiator. By definition, there cannot be 
occurrences of war started by b.
The rest of variables follow exactly R&O. Allies takes the value 1 if states 
were linked by a mutual defence treaty or neutrality pact. The capability ratio 
Incaprt is the natural logarithm of ratio of COW’s [118] capabilities index. Joint 
democracy, jntdem, uses the POLITY [94] data set scales for autocracy and 
democracy,
J N T D E M ij^  i = [(DEMi}t- i  + 10 )(D E M j>t^  + 10)].
The variable D E M  ranges from -10 to +10, where +10 represents the higher 
possible level of democracy and -10 the lowest.
Economic interdependence is calculated using the IMF’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics [119]. The economic importance of trade is calculated by assessing 
the sum of exports and imports relative to their national incomes. Let X y j  be 
the exports to country j  from country i at time t and the imports. Then, 
country z’s dependency on trade with j  in year t — 1 is:
— { X i j j - i +  M i j )t_ i ) / G D P i)t_ i
Scales for small and large dependency, smldepnp and Irgdepnp respectively, 
are constructed using either the lower of higher trade-to-GDP ratio for each dyad. 
This kind of data manipulation takes into account the fact that primarily, the 
likelihood of conflict is a function of the degree to which the less constrained state 
is free to use force, in other words, the state that finds a higher utility in war.
5.4.1 The logit and GEE estimations
R&O found a significant relationship between conflict, trade and democracy.21 
We produced a similar analysis, but using those disputes where actual fighting 
took place. We also introduced the war equilibrium from War and Reason for the 
same set of dyads. We evaluated again the effects of democracy and trade on the
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Table 5.2: Variable definitions
Variable name Definition
warij}t The onset of war between countries i and j (time t)
jntderriijj- i Index of Joint democracy (time t — 1)
smldepnpijit-1 Trade, smallest dependency of countries i and j (t — 1)
Irgdepnpijj-1 Trade, largest dependency of countries i and j (t — 1)
contgkbijit- i Contiguity between states (t — 1)
majdydsijjt_i Major power involved (t — 1)
allies —i Countries were formal allies (t — 1)
lncaprtijj-i Log of capabilities ratio (t — 1)
eqwarijit- i War equilibrium from the IIG (t — 1)
Igdstabijj-i Distance between capitals (t — 1)
peaceyr* peace years (t — 1)
likelihood of military disputes using logistic regression on pooled BTSCS data. 
We estimated the following two logit equations corrected for temporal dependence 
and GEE 22respectively,
warij>t =  fiijntderriijj-i +  smldepnpijit- i + fislrgdepnpijj-i + 
fficontgkbijj-i 4* /35lgdstabij)t-1 + fom ajdydsijj-1 +
(37 allies +  j3$lncpartijjt- i  +  A  eqw arij}t„  ffi^peaceyr 1 ^  +
21Reported in table E.2
22General Estimating Equation (GEE) is an estimating approach that specifies within group 
correlation structure of panel data which is comparable to random effects regressions. See 
appendix E.4.
fiupeaceyr2ij + (3i2peaceyr3ij + fiwpeaceyrAij
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warij)t =  fiijntderriijj-i +  /32smldepnpij)t- i  +  /38lrgdepnpij)t-1 +  
{3iContgkbij}t-i +  /35lgdstabij}t-1 +  pQmajdydsij)t- i  +  
/37alliesij}t^i 4- (38lncpartijit- i  +  /39eqwarij>t- i (5.2)
Equation 5.1 was estimated using standard logit analysis, corrected for tempo­
ral dependency. We assume autocorrelated errors in our choice of GEE estimator 
plus robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity.
Table 5.3: P.(war), trade and democracy. All wars 1950-1992.
warl coef.
Logit
Std.Err. P coef
GEE
Std.Err P
jntdem -.0045408 * .000987 .000 -.0043274 * .0009711 .000
smldepnp -21.43396 35.13748 .542 -184.326 103.2138 .074
lardepnp .8349878 3.075665 .786 .098418 5.10245 .985
contigkb 2.98077 * .2912681 .000 2.533498 * .2824621 .000
lgdstab -.5709842 * .0953958 .000 -.8128447 * .1080023 .000
majdyds 1.617365 * .2872776 .000 2.269161 * .2967918 .000
allies -.5181032 * .2181081 .018 -1.067208 * .2429119 .000
lncaptr -.203596 * .0600283 .001 -.3245599 * .2967918 .000
eqwar .7322062 * .2308517 .002 .7441603 * .2692713 .006
peaceyrl -.2777619 * .0301813 .000 — — —
peaceyr2 .3018692 * .0580222 .000 — — —
peaceyr3 -.052879 .0833488 .526 — — —
peaceyr4 .7449912 * .2457548 .002 — — —
Pseudo R2 =  0.384 —
log likelihood=-l 846.4209 —
P of x 2 < -001 P of x2 < -001
Number of obs.= 270937 Number of obs.= 213338
The coefficient estimation of equation 5.1 is reported in column 2 of table 5.3. 
The robust standard errors are reported in column 2 and the probability in column
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3. In columns 4, 5 and 6 we have reported the results of the GEE estimation.
The index of joint democracy was significant in both estimations. Contigu­
ity and distance between capitals were also significant and have the expected 
signs. The inclusion of a Major Power is significant but has an opposite sign to 
the results reported by R&O. The sign of the capabilities ratio was also nega­
tive and opposite to R&O . The two variables —Lower Dependence and Higher 
Dependence—  that account for dyadic trade levels were not significant. Whereas 
the variable that corresponds to the War and Reason war equilibrium was sig­
nificant in the logit and GEE methods.
Those changes can be explained if we distinguish between the two levels where 
conflict takes place that we mentioned in the introduction. We think about con­
flict from an economic perspective. A conflict is also a sort of trade that takes 
place by force, rather than two-side agreement. Compare to market exchange, re­
distribution by conflict is an inefficient exchange because it produces externalities 
and high transaction costs.
We would like to think that trade and conflict are part of the same process. 
That is why, when we change the dependent variable to record only actual fight­
ing and not threats, the trade variables becomes insignificant. But when R&O 
use all levels of dispute they are significant. Obviously, actual fighting makes a 
difference and this is somehow explained in our theoretical models. It doesn’t 
mean that trade and conflict are not related. Both trade and conflict are similar 
relations between countries. But when we include actual fighting trade becomes 
insignificant. Therefore, what we should be asking ourselves is not whether trade 
has positive effects on peace, but under which conditions, trade will take place 
by force or agreement.23
The inclusion of the war equilibrium and the change in signs of the majdyds
23This is of course highly relevant for economic theories of conflict. The number of conflicts 
in the World whose source hasn’t got a  strong economic component, such us identity conflicts, 
religion or ethnic, shouldn’t be underestimated and this statements shouldn’t be taken out of 
our main economic perspective unless one takes considerable care to account for other factors.
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and the Incaprt variables —the presence of a Major Power and the Capability 
Ratio respectively— is also consistent with our theoretical models. For any given 
war equilibria, the increase in power in the initiator can only help to have a 
deterrence effect. The effect of a major power is more difficult to assess. However, 
the stylized facts reported by Rupesinghe [120] section E.l confirms this result. 
Moreover, if we assume that major powers play in favour of the status quo, then 
they should have a definite positive effect.
All the results are supported by both methods of estimation and to some 
extent, consistent with the equilibrium outcome predicted by strategic theories.24
24Many of these articles can be found in the bibliography section
5.5 Conclusions
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We have reviewed some of the recent empirical work on conflict with specific ap­
plication to the utility theory of war. We have developed Russet and Oneal’s work 
introducing a new dependent variable and using data and variables from Bennett 
and Stam’s utility generation program. The results obtained are encouraging.
We found no significant evidence of the effect on conflict from trade depen­
dency when we use the set of all disputes that record actual confrontation be­
tween states. We also found that the war equilibrium from War and Reason is 
significant which gives some support for our rational theories of conflict. These 
theories can be also applied to the interpretation of the different results in several 
empirical models.
All these results should be considered carefully. Testing rational models of 
war lags well behind its theoretical development. There are several caveats that 
shouldn’t be forgotten. First of all, calibrating the utility of war is a difficult task. 
One of the main problems is the lack of data about the costs and perceptions of 
decision makers which are fundamental in determining the equilibrium outcome. 
While Bennett and Stam acknowledge that considerable bias can be introduced in 
these calculations, they hope that negative and positive effects cancel out. This 
should not be taken for granted.
Other problems arise from game theoretic constraints. Different equilibria 
are highly susceptible to the assumptions chosen. We have to be careful to allow 
for the possible effects in the outcome of a game introduced by one or another 
mechanism of negotiation. So far we haven’t constructed yet any model of war as 
a signalling mechanism, models of preventive war -  or a similar variant which is 
known as the window of opportunity. We haven’t considered either any dynamic 
set up that take into account decisions makers that may base their actions in the 
calculations of long-term trends.
On the data collection front, although considerable effort has been put into
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recording all disputes in the international system, there are few explanatory vari­
ables which allows the testing of more ambitious hypotheses. The size of the 
data set is a great constraint and its development would require a considerable 
amount of time and resources. It might be worth considering smaller data sets, 
case studies and sampling techniques, in order to introduce more explanatory 
variables.
Finally, this worlc is related to those factors that may have a positive or 
negative effect on the initiation of conflict. We haven’t said anything about its 
intensity. At the individual level, one may not be better or worse off if one gets 
killed in a small guerrilla campaign or in the nuclear holocaust, but at the social 
level is a question of great importance.
Despite the above problems, we consider that the amount of empirical evi­
dence in favour of models of rational conflict behaviour is sufficient and further 
research should be taken in this direction.
5.5.1 Developments
Our simulations of conflict show that the main variable explaining the outbreak 
of hostilities is the asymmetric perception of the cost of conflict. We also give 
some advantage to the status quo and show that a scenario with optimal alloca­
tion of resources between production and appropriation is less war-prone than a 
non-optimal one. Some of these findings are consistent with the empirical regu­
larities mentioned in the literature of conflict. It shouldn’t be difficult to see the 
relation between democracy and information; between average ratios of military 
expenditure to GDP and optimal allocation of resources. We can also find in the 
literature some support for the design of our bargaining procedures. Geller and 
Singer wrote about the importance of the status quo:
The orientation of a state’s decision makers toward the status quo
might be expected to have a critical impact on the probability of its
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initiation of, or engagement in, foreign conflict and war. Specifically, 
a nation that is satisfied with the status quo would be expected to 
engage in war only if attacked, and to initiate war solely under pre­
emptive or preventive circumstances. In contradiction, a state which 
is dissatisfied with the status quo, might be expected to initiate the 
use of force whenever circumstances are favourable and nonviolent 
means for change prove inadequate. The logic is found in various 
studies focusing on the behaviour of major powers (e.g., Oerganski 
1958; Organsky and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Modelski 1983), but it 
applies to minor powers as well.
However, there are some problems related to testing the utility models of 
war. First of all, it is very difficult to account for the utility of war since we 
don’t have reliable estimates of the costs of war. On the other hand, game theory 
models’ equilibria are highly influenced by the initial assumptions. For example, 
in a bargaining model, the equilibrium changes completely with changes on the 
assumptions about the bargaining extensive form. All these questions will require 
careful consideration.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
The existence of incompatibilities is a necessary condition but not sufficient to 
explain conflict. There are many theories that explain conflict according to differ­
ent classifications of it. It can be approached from many different methodologies 
and every one of them offers some understanding of it. However, no discipline 
can claim the production of some “General Theory of Conflict” . Therefore, we 
do not claim that we can give a complete explanation of conflict.
Given the complexity of the subject we have decided to abstract from the 
influence of cultural and political factors that have great influence in the existence 
of incompatibilities. We have focused on the strategy of conflict and concentrated 
on the study of optimal allocation of effort when resources are scarce. This process 
is complemented by a mechanism of negotiation which takes place in order to 
avoid the cost produced by conflict.
From all the types of conflict, we have dedicated our attention to wars or 
interstate conflict. Although the basic ideas should be applicable to many conflict 
situations, there were two main reasons to concentrate in this type of conflict. 
First, we considered the cost of conflict as one of the most important factors 
to understand its occurrence; it is apparent that wars are the most costly type 
of conflict. Second, the fact that nation-states are fully sovereign, allowed us to
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concentrate on strategic interactions in the absence of higher coercive institutions.
The political study of international conflicts applies to the study of systemic 
interactions and theories of hegemony, alliance formation, power struggles, theo­
ries of imperialism, etc. However, as we have mentioned in the previous chapter, 
we concentrated on dyadic interactions of countries, abstracting from systemic 
factors such as the number of alliances or the concentration of power. These 
dyadic interactions are assumed to be in evolutionary stable environment. Ex­
tending the analysis of the micro-level to account for possible evolutionary influ­
ences goes beyond the scope of this thesis. We have therefore, arbitrarily decided 
to focus in a narrow definition of conflict where economic models can offer some 
added valued to the already vast number of theories of conflict.
Introducing a model that allows parties to negotiate over the possible out­
comes of an underlying conflict gave us some interesting results. The possibility 
of negotiations introduces a completely new dimensions into the study of conflict, 
arms trade, and efficient allocation of resources.
When parties are allowed to negotiate, the corresponding equilibrium of mili­
tary expenditure is much lower compared to situations where negotiations cannot 
take place. The traditional idea that military security is a public good that de­
pends only on the respective stocks of arms of two potential enemies may not 
apply to every conflict. In these cases where the cost of negotiating is very low, 
and countries have perfect or near perfect information, the concept of military 
security should be replaced by economic security.
This model also introduced some interesting developments into Hirshleifer’s 
framework. The possibility of negotiating gives countries different allocations of 
resources from the ones predicted by the original models. This happens due to 
the fact that in the earlier models, the cost of conflict has no strategic effect 
on the optimal allocation of resources. However, when countries are allowed to 
negotiate, the country that has a strategic advantage can exploit the amount of 
potential damage in his favour, producing different optimal strategies.
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This is one of the first conclusions of this thesis. In the face of conflict, the 
status quo has a great value and the parties who have a strategic advantage can 
exploit it in a negotiation process. The cost of conflict seems to play a crucial part 
in the allocation of resources and division of income. The models in chapter 3 
simply demonstrate the benefits of incorporating the cost of conflict into analyses 
of wars: there is a great scope for extending research in this field.
Most theories of conflict are based on the assumption that countries decide 
their war and peace strategies based on calculations of the probabilities of winning 
a potential war. These models are heavily biased towards the idea of military 
security and pay little attention to economic security. Rather than concentrating 
on the probability of winning (as if accuracy about the probability of victory was 
the only rational consideration) these models put more emphasis in understanding 
the willingness to fight, a concept based on cost-benefit analysis.
For example, the model of bargaining with complete information in chapter 
3 provided a good analysis of the strategic allocations of fighting and productive 
efforts in terms of the marginal utility obtained by moving initial resources be­
tween those activities. It differed from other models of war in that we combined 
a bargaining model with an endogenous probability of winning the war, whereas 
most of the literature assumes bargaining over conflict to be exogenous. In other 
words, we provided a model of bargaining with an endogenous threat point and 
bargaining set. But it did not provide an endogenous explanation of conflict. In 
this framework, actual fighting never takes place.
Chapter 4 presented a model of conflict that differed from the previous models 
because we assumed asymmetric information. Participants always try to avoid 
costly conflict which takes place in some extreme circumstances. For some large 
enough probabilities of facing a ‘soft5 enemy, combined with a large gap in the 
perception of the cost of fighting, there is a positive probability of war.
We compared two main bargaining situations under asymmetric information: 
bargaining with fixed threat points and with optimal allocation of resources. The
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likelihood of war with an endogenous optimal allocation of resources is signifi­
cantly lower than the probability of a war under a fixed one. This indicates that 
the optimal prior allocation of fighting and productive activities on the negoti­
ation process has a more significant impact in the outcome of war than other 
factors traditionally considered more important, such as strategic military ad­
vantage or the probabilities of victory in the contest.
The parameters that have the most influence are a) prior beliefs, t>o and 
b) the difference between the externality cost of the soft and tough countries 
(7 —7 ). These have a direct influence on the expected value of different bargaining 
strategies.
The war decisiveness parameter m and the degree of integration a -  param­
eters that relate to the efficiency of appropriative and productive technologies- 
affect the expected income for both countries but have little role in determining 
the outbreak of war. 1
There are also a few conclusions in terms of the empirical support for our 
models, bearing in mind that the development of empirical tests of rational models 
of war lags well behind its theoretical formulation. Therefore, rather than a robust 
statistical test we present a series of interpretations.
The decline of Major Wars is suggested by our theories, given the increase of 
productivity of civilian technology and the improvements in telecommunications 
that many countries have experienced in the last decades. All this factors are 
consistent with the optimising behaviour predicted by the model. The proba­
bilities of war between different kind of regimes, classified according to the free 
circulation of information is also consistent. The fact that not a single war has 
broken out between nuclear powers can also be explained if we introduce some 
negotiation procedure into our models of conflict (Since destruction would be 
total, there are no miss-perceptions about it). The work of Bennett and Stam
xSee the simulations that we carried out in chapter 4.
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found considerable support for the effects of perceptions and calculations of the 
benefits and costs of war.
Some of the regularities about conflicts are that countries never go into war 2 
because of new militarized disputes. This indicates that countries try to avoid the 
cost of conflict by finding a negotiated settlement. During the last period of high 
uncertainty in the international system, conflict seems to be at its peak . The 
amount of ethnic conflict, identity struggles, religious wars and other problems 
that cannot be negotiated easily seems to be higher than conflicts related to 
disagreements about the partition of scarce resources.
The importance of optimal allocation of resources remains one of the less 
developed questions. We have also reported in appendix E.l the positive relation 
between arms races and conflict — that is a clear example of inefficient allocation 
of resources leading to more conflict.
We found ample evidence of the crucial role that the status-quo plays in 
conflict. Many of the factors that have been recorded by Barringer3 show the 
importance that the status-quo plays in the occurrence of conflict.
The empirical regularities presented in appendix E.2 are consistent with the 
models that we have just introduced. We have also reviewed some of the recent 
empirical work on conflict with specific application to testing rational models, 
obtaining positive results from those estimations.
We found no significant evidence of the effect on conflict from trade depen­
dency when we used the set of all disputes that record actual confrontation be­
tween states. We also found that the war equilibrium from War and Reason is 
significant which gives some support for our rational theories of conflict. These 
theories can also be applied to the interpretation of the different results in several 
empirical models.
2War is here considered when both countries engage in the use of physical violence, whereas 
a  m ilitary dispute involves a threat or display of force
3See appendix E.7
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There are several problems that shouldn’t be forgotten. First of all, calibrating 
the utility of war is a difficult task: one of the main problems is the lack of data 
about the costs and perceptions of decision makers which are fundamental in 
determining the equilibrium outcome.
Other problems arise from game theoretic constraints. Given the changes in 
the strategic situation of the international system, it is difficult to argue that 
any single game can be applied to every conflict situation, especially when we 
know that the outcome of a bargaining game can be influenced by the choice of 
negotiating procedures.
On the data collection front, although considerable effort has been put into 
recording all disputes in the international system, there are few explanatory vari­
ables which restricts the testing of more ambitious hypotheses. The size of the 
data set is a great constraint and its development would require a considerable 
amount of time and resources. It might be worth considering smaller data sets, 
case studies and sampling techniques, in order to introduce more explanatory 
variables.
Despite the above problems, we consider that the amount of empirical evi­
dence in favour of models of rational conflict behaviour is significant and further 
research should be taken in this direction.
Finally, despite the obvious problems with the classification of the stylised 
facts, our models are largely consistent with some of the widely accepted regu­
larities of conflict.
The conclusion for the policy maker that can be derived from this study is 
that more resources should be put into making the process of negotiation more 
efficient. The goals and political practices should be more transparent. More 
resources should be put into conflict management and resolution strategies and 
less resources into militarized security.
6.1 Developments
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 190
This work could be improved in two main directions. One is the theoretical 
formulation of conflict and the other is its empirical study.
Regarding the possible theoretical developments there are several main av­
enues to follow. First, we can improve the models of optimal allocation of re­
sources combining them with other developments in game theory. We could apply 
other ideas such as wars of attrition, arbitration, evolutionary game theory, mod­
els of imperfect information with signalling, with learning and other equilibrium 
refinements.
There is a fundamental difference between the time preference model and 
the exogenous risk of breakdown, deriving from the source of asymmetry and 
bargaining power. In many games the equilibrium outcome could be affected 
by the choice of bargaining procedure. A model of exogenous risk can give some 
interesting results because it gives the opportunity to introduce some asymmetries 
by:
• giving different perceptions to the exogenous risk of breakdown of negotia­
tions
• Introducing different degrees of risk aversion in the utility functions.
On the other hand, we can try to merge models of the optimal allocation of 
resources, with other models that explain the sources of incompatibilities and the 
complexity of conflict networks, systemic influences and the formation of norms 
and values that may a) introduce different principles of behaviour or b) affect 
the utility functions of the decision makers, introducing, for example, reference 
points or different degrees of risk aversion.
Another possible development of this thesis will be to improve the concept of 
the cost of fighting. Our models of bargaining introduce the idea that the effect 
of cost in conflict has been neglected and there is a great scope for extending
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research in this field.
Most part of theories of conflict are based on the assumption that countries 
decide their war and peace strategies based on calculations of the probabilities of 
winning a potential war. Those models are heavily biased on the idea of military 
security and pay little attention to economic security.
At this stage we have introduced a fixed exogenous cost. We could introduce 
the cost of conflict as a function of fighting intensities. We could even try to base 
our contest success functions on the probability of inflicting unbearable costs on 
the other party. However, the problem will be to introduce a sensible form that 
describes military technology not only as a relation between fighting intensities 
and probability of success, but also as a relation with the cost of destruction.
With respect to the development of empirical testing of rational models of 
war there is a great task ahead. There is no a systematic collection of data about 
the cost of war. Without it, it is difficult to establish the relation between say, 
political systems, military forces and perceptions of cost, which will ultimately 
bring about a peaceful or violent outcome.
Although this research agenda would be complicated, the results in this thesis 
suggest that it may prove fruitful to pursue.
Appendix A 
Introduction
A .l  The Seville Declaration
IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that we have inher- 
ited a tendency to make war from our animal ancestors. Although 
fighting occurs widely throughout animal species, only a few cases of 
destructive intraspecies fighting between organised groups have ever 
been reported among naturally living species, and none of these in­
volve the use of tools designed to be weapons. Normal predatory 
feeding upon other species cannot be equated with intra-species vio­
lence. Warfare is a peculiarly human phenomenon and does not occur 
in other animals.
The fact that warfare has changed so radically over time indicates 
that it is a product of culture. Its biological connection is primarily 
through language which makes possible the coordination of groups, 
the transmission of technology, and the use of tools. War is biologi­
cally possible, but it is not inevitable, as evidenced by its variation in 
occurrence and nature over time and space. There are cultures which 
have not engaged in war for centuries, and there are cultures which 
have engaged in war frequently at some times and not at others.
IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that war or any vi­
olent behaviour is genetically programmed into our human nature. 
While genes are involved at all levels of nervous system function, 
they provide a developmental potential that can be actualised only in 
conjunction with the ecological and social environment. While indi­
viduals vary in their predisposition to be affected by their experience, 
it is the interaction between their genetic endowment and conditions 
of nurturance that determines their personalities. Except for rare 
pathologies, the genes do not produce individuals necessarily predis­
posed to violence. Neither do they determine the opposite. While
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genes are co-involved in establishing our behavioural capacities, they 
do not by themselves specify the outcome.
IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that in the course of 
human evolution there has been a selection for aggressive behaviour 
more than for other kinds of behaviour. In all well-studied species, 
status within the group is achieved by the ability to cooperate and to 
fulfil social functions relevant to the structure of that group. ‘Domi­
nance’ involves social bonding and affiliations; it is not simply a mat­
ter of the possession and use of superior physical power, although it 
does involve aggressive behaviours. Where genetic selection for ag­
gressive behaviour has been artificially instituted in animals, it has 
rapidly succeeded in producing hyper-aggressive individuals; this in­
dicates that aggression was not maximally selected under natural con­
ditions. When such experimentally-created hyper-aggressive animals 
are present in a social group, they either disrupt its social structure 
or are driven out. Violence is neither in our evolutionary legacy nor 
in our genes.
IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that humans have a 
‘violent brain.’ While we do have the neural apparatus to act violently, 
it is not automatically activated by internal or external stimuli. Like 
higher primates and unlike other animals, our higher neural processes 
filter such stimuli before they can be acted upon. How we act is 
shaped by how we have been conditioned and socialised. There is 
nothing in our neurophysiology that compels us to react violently.
IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that war is caused by 
‘instinct’ or any single motivation. The emergence of modern warfare 
has been a journey from the primacy of emotional and motivational 
factors, sometimes called ‘instincts,’ to the primacy of cognitive fac­
tors. Modern war involves institutional use of personal characteristics 
such as obedience, suggestibility, and idealism, social skills such as 
language, and rational considerations such as cost-calculation, plan­
ning, and information processing. The technology of modern war has 
exaggerated traits associated with violence both in the training of 
actual combatants and in the preparation of support for war in the 
general population. As a result of this exaggeration, such traits are 
often mistaken to be the causes rather than the consequences of the 
process.
They concluded that biology does not condemn humanity to war. But, what 
is war? Modern wars take place amongst states. However, 10 out of the 13 most 
deadly wars since the Congress of Vienna in 1815 were internal-conflicts or civil- 
wars. On the other hand, if there is no break-out of hostilities, does it mean that
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there is no conflict? Many people live under a status quo which is the result of a 
violent imposition. It is, therefore, necessary to define the concept of conflict in 
a way that can eliminate these contradictions.
Appendix B 
The Bargaining Models
B .l Preference Assertions
Rubinstein makes five assertions about the players preferences:
For all r,s € S, t , ti ,t2 £ N, and i € {1 ,2}
A  1 i f r i>  Si, then (r ,t) >* (s, t);
A  2 if Si >  0 and t2 > t, then (s,ti) >i (s ,t2) >* (0,oo);
A  3 (r,U ) >i (s,ti +  1) iff (r, t2) >* [s ,t2, + 1);
A  4 if rn r and (rn,ti ) >* [s,t2), then (r,ti) (s,t2); 
i fr n -> r  and (rn,t\) >i (0,oo),then (r ,ti) >i (0,oo);
A  5 if (s +  e, 1) ~i ((s, 0), (s +  e, 1) ^  (5,0), and, Si < Si, then
B.2 Proof of infinite time horizon model
In order to demonstrate the uniqueness of the infinite time horizon model Fuden- 
berg & Tirole [121] follow the proof by Shaked and Sutton [122]. First, we must 
define an upper and lower bound representing the maximum (vi) and minimum 
(Ui) payoffs that each player can obtain, and then, show that both payoffs are 
the same.
Besides, we have to define the expected payoffs of every strategy profile at 
any point in time. For example, if a strategy leads to obtaining the whole income 
I  in period 3, its expected payoff in period 1, for c\ is 61 in period 2, and 62I  in 
period 1.
Similarly we define the maximum W{ and minimum w_i payoff that each country 
can obtain when a strategy beginning with the other player.
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When ci makes an offer, c2 will accept any s exceeding (1 — s) =  82v2. Hence, 
> 1 — 82v2 and by symmetry, y2 >  28iVi.
The highest equilibrium payoff tq satisfies:
Ui < max(l — 82v2, 8iW i) < max(l — 82v2, S2Vi).
and
max(l — 82v 2, 5\vi) —  1 — 82y2.
Thus: Vi <  1 — 82v2 and v2 <  1 —
Combining these inequalities:
v i > 1 — 82v 2 >  1 - 52(1 - 5 iV i).
Because Ux < -iq, this implies Vi =  «i. We can follow a similar procedure for 
(v2,v2), (wu wi) and (w2,w2).
This shows that there is a unique equilibrium.
B.3 Bayesian updating
When an offer gets rejected in period one, the seller updates his believes as follows: 
We know that the probability of rejection of pi in period 1 for the soft buyer 
is (1 — r(pi)) and for the tough (1 — r(pi)) =  1.
Then the updated probability of facing a soft buyer in second period will be:
_ . =  Pr[b rejects £i[pi] =  (1 -  r(pi))Pr(&)
1 Pr (rejection) Pr (rejection)
and also the total probability of rejection of pi is:
P r( rejection) =  (1 — r(pi))Pr(b) +  (1 — r(pi))Pr(b) —
=  IK1 - r(pi)) +  (i - c(pi))1
Therefore:
B.4 The Axioms of von Neumann-Morgensten
Consider a system U of abstract utilities u, v,w, • • • In U a relation is given, 
u > v,and for any number a, 0 < a <  1, and operation
a u  +  (1 — a ) v  — w .
These concepts satisfy the following axioms:
A 1 u > v is a complete ordering of U. This means u < v when v > u, Then: 
A l  1 For any two u,v one and only one of the three following relations holds:
U  =  V,  U  >  V,  U  <  V
A l  2  u > b, v > w, imply u > w.
A  2 Ordering and combining 
A 2  1 u < v implies that u < au +  (1 — a)u.
A 2  2  u >  v implies that u > au +  (1 — a)v.
A 2  3 u < v < w implies the existence of an a with
au +  (1 — a)v < w 
A 2  4 u > v > w implies the existence of an a with
a u  +  (1 — a ju  >  w
A 3 Algebra combining 
A 3  1
a u  +  (1 — a ) v  =  (1 — a ) v  +  a u
A 3  2
a ( /3 u  +  (1 — f$ )v ) +  (1 — a )v  =  j u  +  (1 — j ) v
W h e re  j  — a /3
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Appendix C 
Bargaining and conflict
C .l Matlab program
t y t y t y O / W O / « / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 /  0 / 0 / 0 / 0 7  0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 6 / 0 7 0 / 0 / 0 /  0 / 0 / 0 /  0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 /  
/o/G/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/oA/o/o/o/e/e/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/Q/o/o/o/eA/Q
70time preference model a la  h isch l %
% %
% 7-1-98 7o
o/o/o/o/o/«/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/c/ o/o/ 0/ 0/0/0/ 0/ 0/0/ 0/0/ o/«/ 0/0/ 0/0/ 0/0/0/ 0/9/0,
global mm ss r l  r2 kk f l  f2  dd gg 
“/ in i t i a l  resources are r i  and r2
rl-100;
r2=100;
%
% is  the parameters of the production function with CES 
%
ss= l;
°/o
%mm is  the decisiveness parameter that must be between 0 and 1
°/o
mm=l;
% gg is  the destruction co e ffic ie n t  between 0 and 1
t
gg= 0;
I
%dd is  the time preference co e ffic ie n t  between 0 and 1 
%
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dd=l;
7.
7»kk is a variable that counts the number of iterations 
%
kk=0;
7.
°/aff are the initial roots
7.
ff1=50; 
ff2=50;
x=fsolve(’tnash25,[ff1 ff2]*) ; 
fl=x(l) ; 
f2=x(2) ;
7,
7»the symmetric solution is 
7,
pause
%
7#The income for Country 1 and 2 is 
%
el=rl-f1 ;
e2=r2-f2 ;
zz= f1."mm+f2."mm ;
yy= (el."(l./ss)+e2."(l./ss))."ss ;
pause
sl=l-dd+dd."2 ; 
s2=l-sl;
IN1=(1-dd.*(i-dd.*(f1."mm./zz))).*yy 
IN2=(1-(1-dd.*(1-dd.*(f1."mm./zz)))).*yy
0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/07 0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/C/o; 0/0/0/0/0/0/C/0/0/0/C/0/07 0/6/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/oyo/ /o/o/o/o/e/a /o/o/o/o/o/q /o/o /o/o/o/o /o/o /o/o/o/o /o /g/o /o/o /o/o/o /q /q/q /o/o/q /o/o /q /o/o /q /o/q/o/q/o/q/q/q/q
7, 28-12-97 tnash2.m 7,
7. 7«
7«Calculation of the time preference Nash equilibrium7o 
7o 7oa/0/o/c/o/c/0/a/0/a/0/0/0/0/0/a/0/0/0/0/a/0/0/0/0/o/o/o/c/o/e/e/o/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0; /o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/a/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o
function q=tnash2(x)
global m m  ss rl r2 dd gg kk
q=zeros(2,l) ;
fl=x(l) ;
f2=x(2) ;
el=rl-f1 ;
e2=r2-f2 ;
xy= dd.*(l-gg)
xx= (1-dd)/dd."2*(1-gg) ;
zz= f 1. '‘mm+f2. ~mm ;
q( 1) = (f 1 ./(f2.''mm.*f 1. ''mm))-(mm.*el ...
(l+(e2./el) .'H(l./ss)))/(((xx*zz)+fl.’'mm) . *zz) 
q(2) = (f2./(f2,''mm.*f 1. ’“mm) ) - (mm. *xy .*e2.*.. . 
(l+(el./e2) ."(l./ss))) ./((zz-(f 1.~ m m .*xy)) . *zz) 
kk=kk+l
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Appendix D 
Incomplete Information
D .l Alternative Payoffs
D.1.1 Payoffs when Country 2 soft plays tough
Strategy Period Country 1 Country 2 (Soft) Country 2 (Tough)
1 1 5i I  r =  1 r =  1
2
2 1 s i  r =  0 r — I
2 s2I  r =  1
3 1 SjJ r =  0 r =  r
2 s2I  r =  0 r =  1
Table D.l: Three Strategies for Country 1
St. Country 1 Country 2 (Soft) Country 2 (Tough)
1 811 ( 1 - 3 0 /  I - V
2 (1 -  vq)sI  +  vq5is2I «2(1-S2)/ (1 -  s)T
3 (1 -  uo)[riiI + (1 -  r)5ia2i] r ( l -a O I +
+ti0(l -  7)^1 ( l - f ) i 2( l - & ) /
Table D.2: Expected payoffs for the Three Strategies
201
D.2 The Reaction Curves
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D.2.1 Strategyl 
Country 1
Country 1 using strategy 1 will maximize 7Tn =  s ff
d n n  ds_ i d l
— +  T/jT S-l
where
dFi dFi dFi
I  =  A ( ( R 1 - F ]) a +  { R i - E a ) a y
F m
S.1 =  1 “ &(1 ~ /) 1
flat , m F T /M .
dF1 ^  -v (Ff* +  ££*)2
91 =  -A {R 1 -  Fl)a- 1((R1 -  F1)a +  (ifc -  Z 2)“ ) i " 1
dFl
Country 2 (soft)
Under strategy 1, Country 2 (soft) will maximize 71*12 =  /  -  S]I
cki2 cU
j t 2 ~ w ~2
di
dFo
Country 2 (tough)
Under strategy 1, Country 2 (tough) will maximize 7T13 =  (1 — sL) /
dir 13 d7Ti3 ds! diriz dl
~T~dF2 ds:1 dF2 d l dF2
dir13
ds.i
=  - I
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d F 2 ( F f f  +  F f f ) 2
d iv is
d i =  (i - S i )
d i
d F 2 =  - A ( r 2 _ F 2)a_i((i?1 - Fx)a + (e2 - z 2r )“- 1
D.2.2 Strategy 2 
Country 1
Country 1 using strategy 2 will maximize ir2i =  v0s l  +  (1 — vo)<5is2I
dK2i  _  (  ds -  d i  ( ds2 T t 5 1-  +  C1 “ vo)<?i + -^rs2dFi u \dFl ' dFx J v ' V ^ i "  &Pi 
where _ _
8 = 1  1 —
5 s  _  ds d i  ds  5 1  5 s  5 s 2 
ap\ “  97ap\ +  d L d F i + d i2 d i\
ds _  62I  - 62(1 -  s2I) _  62s2l 2 
$ J -  jjy  “  ( f y ~
5 s  _  6s2
di =  ~T
d s _ _ 6 L  
ds2 I
=  ~ A ( R i  -  F 1r ~ 1( ( R 1 -  F { j a  +  (R 2 -  F 2r )« “ 1
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= -A (R i  -  F ^ d R i -  JFi)a + (i?2 -  F 2)“)“
,  m F ^ F ™  
- 2 = ( l - 7)- 2dFt v -  (F f1 +  F™)2
Country 2 (soft)
Country 2 (soft) using strategy 2 will maximize: 7T22 =  (1 — s)I
dir22 0^22 ds dir22 d l+dF2 ds dF2 d l dF2 
dir22
ds
-I
dir 22
di
95 +  («/-&/)) +
9Z2 (I)2
J r  =  - Z ) “ +  (Z2 - Z 2)“)“_1
O r  2
Country 2 (tough)
Country 2 (tough) using strategy 2 will maximize: ir2z =  52(1 — s2)I
dn23 dir22 ds2 ^  dir22 d l
dF_2 ds2 dF2 d l dF2 
dn22 r r
a i T =
^23 _  X f - t  \~~QJ~ ~  - 2V 1 ~  - 2)
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ds2 . raZfZJ*-1-2 = - ( l - 7) 1 “ 2az2 - ^ ( z z + z ?)2
=  -A (R 2 -  F ^ - ' i i R ,  -  Z i)“  +  (fl2 -  £ , ) “ )« '
D.2.3 Strategy 3
Country 1
Country 1 using strategy 3 will maximize
7T3i = V o ( r s J  + (1 -  r)5i52I) + (1 -  u0)5ipl(l -  7 )
where
lets find firstly M
"  _  v°s21 +  ( 1  “  t , o ) ( 1  ~  7)pL -  s2l
V q ( s 2I - s 21 )  
dFi
dr dr d l dr dp dr dl dr ds2 dr ds2
dFx d ldF i dp dF! d id  Ft ds2 dFx ds2 dFL 
dr VqS2(v0(s2I  -  s2I)) -  v0s2(vQs2I  +  (1 -  v0)( l  -  7)pl -  s2I)
dJ“  (v0(s2I  ~  s2I ) )2
dr _  (1 -  u0)(l -  7 ) /
dp V q (s2I - S 2l )
dr _  ((1 -  r>o)(l -  j)p  -  g2)^o(g2X ~ s2i) + t>0s2(r>os27 + (1 -  u0)(l -  7 )p l -  s2I )
d /“  M s27 -s 2I))2
dr _  -J(u0(g2X ~ s2I) + UoJ(u052I + (1 -  u0)(l -  7 )gj -  s2I)
s2 (uo(s27 -s 2/))2
dr u07(t>o(s27 “  S2 J O ) ~  V o I ( v o S 2I  + (1 -  u0)(l -  7 ) p L  ~  s2I )
(v0(s2I  -  s2I ))2
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dp _  mFT~lF f  
d F i  ~  (FT +  Z “ )2
9Zi
-A (R x -  Fi)a~l ((Ri -  F i)“  +  (i?2 -  Z 2)Q)I  ‘  /  *  ■ ' a — L / " /  i j  t p  \ a  i ! D  u i  19Zi
9s2 ,, , mZf-'Z”
( 1 - 7 )dF1 v -1' (Zf* +  Z™)2
952 = ( 1 _ T )
QFl v , / (Z1m +  Z 2 )2
end of
dir3i _  d n i dr d m  dsi dun di d%3\ ds2 dir31 dp dix3i d l
d Z T ~  ~dfr dF1 a iT a Z  ~WdF\  9Z! l ip  9Zx
=  va(sil - hs2I)
d m  _T-5T- =  «0«  dsi
=  i J o f f S !  +  ( 1  -  f ) c 5 i « 2 )
= (1 - vo)(5iI(l - 7)
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=  (1 -  v 0)(Jip(l -  t)
D.2.4 Country 2 (soft)
Country 2 (soft) using strategy 3 will maximize:
7 T 3 2  =  f ( l  -  Sl)I +  (1 ~  f ) < 5 2 ( l  “  S2) I
- -  VqS21+ 11 ~ ~ j)eL  ~ -2"
Vo{s2I  -  S2l )
dr dr d l dr ds2 4*dF2 d l dF2 ds2 dF2
M  =  —A(R2 -  F 2)“ - l ((i?1 -  F1)a +  (R2 -  F 2)a) i~ 1
u r  2
d s 2 m F ?  V f
d F 2 ' F 2 )!
end  of
d/K82 _  7r32 <9r ?r32 <9si 7r32 9 /  7r32 d s 2
ZFs ”  d f dF2 ds\ dF2 d l d~F2 ds2 dF2
((1 — si) — <$2(1 — s2))Id 7T  32
dr
d7T32 =  — f  I
$7132 /1 -at T
a i r  =  - ( 1  - r>w
APPENDIX D. INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
= f(l - Si) + (1 - -
Country 2 (tough)
Country 2 (tough) using strategy 3 will maximize
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D.3 The Matlab Program
D.3.1 The optimal allocation of resources
•/.---------------------------------------------------------------- •/.
'/.---------------------------------------------------------------- %
7 . ---------------------------------------------------------------- */.
°/a warl is a calculation of the equilibrium of a %
% bargaining model with endogenous allocation of fighting effort %
% in the paper "Rational Wars with incomplete %
% information" by P. Levine and F. Moraiz 3 / 2  /99 %
I ---------------------------------------------------------------- '/.
I ---------------------------------------------------------------- %
I ---------------------------------------------------------------- %
global fl f21 f2h rl r2 gg gh gl aa dd dh dl mm A vl
% y.7.%%y.y.yx/.y.y.nn7o7//.7.y.7.nyay//,%%%y//#ny.y.y.n%yoya%y.%%y.yo7.%%%%%y»y.%y,%%%y«yj//on%
% GLOBAL VARIABLES DEFINITION I
% fl is the expenditure in arms of Country 1 %
°/9 f21 and f2h are the expenditure in arms of country tough and soft % 
% rl and r2 are the initial resources of Country 1 and two %
% gg gh gl are the externality costs gamma gamma low and high %
% dd dh dl are the discounting factors %
% vl is the probability of facing a soft Country 2 %
%
% Enter the initial values 
°/«
disp(’-------------------------------------------------------------------- 5)
disp(’Calibration of the model of Rational Wars with incomplete information’) 
disp( ’-------------------------------------------------------------------- ’)
disp(’Enter the value of the externality cost for Country 1 gg’) 
disp(’Enter the value for Country 2 soft gh and tough gl’) 
disp(’gg must be bigger than gh, and gh bigger that gl’)
gg = input(’Enter gg: ’) 
gh » input(’Enter gh: ’) 
gl = input(’Enter gl: ’)
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rl = 100 ; 
r2 = 100 ; 
dd = 0.9 ; 
dl = 0.9 ;
dh - 0.9 ; 
aa = 1 ;
A = 1 
mm=l;
7
7 Loop for different probabilities of facing a soft country
7
for i = 1:100,
°/, Calculation of the probabilities of winning of Country 1
7
vl(i)=(i/100); 
vl=vl(i);
oy «/o/0/0/o/o/o/o/o/«/o/«/o/0/«/c/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/0/«/0/#/o/o/o/o/#/o/o/o/o/o/e/»/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/#/«/«/o/0/0/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/#/c/o.
7t Barwar is a m file that estimates the unique nash equilibrium %
% Barwar returns a unique value for FI, F21 and F2h 7,
o/o/ e/ o/ o/ o/e/o/ 0/ o/ c/ o/ o/o/o/ o/ e/o/o/o/ c/o/ c/ e/ o/e/o/e/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/ o/ o/ c/ o/ o/ o/oyo/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o//o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o /o/o
barwar21 ;
fffl(i)=f1;
fff2(i)=f21;
fff3(i)=f2h;
7
7 Once we have calculated the optimal allocation to FI, F21 and F2h 
7, we can proceed to calculate the different equilibrium outcomes for 
7 different values of gg, vl, mm ...
7
7» Probabilities of winning
pi = (fl~mm)/(fI'mm+f21~mm); 
ph = (f l~mm)/(f l~mm+f2h''mm);
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% Calculation of the size of cake
el = rl - fl ; 
e21 = r2 - f21 ; 
e2h = r2 - f2h ;
il = A*(el~(l/aa)+e21''(l/aa)) "aa ; 
ih = A*(el"(l/aa)+e2h"(l/aa))"aa ;
% Offers in period 2
s21 = l-(l-gl)*(l-pl) ; 
s2h = l-(l-gh)*(l-ph) ;
% Offers in period 1
sll = l-dl*(l-s21) ; 
slh = l-dh*(l-s2h) ;
o / o / o / o / o / o / o /0/ o / o / o / o / o / c y e / o / ° / f l / o / o / o / o / 0 / 0 / 0 / o / o / c / ° / d / c / ° / o / o / o / o / o / o / 0 / ° / o / o / e / o /  
/ o / o / o / o / o / o  / o / o  / o / o  / a / o  / o / o  / o / o  / o / o / & / o / o / o  / o / o  /o  / o / o  / o / o  /o  / a / o  / o / o / o  /o  / o / o  / o / o  / o / o / o / o
7PART I Country soft becomes tough because % 
*/#it has a higher expenditure in arms %
« / « / « / « / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 /  o / o / o / o / c / o /  0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / « / « / « /  0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 /  c /  0/ 0/ 0 / 0/ 0 / o,
if (l-gl)*(l-pl) < (l-gh)*(l-ph) ;
deni = (l-vl)*(s21*il-s2h*ih) ; 
nunl =(l-vl)*s21*il+vl*(l-gg)*ph*ih-s2h*ih; 
rtilda = nunl/denl; 
stilda = 1- (dl*(il-(s2h*ih))/il) ;
7.
% For Country 1 
%
pil = slh*ih ;
pi2 = (l-vl)*stilda*il+vl*dd*s2h*ih ;
pi3= vl*(rtilda*sll*il+(l-rtilda)*dd*s21*il)+vl*(l-gg)*dd*ph*ih ;
°/o
% For Country 2 soft 
%
pihl = (l-slh)*ih;
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pih2 = dh*(l-s2h)*ih ; 
pih3 = dh*(l-gh)*(l-ph)*ih ;
°/o
% For Country 2 tough
fl/o
pill = il-slh*ih; 
pil2 = (l-stilda)*il ;
pil3 = rtilda*(l-sll)*il+(l-rtilda)*dl*(l-s21)*il I
o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/ey o/oy oy o/e/o> o/o/o/o/o/oy o/o/o/0/0/0/0/e/o/o/d/oy oy 0/0/0/0/e/o/0/0/0/0/o/e/o/e/0/0/o/oy 0/0/0/0/0/0/e/o/
“/Country 1 calculates the strategy with the highest payoff °/0
if pil>pi2 
if pil>pi3 
cl(i)= pil ; 
c2t(i)= pill ; 
c2s(i)=pihl; 
strl(i)=pil ; 
end 
end
if pi2>pil 
if pi2>pi3 
cl(i)= pi2 ; 
c2t(i)= pil2 ; 
c2s(i)=pih2;
Str2(i)=pi2;
end
end
if pi3>pil 
if pi3>pi2 
cl(i)- pi3 ; 
c2t(i)= pil3 ; 
c2s(i)-pih3; 
str3(i)=pi3 ; 
end 
end
I
C/0PART II Country tough is tough and soft is soft 
%
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else
%
% This is the individual rationality for Country 1, equation 2 in 
7 first draft of the paper 
%
if (l-gg)*pl*il<s21*il 
%
7 This is the condition for Country 1 to be play soft 
% Equation 3 in the first draft
7
if s21*il > vl*s2h*ih+(l-vl)*(l-gg)*pl*il 
7
7 Country 1 is soft 
7 pil pi2 pill pil2 pihl pih2 
% Country 1 plays only strategy 1 and 2
7
stilda = 1- (dh*(ih-(s21*il))/ih) ;
7
°/0 For Country 1
7
pil = sll*il ;
pi2 = vl*stilda*ih+(l-vl)*dd*s21*il ;
7
% For Country 2 soft
7
pihl = ih-sll*il; 
pih2 = (l-stilda)*ih ;
7
% For Country 2 tough
7
pill = (l-sll)*il ; 
pil2 = dl*(l-s21)*il ;
7
% Otherwise Country 1 is tough
7
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if pil>pi2 
cl(i)=pil; 
c2t(i)=pill; 
c2s(i)=pihl ; 
str4(i)=pil ;
end
if pi2>pil ;
01(1) ^ 12; 
c2t(i)=pil2; 
c2s(i)=pih2 ; 
str5(i)=pil ;
end
else
%
% Country 1 is tough
% CALCULATE THE PAYOFFS FOE THE THREE STRATEGIES 
% pil pi2 pi3 pill pil2 pil3 pihl pih2 pih3 
%
rtilda = ((vl*slh*ih)+((l-vl)*(l-gg)*pl*il)-...
(s21*il))/(vl*((s2h*ih)-(s21*il))); 
stilda = 1- (dh*(ih-(s21*il))/ih) ;
%
% For Country 1 
%
pil * sll*il ;
pi2 = vl*stilda*ih+(l-vl)*dd*s21*il ;
pi3 = vl*(rtilda*slh*ih+(l-rtilda)*dd*s2h*ih)+(l-vl)*dd*pl*il ; 
%
% For Country 2 soft
7
pihl = ih-sll*il; 
pih2 = (l-stilda)*ih ;
pih3 = rtilda*(l-slh)*ih+(l-rtilda)*dh*(l-s2h)*ih ;
I
7 For Country 2 tough
7
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pill = (l-sll)*il ; 
pil2 = dl*(l-s21)*il ; 
pil3 = dl*(l-pl)*il ;
if pil>pi2 
if pil>pi3 
cl(i)= pil ; 
c2t(i)- pill ; 
c2s(i)=pihl; 
str6(i)=pil ; 
end 
end
if pi2>pil 
if pi2>pi3 
cl(i)= pi2 ; 
c2t(i)= pil2 ; 
c2s(i)=pih2; 
str7(i)=pi2; 
end 
end
if pi3>pil 
if pi3>pi2 
cl(i)= pi3; 
c2t(i)= pil3 ; 
c2s(i)=pih3; 
str8(i)sspi3 ; 
end 
end 
end 
else
cl(i)=vl*((1-gh)*ph*ih)*(1-vl)*((1-gg)*pl*il); 
c2t(i)=(l-gl)*(l-pl)*il; 
c2s(i)-(l-gh)*(l-ph)*ih;
end
end
end
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy
% Plot the results %
% Values for payoffs and expenditure in arms %
0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 7 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / ° / 0 / C / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / ° / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 //o/o/o/o /o/o A A A A/o/o A A/o/o A A A A A A A A/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o A/o/o/o/o/o A/o/o/o/o/o /o/o
x=[0.01:0.01:1];
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plot(x,cl,’o-’, x,c2t,’x-’, x,c2s,’+-’); 
xlabel(’Priors \upsilon_0’) 
ylabeK’EXPECTED INCOME’)
title(’ THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN PRIOR BELIEFS’) 
legend(’cl = country 1’,...
’c2t= country 2 tough’,...
’c2s= country 2 soft’)
The bargaining game subroutine
’/  %
barwar21.m is a calculation of the nash equilibrium of a %
the bargaining model warl.m in the paper "Rational Wars with incomplete °/a
information" by P. Levine and F. Moraiz 3 / 2  /99 %
 1
global fl f21 f2h rl r2 gg gh gl aa dd dh dl mm A vl
%
% Enter the initial values
I
fl= 45 ; 
f21 =45; 
f2h = 45 ; 
fli = 51; 
f21i= 53 ; 
f2hi =57 ;
yyyyyyyyyyyy °/y y°/yy yy yyyyyyy yy yyyyyyyyyyy°/yy °/yy yyy yyyyyy yyy
fl/a M U  M22 are the result vectors %
% M33 is a control vector for accuracy %
*/, The program loops for the solution until the accuracy %
°/» indicated in M33 is satisfied %yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy
Mll= [f1; f2h; f21];
M22=[fli; f2hi; f21i];
M33= [0.05; 0.05; 0.05];
while abs(MU(l)-M22(l))>M33(l); 
while abs(Mil(2)-M22(2))>M33(2);
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while abs(Mil(3)-M22(3))>M33(3);
Mil = M22 ; 
f1=M11(1) ; 
f2h=Mll(2) ; 
f21=Mll(3) ;
1
% Calculation of the probabilities of winning of Country 1 
%
pi = (fl"mm)/(fl"mm+f21"mm); 
ph = (f l~mm)/(fl"mm+f2h'Nmm);
I
% Calculation of the size of cake 
%
el = rl - fl ; 
e21 = r2 - f21 ; 
e2h = r2 - f2h ;
il = A*(el"(l/aa)+e21~(l/aa))~aa ; 
ih = A*(el'>(l/aa)+e2h~(l/aa))"aa ;
I
% Offers in period 2 
°/»
s21 = l-((l-gl)*(l-pl)) ; 
s2h = 1-((l~gh)*(1-ph)) ;
I
% Offers in period 1 
I
sll ■ l-(dl*(l-s21)) ; 
slh = l-(dh*(l-s2h)) ;
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%
“/Distinction between a soft always soft 
“/and a soft becoming tough 
%
0/0/ 0/ 0/ 0/0/ 0/0/ 0/ 0/0/ 0/0/0/ 0/ 0/0/0/ 0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/ 0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/ 
/ o  / o  / o  / o  / o / o / q / o / o  / o / g / g  / o / o / g  / o / o A  / q / o  / o / o / o  / o  / o / o / o / o  / o  / o  / o  / o / o / o / o  / o / o / o  / o  / q / o
“/PART I corresponds to PART I in warl.m “/,
o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/e/o/e/0/0/o/o/o/o/«/c/e/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/o/o/o/o/o/o/ 
/ o / g / g / g / o / o / g / g / o / o / g / o / o / o / o / o / g / o / o / o / o / o / o / o / g / g / g / g / g / o / o / o / g / g / o / o / g / o / o / o / o
if (l-gl)*(l-pl) < (l-gh)*(l-ph) ;
%
*/ Individual rationality constraint for Country 1
“/« If the constraint is not met country will proceed to war
%
if (l-gg)*pl*il < s21*il
“/ Distinction between soft and tough country 
%
if s2h*ih > (l-vl)*s21*il+ vl*(l-gg)*ph*ih
I
“/ Country 1 is soft
“/, pil pi2 pi3 pill pil2 pil3 pihl pih2 pih3 
“/ Country 1 plays only strategy 1 and 2 
%
stilda = 1- (dl*(il-(s2h*ih))/il) ;
I
“/» For Country 1 
“/«
pil = slh*ih ;
pi2 = (l-vl)*stilda*il+vl*dd*s2h*ih ; 
I
“/ For Country 2 soft
t
pihl = (l-slh)*ih;
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pih2 = dh*(l-s2h)*ih ;
%
% For Country 2 tough 
%
pill = il-slh*ih; 
pil2 = (l-stilda)*il ;
ffl = fl ; 
ff 2 = f2h ; 
ff3 = f21 ;
yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy
% For every possible choice of strategy we find the nash equilibrium by %
% solving the system of simultaneous equations in strl.m, str2,m str3.ni, %
’/. str4.m, str5.m, str6.m and strw.m (and strwl.m) %
0/0/V®/©/®/©/©/•/©/©/©/©/*/©/©/©/°/0/0/0/0/®/0/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/©/°/0/0/0/0/°/°/0/©/©/©/°/°/°//o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o
if all(pil>pi2)
x=fsolve(’str4’, [ff1 ff2 ff3] D  ;
stl=l;
end
if all(pi2>pil)
x=fsolve(’str5’,[ffl ff2 ff3]0 ; 
st2=1 ;
end
else
’/Country 1 is tough and plays three strategies
deni = (l-vl)*(s21*il-s2h*ih) ; 
nunl =(l-vl)*s21*il+vl*(l-gg)*ph*ih-s2h*ih; 
rtilda = nunl/denl; 
stilda = 1- (dl*(il-(s2h*ih))/il) ;
%
% For Country 1 
%
pil = slh*ih ;
pi2 = (i-vl)*stilda*il+vl*dd*s2h*ih ;
pi3= vl*(rtilda*sil*il+(l-rtilda)*dd*s21*il)+vl*(l-gg)*dd*ph*ih ;
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%
% For Country 2 soft
I
pihl = (l-slh)*ih;
pih2 = dh*(l-s2h)*ih ;
pih3 = dh*(l-gh)*(l-ph)*ih ;
%
% For Country 2 tough 
°/.
pill = il-slh*ih; 
pil2 = (l-stilda)*il ;
pil3 = rtilda*(l-sll)*il+(l-rtilda)*dl*(l-s21)*il ;
ffl = fl ; 
ff2 = f2h ; 
ff3 = f21 ; 
if all(pil>pi2&pi3)
x=fsolve(’str4’,[ffl ff2 ff3]’); 
st3=l; 
end
if all(pi2>pil&pi3)
x=fsolve(’str5’,[ffl ff2 ff3]’) ; 
st4=l;
end
if all(pi3>pil&pi2)
x=fsolve(}str6’,[ff1 ff2 ff3]’) ; 
st5=l;
end
end
fli = x(l) 
f2hi = x(2) 
f21i = x(3)
M22 = [fli; f2hi; f21i] 
end
if (l-gg)*pl*il>s21*il ; 
ff1=50 ; 
ff2=50 ;
x=fsolve(,stratw’,[ffl ff2]J); 
y=fsolve(’stratwl’,[ff1 ff2]’); 
fl=x(l);
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f21=x(2); 
fll=y(1); 
f2h=y(2);
fl= vl*fl+(l-vl)*f11;
fli= fl ; 
f21i= f21 ; 
f2hi=f2h ; 
st7=l
7
% Put the results back into M22 and start the loop 
%
M22 = [fli; f2hi; f21i] 
end
% PART II 
else 
%
°/8 Individual rationality constraint for Country 1
% If the constraint is not met country will proceed to war
7,
if (l-gg)*pl*il < s21*il ;
7,
% Distinction between soft and tough country 
%
if s21*il > vl*s2h*ih+(l-vl)*(l-gg)*pl*il
7.
7 Country 1 is soft
7. pil pi2 pi3 pill pil2 pil3 pihl pih2 pih3 
7 Country 1 plays only strategy 1 and 2
7
stilda = 1- (dh*(ih-(s21*il))/ih) ;
7
7 For Country 1 
7
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pil = sll*il ;
pi2 = vl*stilda*ih+(l-vl)*dd*s21*il ;
%
°/0 For Country 2 soft
y.
pihl = ih-sll*il; 
pih2 = (l-stilda)*ih ;
I
% For Country 2 tough 
%
pill = (l-sll)*il ; 
pil2 = dl*(l-s21)*il ;
ffl = fl ; 
ff2 = f2h ; 
ff3 = f21 ; 
if all(pil>pi2)
x=fsolve(’strl’, [ffl ff2 ff3]’) ;
st6=l;
end
if all(pi2>pil)
x=fsolve(,str2’,[ff1 ff2 ff3]’) ; 
st7*1;
end
y.
*/, Put the results back into M22 and start the loop 
%
else
%
“/Country 1 is tough and plays any of the three strategies
y.
deni a vl*((s2h*ih)-(s21*il)) ;
nunl =(vl*slh*ih)+((l-vl)*(l-gg)*pl*il)-(s21*il);
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rtilda = nunl/denl;
stilda = 1- (dh*(ih-(s21*il))/ih) ;
7.
7» For Country 1 
%
pil = sll*il ;
pi2 = vl*stilda*ih+(l-vl)*dd*s21*il ;
pi3 = vl*(rtilda*slh*ih+(l-rtilda)*dd*s2h*ih)+(i-vl)*dd*pl*il ; 
%
7# For Country 2 soft
7.
pihl = ih-sll*il; 
pih2 = (l-stilda)*ih ;
pih3 = rtilda*(l-slh)*ih+(l-rtilda)*dh*(l-s2h)*ih ;
7.
7* For Country 2 tough
7,
pill = (l-sll)*il ; 
pil2 « dl*(l-s21)*il ; 
pil3 » dl*(l-pl)*il ;
ffl = fl ; 
ff2 = f2h ; 
ff3 * f21 ; 
if all(pil>pi2&pi3)
x=fsolve(’strl’,[ffl ff2 ffS]’); 
st8=l; 
end
if all(pi2>pil&pi3)
x=fsolve('str2\ [ff1 ff2 ff3]*) ; 
st9=l;
end
if all(pi3>pil&pi2)
x=fsolve(,str3’,[ff1 ff2 ff3]’) ; 
stlO=l;
end
end
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fli = x(l); 
f2hi = x(2); 
f21i = x(3) ;
M22 = [fli; f2hi; f21i] 
end
if (l-gg)*pl*il>s21*il ; 
ff1=50 ; 
ff2=50 ;
x=fsolve(’stratw’,[ffl ff2]1); 
y=fsolve(’stratwl’,[ffl ff2]0; 
fl=x(l); 
f21=x(2); 
fll=y(l); 
f2h=y(2);
f1= vl*fl+(l-vl)*f11;
fli= fl ; 
f21i= f21 ; 
f2hi=f2h ; 
st 7=1
I
% Put the results back into M22 and start the loop 
%
M22 = [fli; f2hi; f21i] 
end 
%
% The unique outcome is the input for warl.m 
%
flx(i)=f1;
f21x(i)=f21;
f2hx(i)=f2h;
end
end
end
end
Calculation of the strategies
° /o ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
% The reaction functions of strategy 1 °/0
% This finds the nash equilibrium in PART I, barwar21.m °/0
% Model warl.m. Rational wars with incomplete information %
% --------------------------------------------------------- %
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function q=strl(x)
global vl mm dl dd dh gg gl gh rl r2 aa A fl f21 f2h
q=zeros(3,l) ,*
fl=x(l) ;
f2h=x(2) ;
f21=x(3) ;
%
*/, Main functions of the program 
%
ih=A* ((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h) "aa) " (1/aa) ; 
il=A*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"(1/aa) ; 
pl=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm) ; 
ph=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm) ;
S21 = l-(l-gl)*(l-pl) ; 
s2h = l-(l-gh)*(l-ph) ; 
slh = l-dh*(l-s2h) ; 
sll = l-dl*(l-s21) ;
“/derivatives
dpldl=mm*f 1" (mm-1) *f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm) "2 ; 
dpll=mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dphdl=mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dphh=mm*f2h" (mm-1) *fl''mm/ (fl"mm+f2h"mm) "2 ;
dlldl=(-1)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlhdl=(-1)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlhdh=(-1)*A*(r2-f2h)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlldl=(-l)*A*(r2-f21)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((l/aa)~l) ;
ds2hdls=(l-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=(l-gl)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslhdl= dh*(l-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ;
APPENDIX D. INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 226
ds2hdh=- (1-gh) *mm*f2h" (mm-1) *f 1 ''mm/ (f 1 J'mm+f2h"mm) "2 ; 
dslhdh= -dh*(l-gh)*mm*f2h''(mm-l)*fl*'mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslldi=dl*(1-gl) *mm*f 1" (mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm) "2 ; 
ds lldl=-dl* (1-gl) *mm*f21" (mm-1) *f l"mm/ (f l"mm+f2h"mm) " 2  ; 
ds21dl=-(1-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ;
pl3dsll=(-l)*il ; 
pl3dil= 1—sil ;
Rcl=dslldl*il+dlldi*sll ; 
Rc2=dlhdh;
Rc3=pl3dsll*dslldl+pl3dil*dlldl ;
q(l)= Rcl 
q(2)- Rc2 
q(3)= Rc3
% --------------------------------------------------------- 7
% The reaction functions of strategy 2 %
% This finds the nash equilibrium in PART I, barwar21.m %
7 Model warl.m. Rational wars with incomplete information °/»
7 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
function q=str2(x)
global vl mm dl dd dh gg gl gh rl r2 aa A fi f21 f2h
q=zeros(3,l) ;
fl=x(l) ;
f2h=x(2) ;
f21s=x(3) :
7
% Main functions of the program
7
ih=A*((rl-fI)"aa+(r2~f2h)"aa)"(l/aa) ; 
il=A*((rl-fI)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"(1/aa) ; 
pl=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm) ; 
ph=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm) ;
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s21 = l-(l-gl)*(l-pl) ; 
s2h » 1-(1-gh)*(1-ph) ; 
slh = l-dh*(l-s2h) ; 
sll = l-dl*(l-s21) ;
“/derivatives
dpldl=mm*fl"(mm-l)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dpll=mm*f21"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dphdl=mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dphh=mm*f2h"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ;
dlldl=(-l)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((l/aa)-l) ; 
dlhdl=(-1)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlhdh=(-1)*A*(r2-f2h)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((l/aa)-l) ; 
dlldl=(-1)*A*(r2-f21)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((l/aa)-l) ;
ds2hdl=(l-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=(l-gl)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
ds.lhdl= dh*(l-gh)*mm*f 1" (mm-1) *f2h"mm/ (f l"mm+f2h"mm) "2 ; 
ds2hdh=-(1-gh)*mm*f 2h"(mm-1)*f1"mm/(f1"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslhdh= -dh*(1-gh)*mm*f2h"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=dl*(l-gl)*mm*fl"(mm-l)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=-dl*(1-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=-(l-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ;
stilda=l-dh*(ih-s21*il)/ih ;
dstll= (-l)*dh*s21*il/(ih)"2 ; 
dsts21= dh*il/ih ; 
dstlh= dh*s21/ih ;
dstl=dstlh*dlhdl+dstll*dlldl+dsts21*ds21dl ; 
dsth=(dh*ih*dlhdh+dh*(ih-s21*il)*dlhdh)/(ih)"2 ;
p22dst=(-l)*ih ; 
p22dlh=l-stilda ; 
p23ds21=(-1)*dl*il ; 
p23dll=dl*(l-s21) ;
Rcl=vl*(dstl*ih+dlhdl*stilda)+(1-vl)*(ds21dl*il+dlldl*s21) ;
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Rc2= (p22dst*dsth) -5- (p22dlh*dlhdh) ;
Rc3=(P23ds21*ds21dl)+(p23dll*dlldl) ; 
q(l)= Rcl 
q(2)= Rc2 
q(3)= Rc3
% --------------------------------------------------------- %
% The reaction functions of strategy 3 %
% This finds the nash equilibrium in PART I, barwar21.m %
% Model warl.m. Rational wars with incomplete information %
7 .---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
function q=str3(x)
global vl mm dl dd dh gg gl gh rl r2 aa A fl f21 f2h
q-zeros(3,l) ;
fl=x(l) ;
f2h-x(2) ;
f21=x(3) ;
7.
% Main functions of the program
I
ih=A*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"(1/aa) ;
il=A*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"(1/aa) ;
pl=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm) ;
ph=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"ram) ;
s21 = l-(l-gl)*(l-pl) ;
s2h = 1-(1-gh)*(1-ph) ;
slh = l-dh*(l-s2h) ;
sil = l-dl*(l-s21) ;
7oderivatives
dpldl=mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dpll=(-l)*mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ;
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dphdl=mm*f 1" (mm-1) *f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm) "2 ; 
dphh=(-1)*mm*f2h" (mm-1)*fl"mm/ (fl"mm+f2h"mm) "2 ;
dlldl=(-1)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlhdl=(-1)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlhdh=(-1)*A*(r2-f2h)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlldl=(-1)*A*(r2-f21)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ;
ds2hdl-(1-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=(1-gl)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslhdl= dh*(1-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-l)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds2hdh=-(1-gh)*mm*f2h"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslhdh- -dh*(1-gh)*mm*f2h"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=dl*(1-gl)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=-dl*(l-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=-(l-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ;
rtilda=((vl*s2h*ih) + ((1-vl)*(1-gg)*pl*il)-(s21*il))/(vl*(s2h*ih-s21*il))
vy=vl*s2h*ih+(1-vl)*(1-gg)*pl*il-s21*il ; 
vx=vl*(s2h*ih-s21*il) ;
drts2h=(vl*ih*vx-vl*ih*vy)/vx"2 ;
drts21=((-1)*il*vx+vl*il*vy)/vx"2 ;
drtll=(((1-vl)*(1-gg)*pl-s21)*vx+vl*s21*vy)/vx"2 ;
drtpl=((1-vl)*(1-gg)*il)/vx ;
drtlh=(vl*s2h*vx-vl*s2h*vy)/vx"2 ;
drtl=drtlh*dlhdl+drtpl*dpldl+drtll*dlldl+drts21*ds21dl+drts2h*ds2hdl ;
p31Il=(l-vl)*dd*pl*(l-gg) ; 
p31pl=(1-vl)*dd*il*(1-gg) ; 
p31s2h=vl*(l-rtilda)*dd*ih ; 
p31Ih-v1*(rt iIda*slh+(1-rtiIda)*dd*s2h) ; 
p31slh=vl*rtilda*ih ; 
p31rt=vl*(slh*ih-dd*s2h*ih) ;
p32rt=((l-slh)-dh*(l-s2h))*ih ; 
p32slh=(-l)*rtilda*ih ;
p32Ih=rtilda*(1-slh)+(1-rtilda)*dh*(l-s2h) ; 
p32s2h=(-l)*(l-rtilda)*dh*ih ;
p33Il=dl*(1-pl)*(1-gl) ;
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p33pl=(-l)*dl(l-gl)*il ; 
drth=drtlh*dlhdh+drts2h*ds2hdh ;
Rcl=p31rt*drtl+p3islh*dslhdl+p311h*dlhdl+p31s2h*ds2hdl+... 
p31pl*dpldl+p3111*dlldl ;
Rc2=p32rt*drth+p32slh*dslhdh+p321h*dlhdh+p32s2h*ds2hdh ; 
Rc3=p3311*dlldl+p33pl*dpll ;
q(l)= Rcl 
q(2)= Rc2 
q(3)= Rc3
% --------------------------------------------------------- %
% The reaction functions of strategy 4 %
% This finds the nash equilibrium in PART II, barwar21.m %
% Model warl.m. Rational wars with incomplete information %
I --------------------------------------------------------- %
function q=str4(x)
global vl mm dl dd dh gg gl gh rl r2 aa A fl f21 f2h
q=zeros(3,l) ;
fl=x(l) ;
f2h=x(2) ;
f21=x(3) ;
vl=l-vl;
%
% Main functions of the program 
%
ih=A*((rl-fl)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"(1/aa) ;
il=A*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"(1/aa) ;
pl=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm) ;
ph=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm) ;
s21 = l-(l-gl)*(l-pl) ;
s2h = l-(l-gh)*(l-ph) ;
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slh = i-dh*(l~s2h) ; 
sll = l-dl*(l-s21) ;
“/derivatives
dpldl=mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dpll=mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dphdl=mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dphh=inm*f2h"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ;
dlldl=(-l)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlhdl=(-1)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlhdh=(-1)*A*(r2-f2h)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlldl=(-1)*A*(r2-f21)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ;
ds2hdl=(1-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=(l-gl)*mm*fl"(mm-l)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslhdl= dh*(l-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds2hdh=-(1-gh)*mm*f2h"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslhdh= -dh*(1-gh)*mm*f2h"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=dl*(1-gl)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=-dl*(l-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=-(1-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ;
dpl2dslh=-ih;
dpl2dlh=l-slh;
Rcl=dslhdl*ih+dlhdl*slh;
Rc2=dpl2dslh*dslhd1+dp12dlh*dlhdh;
Rc3=dlldl;
q(l)= Rcl 
q(2)= Rc2 
q(3)= Rc3
% --------------------------------------------------------- 1
*/ The reaction functions of strategy 4 “Z
“/# This finds the nash equilibrium in PART II, barwar21.m */
“/ Model warl.m. Rational wars with incomplete information “/
% --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- o/o
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function q=str4(x)
global vi mm dl dd dh gg gl gh rl r2 aa A fl f21 f2h
q=zeros(3,l) ;
fl=x(l) ;
f2h=x(2) ;
f21=x(3) ;
vi=l-vl;
7o
% Main functions of the program 
%
ih=A*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"(1/aa) ;
il=A*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"(1/aa) ;
pl=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm) ;
ph=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm) ;
s21 = l-(l-gl)*(l-pl) ;
s2h = l-(l-gh)*(l-ph) ;
slh = l-dh*(l-s2h) ;
sil = l-dl*(l-s21) j
“/derivatives
dpldl=mm*f 1" (mm-1) *f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm) "2 ; 
dpll=mm*f21" (mm-1) *fl"mm/ (fl"mm+f21"mm) "2 ; 
dphdl=mm*f 1" (mm-1) *f2h"mm/ (fl"mm+f2h"mm) "2 ; 
dphh=mm*f2h" (mm-1) *fl"mm/ (fl"mm+f2h"mm) "2 ;
dlldl= (-1) *A* (rl-f 1)" (aa-1) * ((rl-f 1) "aa+ (r2-f21) "aa)" ((1/aa) -1) ; 
dlhdl= (-1) *A* (rl-f 1)" (aa-1) * ((rl-f 1) "aa+ (r2-f2h) "aa)" ((1/aa) -1) ; 
dlhdh=(-1)*A*(r2-f2h)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlldl=(-l)*A*(r2-f21)"(aa-l)*((rl-fl)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((l/aa)-l) ;
ds2hdl=(l-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-l)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=(l-gl)*mm*fl"(mm-l)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslhdl= dh*(1-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(f1"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds2hdh=-(1-gh)*mm*f2h"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ;
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dslhdh= -dh*(1-gh)*mm*f2h"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=dl*(1-gl)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=-dl*(1-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=-(1-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ;
dpl2dslh=-ih; 
dpl2dlh=l-slh;
Rcl=dslhdl*ih+dlhdl*slh;
Rc2-dp12dslh*dslhdl-f-dp12dlh*dlhdh;
Rc3=dlldl;
q(l)= Rcl 
q(2)= Rc2 
q(3)= Rc3
% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------y #
7« The reaction functions of strategy 5 %
7 This finds the nash equilibrium in PART II, barwar21.m %
7 Model warl.m. Rational wars with incomplete information %
% --------------------------------------------------------- %
function q=str5(x)
global vl mm dl dd dh gg gl gh rl r2 aa A fl f21 f2h
q=zeros(3,1) ;
fl=x(l) ;
f2h=x(2) ;
f21=x(3) ;
vl=l-vl;
7
7 Main functions of the program 
7
ih=A*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"(1/aa) ; 
il=A*((rl-fl)"aa+(r2~f21)"aa)"(1/aa) ; 
pl=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm) ; 
ph=f1"mm/(f1"mm+f2h"mm) ;
s21 = l-(l-gl)*(l-pl) ;
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s2h = l-(l-gh)*(l-ph) ; 
slh = l-dh*(l-s2h) ; 
sll = l-dl*(l-s21) ;
“/derivatives
dpldl=mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dpll=mm*f21"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dphdl=mm*f1"(mm-l)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dphh=mm*f2h"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ;
dlldl=(-1)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlhdl=(-1)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlhdh=(-1)*A*(r2-f2h)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) ; 
dlldl=(-1)*A*(r2-f21)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((l/aa)-l) ;
ds2hdl=(l-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=(l-gl)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslhdl= dh*(1-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(f1"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds2hdh=-(1-gh)*mm*f2h"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(f1"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslhdh= -dh*(1-gh)*mm*f2h"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=dl*(1-gl)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=-dl*(1-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=-(1-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ;
stilda=l-(dl*(il-s2h*ih)/il);
dstdll=(-dl*s2h*ih)/(ih"2); 
dstdlh=dl*s2h/il; 
dstds2h=dl*ih/il;
dstdl=dstdlh*dlhdl+dstdll*dlldl+dstds2h*ds2hdl;
dp21dst=vl*il; 
dp21dll=vl*stilda; 
dp21ds2h=(1—vl)*dd*ih; 
dp21dlh=(l-vl)*dd*s2h;
dp22ds2h=-dh*ih; 
dp22dlh=dh*(l-s2h);
APPENDIX D. INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 235
dstdh=dstdll*dlldl+dstdlh*dlhdh+dstds2h*ds2hdh;
dp23dst=-il;
dp23dll=l-stilda;
Rcl=dp21dst*dstdl+dp21dll*dlldl+dp21ds2h*ds2hdi+dp21dlh*dlhdl;
Rc2=dp22ds2h*ds2hdh+dp22dlh*dlhdh;
Rc3=dp23dst*dstdh+dp23dll*dlldl;
q(l)= Rcl 
q(2)= Rc2 
q(3)= Rc3
% --------------------------------------------------------- %
% The reaction functions of strategy 6 %
% This finds the nash equilibrium in PART II, barwar21.m %
% Model warl.m. Rational wars with incomplete information %
% --------------------------------------------------------- %
function q=str6(x)
global vl mm dl dd dh gg gl gh rl r2 aa A fl f21 f2h
q=zeros(3,l) ;
fl=x(l) ;
f2h=x(2) ;
f21=x(3) ;
vl=l-vl;
7
% Main functions of the program 
7
ih=A*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"(1/aa) ;
il=A*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"(1/aa) ;
pl=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm) ;
ph=fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm) ;
s21 = l-(l-gl)*(l-pl) ;
s2h = l-(l-gh)*(l-ph) ;
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slh = l-dh*(l-s2h) ; 
sll = l-dl*(l-s21) ;
“/derivatives
dpldl=mm*f 1" (mm-1) *f21 "nun/(fl"mm+f21"mm) "2 ; 
dpll=mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(f l"mm+f 21"mm)"2 ; 
dphdl=mm*f1"(mm-l)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm) "2 ; 
dphh=mm*f2h"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ;
dlldl=(-1)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) 
dIhdl=(-l)*A*(rl-f1)"(aa-l)*((rl-fI)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((l/aa)-l) 
dlhdh=(-1)*A*(r2-f2h)"(aa-1)*((r1-f1)"aa+(r2-f2h)"aa)"((1/aa)-1) 
dlldl=(-1)*A*(r2-f21)"(aa-1)*((rl-f1)"aa+(r2-f21)"aa)"((1/aa)-1)
ds2hdl=(l-gh)*mm*fl"(mm-l)*f2h"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=(1-gl)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslhdl= dh*(1-gh)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f2h"mm/(f1"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds2hdh=-(1-gh)*mm*f2h"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(f1"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslhdh= -dh*(1-gh)*mm*f2h"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=dl*(1-gl)*mm*f1"(mm-1)*f21"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ; 
dslldl=-dl*(l-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-l)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm)"2 ; 
ds21dl=-(1-gl)*mm*f21"(mm-1)*fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm)"2 ;
vy=vl*s21*il+(1-vl)*(1-gg)*ph*ih-s2h*ih;
vx=vl*(s21*il-s2h*ih);
rtilda=vy/vx;
drtdll=(vl*s21*vx-vl*s21*vy)/vx"2;
drtdlh=(vx*((1-vl)*(1-gg)*ph-s2h)+vl*s2h*vy)/vx"2;
drtdph=(1-vl)*(1-gg)*ih/vx;
drtds2h=(-ih*vx-vl*ih*vy)/vx"2;
drtds21=(vl*il*vx-vl*il*vy)/vx"2;
drtdl=drtdll*dlldl+drtdlh*dlhdl+drtdph*dphdl+drtds2h*ds2hdl+...
drtds21*ds21dl;
dp31dsll=vl*rtilda*il;
dp31dll= vl*(rtilda*sll+(1-rtilda)*dd*s21);
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dp31drt=vl*(sll*il-dd*s21*il); 
dp31ds21=vl*(l-rtilda)*dd*il; 
dp3ldlh=(1-v1)*(1-gg)*dd*ph; 
dp31dph=(1-vl)*(1-gg)*dd*ih;
dp32dph=-dh*(1-gg)*ih; 
dp32dlh= dh*(1-gg)*(1-ph);
drtdl=drtds21*ds21dl+drtdll*dlldl;
dp33drt=(1-sll)*il-dh*(l-s21)*il;
dp33dll=rtilda*(1-sll)+(l-rtilda)*dh*(l-s21)*il;
dp33dsll=-rtilda*il;
dp33ds21=dh*il;
Rcl=dp31dsll*dslldl+dp31dll*dlldl+dp31drt*drtdl+dp31ds21*... 
ds21dl+dp31dlh*dlhdl+dp31dph*dphdl; 
Rc2=dp32dph*dphh+dp32dlh*dlhdh;
Rc3=dp33drt*drtdl+dp33dll*dlldl+dp33dsll*dslldl+dp33ds21*ds21dl;
q(l)= Rcl 
q(2)= Rc2 
q(3)= Rc3
%
% The reaction functions of war between 
'/» Country 1 and Country 2 tough 
% Model barwarl.m and warl.m 
°/«
function q=stratw(x)
global gg dl rl r2 aa mm fl f21 gl
q=zeros(2,l) ;
fl=x(l) ;
f21=x(2) ;
f11= (fl"mm+f21"mm); 
ppl= fl"mm/(fl"mm+f21"mm); 
pp2= 1-ppl;
rrl= ((rl-f1)"(1/aa)+(r2-f21)"(1/aa));
q(l) = (l-gg)*(mm*(f l's(mm-l))*(f21"mm)*(rrl"aa)/fll~2-ppl*. . .
((rl-f1)"(1/aa-1))*(rrl"(aa-1)));
q(2)=(l-gl)*(mm*(f21"(mm-l))*(fl"mm)*(rrl"aa)/fU"2-pp2*...
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((r2-f 21) " (1/aa-l))*(rrl" (aa-i)));
7
% The reaction functions of war between 
°/0 Country 1 and Country 2 soft 
% Model barwarl.m and warl.m 
%
function q=stratwl(y)
global gg dl rl r2 aa mm fl f2h gh
q=zeros(2,l) ;
fly=y(l) ;
f2h=y(2) ;
f 11= (f l"mm+f 2h"mm); 
ppl= fl"mm/(fl"mm+f2h"mm); 
pp2= 1-ppl;
rrl= ((rl-fI)"(l/aa)+(r2-f2h)"(1/aa));
q(l)=(l-gg)*(mm*(fl"(mm-l))*(f2h"mm)*(rrl"aa)/fll"2-ppl*... 
((rl-f1)"(1/aa-l))*(rrl"(aa-1)));
q(2)=(1-gh)*(mm*(f2h"(mm-1))*(fl"mm)*(rrl"aa)/fll"2-pp2*... 
((r2-f2h)"(1/aa-l))*(rrl"(aa-1)));
The equilibrium with fixed allocations
7 -------------------------------------------------------------- %
% fixwar is a calculation of the equilibrium of a 7
7 bargaining model with exogenous allocation of fighting effort 7
7 in the paper "Rational Wars with incomplete 7
7 information" by P. Levine and F. Moraiz 3 / 2  /99 7
o/#-------------------------------------------------------------- o/o
global fl f21 f2h rl r2 gg gh gl aa dd dh dl mm A vl
7
7 GLOBAL VARIABLES DEFINITION 
7 fl is the expenditure in arms of Country 1
7 f21 and f2h are the expenditure in arms of country touth and soft 
7 rl and r2 are the initial resources of Country 1 and two 
7 gg gh gl are the externality costs gamma gamma low and high
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% dd dh dl are the discounting factors 
% vl is the probability of facing a soft Country 2
1
% Enter the initial values 
1
dispC5----------------------------------- ’)
disp(’Calibration of the fixed allocations’) 
disp( ’----------------------------------- ’)
disp(’Enter the value of the externality cost for Country 1 gg’)
disp(’Enter the value for Country 2 soft gh and touth gl’)
disp(’gg must be bigger than gh, and gh bigger that gl’)
gg = input(’Enter gg: ’)
gh = input(’Enter gh: ’)
gl = input(’Enter gl: ’)
rl = 100 ; 
r2 = 100 ; 
dd = 0.90 ; 
dl * 0.87 ;
dh = 0.93 ; 
aa « 1 ;
A = 1 ; 
mm=l ; 
vl=0.8;
1
1 Loop for different probabilities of facing a soft country 
%
for i = 1:10, 
for j = 1:10, 
for h = 1:10,
% Calculation of the probabilities of winning of Country 1
°/o
fll(i)=(i/10); 
fl=f11(i); 
f211(j) = (j/10);
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f21=f211(j); 
f2hl(h)=(h/10); 
f2h=f2hl(h);
%
% Barwar is a m file that estimates the unique nash equilibrium 
% Barwar returns a unique value for Fl, F21 and F2h
°/,
%
% Once we have calculated the optimal allocation to Fl, F21 and F2h 
% we can proceed to calculate the different equilibrium outcomes for 
% different values of gg, vl, mm ...
%
% Probabilities of winning
pi = (fl"mm)/(fl"mm+f21"mm); 
ph = (fl"mm)/(fl"mm+f2h"mm);
°/a Calculation of the size of cake
el = rl - fl ; 
e21 = r2 - f21 ; 
e2h = r2 - f2h ;
il = A*(el"(l/aa)+e21~(l/aa))"aa ; 
ih = A*(el"(l/aa)+e2h"(l/aa))~aa ;
°/» Offers in period 2
s21 = l-(l-gl)*(l-pl) ; 
s2h = 1-(1-gh)*(1-ph) ;
% Offers in period 1
sll = l-dl*(l-s21) ; 
slh = l-dh*(l-s2h) ;
/PART I
if (l-gl)*(l-pl) < (l-gh)*(l-ph) ;
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deni = (l-vl)*(s21*il-s2h*ih) ; 
nunl =(1-vl)*s21*il+vl*(1-gg)*ph*ih-s2h*ih; 
rtilda = nunl/denl; 
stilda = 1- (dl*(il-(s2h*ih))/il) ;
7.
% For Country 1 
%
pil = slh*ih ;
pi2 = (l-vl)*stilda*il+vl*dd*s2h*ih ;
pi3= vl*(rtilda*sil*il+(l-rtilda)*dd*s21*il)+vl*(1-gg)*dd*ph*ih ;
7
7o For Country 2 soft 
%
pihl = (l-slh)*ih;
pih2 = dh*(l-s2h)*ih ;
pih3 = dh*(l-gh)*(l-ph)*ih ;
7o
7o For Country 2 tough
7
pill = il-slh*ih; 
pil2 ■ (l-stilda)*il ;
pil3 = rtilda*(l-sll)*il+(l-rtilda)*dl*(l-s21)*il ; 
if pil>pi2 
if pil>pi3 
incl(i,j,h)= pil ; 
inc21(i,j,h)= pill ; 
inch(i,j,h)=pihl; 
strl(i,j,h)=pil ; 
end 
end
if pi2>pil 
if pi2>pi3 
incl(i,j,h)= pi2 ; 
inc21(i,j,h)= pil2 ; 
inch(i,j,h)=pih2; 
str2(i,j,h)=pi2; 
end
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end
if pi3>pil 
if pi3>pi2 
incl(i,j,h)= pi3 ; 
inc21(i,j,h)= pi!3 ; 
inch(i,j,h)=pih3; 
str3(i,j,h)=pi3 ; 
end 
end
‘/PART II 
else 
%
% This is the individual rationality for Country 1, equation 2 in 
% first draft of the paper 
%
if (l-gg)*pl*il<s21*il
7
7 This is the condition for Country 1 to be play soft 
7 Equation 3 in the first draft
7
if s21*il > vl*s2h*ih+(l-vl)*(l-gg)*pl*il;
7
7 Country 1 is soft 
7 pil pi2 pill pil2 pihl pih2 
7 Country 1 plays only strategy 1 and 2
7
stilda = 1- (dh*(ih-(s21*il))/ih) ;
7
7 For Country 1 
7
pil = sll*il ;
pi2 = vl*stilda*ih+(l-vl)*dd*s21*il ;
7
7 For Country 2 soft 
7
pihl = ih-sll*il; 
pih2 = (l-stilda)*ih ;
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I
°/0 For Country 2 tough 
%
pill = (l-sll)*il ; 
pil2 = dl*(l-s21)*il ;
%
% Otherwise Country 1 is tough 
%
if pil>pi2
incl(i,j,h)=pil; 
inc21(i,j,h)=pil1; 
inch(i,j,h)=pihl ; 
strl(i,j,h)=pil ;
end
if pi2>pil ;
incl(i,j,h)=pi2; 
inc21(i,j,h)=pil2; 
inch(i,j,h)=pih2 ; 
str2(i,j,h)=pil ;
end
else
%
% Country 1 is tough
% CALCULATE THE PAYOFFS FOR THE THREE STRATEGIES 
% pil pi2 pi3 pill pil2 pil3 pihl pih2 pih3
I
rtilda = ((vl*slh*ih)+((l-vl)*(l-gg)*pl*il)-(s21*il))...
/(vl*((s2h*ih)-(s21*il))) ;
stilda = 1- (dh*(ih-(s21*il))/ih) ;
I
% For Country 1
°/o
pil = sll*il ;
pi2 = vl*stilda*ih+(l-vl)*dd*s21*il ;
pi3 = vl*(rtilda*slh*ih+(l-rtilda)*dd*s2h*ih)+(l-vl)*dd*pl*il
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%
°/0 For Country 2 soft 
1
pihl = ih-sll*il; 
pih2 = (l-stilda)*ih ;
pih3 = rtilda*(l-slh)*ih+(l-rtilda)*dh*(l-s2h)*ih ;
%
% For Country 2 tough 
°/«
pill = (l-sll)*il ; 
pil2 = dl*(l-s21)*il ; 
pil3 = dl*(l-pl)*il ;
if pil>pi2 
if pil>pi3 
incl(i,j,h)= pil ; 
inc21(i,j,h)= pill ; 
inch(i,j,h)=pihl; 
strl(i,j,h)=pil ; 
end 
end
if pi2>pil 
if pi2>pi3 
incl(i,j,h)= pi2 ; 
inc21(i,j,h)= pil2 ; 
inch(i,j,h)=pih2; 
str2(i,j,h)=pi2; 
end 
end
if pi3>pil 
if pi3>pi2 
incl(i,j,h)= pi3 ; 
inc21(i,j,h)= pil3; 
inch(i,j,h)=pih3; 
str3(i,j,h)=pi3 ; 
end 
end 
end 
else
incl(i,j,h)=vl*((1-gh)*ph*ih)*(1-vl)*((1-gg)*pl*il); 
inc21(i,j,h)=(l-gl)*(l-pl)*il;
in c h ( i , j  ,h) = ( l-g h )* (l-p h )* ih ;
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end
end
end
end
end
Appendix E 
Empirical Analysis
E .l Other studies of conflict
So far most part of the empirical studies have been applied to the test of theories 
of conflict from the political science, which has a great influence is the nature 
of the data available. Whether those theories are consistent with some empir­
ical regularities or not depends very much in the way we define the empirical 
regularities of conflict.
Geller and Singer produced a list of consistent and cumulative empirical reg­
ularities of war based on a review of over 500 empirical studies. They found some 
of the most significant factors that increase the probability of war. These factors 
are classified according to the level of analysis (see appendix E.2 and they are 
mostly associated with issues such as the balance of power, the status quo, the 
number of alliances, the contiguity between states, etc.
One of the reasons for the abundance of those theories might be the hetero­
geneity that characterizes conflict. Azar [123] already recognizes the presence of 
many different approaches and classifications of empirical facts in international 
relations. This consists of a series of inventories of empirical findings classified 
according to factors such as:
1. “Limited War” (the intensity of war)
2. the hierarchical structure of the international systems
3. crisis behaviour
4. international interactions
5. biases of information sources available to practitioners
6. significance of alliances in matters of war and peace
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7. predominance of “great powers” in the international communications sys­
tem, and
8. the complex and changeable but understandable underlying dimensionality 
of international communications (i.e. the rapid changes in telecommunica­
tions and its impact in the international community).
Therefore, we should choose the scope of our analysis before we established 
the stylized facts of conflict. Brito and Intrilligator (1996) mention some of these 
facts in relation to the assumption of the rationality of war.
1. In one of the most cited studies on conflict, The War Trap, Bueno de 
Mesquita [100] concluded that wars are consistent with rational behaviour.
2. Wallace ,1982 [124, 125] studied the outbreak of war in serious great power 
disputes and concluded that conflict and disputes accompanied by arms 
races are much more likely to result in war.
3. Siverson and Tennefoss [126] divided conflict into three levels: threats, un­
reciprocated military action and reciprocated military actions. They divide 
nations into four categories: allied major powers, unallied major powers, 
allied minor powers, and unallied minor powers. They found that major 
powers and allied minor powers seem to be involved in less hostility that 
unallied minor powers.
4. Smith [127] focussed on the war proneness of arms races, and found that war 
is normally consistent with rational behaviour on the part of the initiator; 
second, an arms race is less likely to lead to war if the status quo power 
“loses” the arms race; third, conflict between major powers is limited and 
is less likely to escalate into war than conflict between major and minor 
powers; fourth, major powers and allied minor powers seem to be involved 
in less hostility than unallied minor powers; and fifth, unallied minor powers 
initiated conflict with major powers, but there is no case where unallied 
minor powers initiated conflict.
These empirical regularities compiled by Intrilligator and others clearly apply 
to the family of theories that addresses conflict either as a power concentration 
problem or power parity.
A more interesting classification is that of Kumar Rupesinghe [120]. He en­
larges the scope of conflict in order to prove a basic change in its empirical 
regularity: the emergence of new types of conflict. It might be the case that ma­
jor wars are disappearing whereas regional and internal conflict if not increasing 
are not yet decreasing. He established some characteristics based on SIPRI [128] 
observations. This data set reduced the threshold to less than 1000 deaths. As a 
consequence the number of conflicts in the World increased significantly.
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Using this data Rupesinghe observed the following regularities from World 
War II:
1. Most armed conflicts take place in the Third World.
2. The basic issues in the armed conflicts in 1989 were related to internal 
matters.
3. Inter-state conflicts are currently on the decline.
4. External intervention by a regional or international power lead to military 
withdrawals or negotiations of withdrawals.
5. The UN security council war rarely involved though is likely to play a more 
active role in the future
6. In most cases, internal conflicts have been fuelled by arms sales.
7. There has been consistent violations of human rights. Civilians account for 
74% of official deaths.
8. Conflict has involved cross-border affiliations or networks.
9. Many of the conflicts are identity struggles.
The last classification of regularities regarding conflict and the State are those 
stylized facts of conflict and economic performance.
There is no systematic compilation of the regularities of growth and conflict 
together. Barro and Sala I Martin [129] included in their regression for growth 
a conflict variable called political instability. It was defined as the average over 
each decade of revolutions per year and political assassinations per million inhab­
itants per year. The estimated coefficient on political instability is negative and 
marginally significant, -0.033(s.e.=0.018). In their regressions they also include 
two other variables. A war dummy for countries that participated at least in an 
external war, and a variable for defence expenditures. The estimated coefficient 
of the defence expenditure variable was essentially 0, whereas the war dummy was 
negative, but not statistically significant, -0.0061 (s.e=.0.00390). They concluded 
that the failure to isolate important growth effects from external wars results from 
the poor quality of data, rather than the unimportance of war. Blomberg (1995) 
analyzed the effects of political instability and the defence burden in growth. In 
his model defence expenditure works as a sort of insurance policy for the govern­
ment against the probability of being overthrown. The empirical evidence that 
he presented supports the idea that political instability reduces growth. Finally, 
we did not find any study of the empirical regularities of conflict, information 
environment and economic growth. There is plenty of data in growth and both 
internal and external conflict. It could be worthwhile to establish the empirical 
regularities regarding conflict and economic performance by selecting conflicts of 
an essentially economic nature .
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E.2 Empirical Regularities
Level of Analysis: state
• Power status (major power)
• Power cycle (critical point if major power)
® Alliance (alliance member)
• Borders (number of borders)
Level of Analysis: dyad
® Contiguity/proximity (common border/distance)
• Economic development (absence of joint advanced economies)
• Static capability balance (parity)
@ Dynamic capability balance(unstable:shift/transition)
• Alliance (unbalance external alliance-tie)
® Enduring rivalry
Level of Analysis: region
• Contagion/diffusion (presence of ongoing regional war)
Level of analysis:system
® Polarity (weak unipolarity/declining leader)
9 Unstable hierarchy 
9 Number of Borders
• Frequency of civil/revolutionary wars
There are also other factors that affect the seriousness of the war once it takes 
place. These factor are:
Level of Analysis: state
• Power status (major power)
Level of Analysis: system
® Alliance (high polarisation)
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E.3 Data
E.3.1 The Correlates of War Project (COW): Interna­
tional and Civil War Data, 1816-1992
This data collection [118] describes international and civil wars for the years 
1816-1992. The unit of analysis is the participant in a particular conflict. Each 
participant is coded, along with battle and total deaths, pre-war population and 
armed forces, and whether the member in question initiated the conflict. The 
conflicts are classified in two major categories: international war and civil war.
International war
In order to be considered a nation-participant in the interstate system, certain 
minimal criteria of population and diplomatic recognition were used (at least 
500,000 total population and either diplomatic recognition by at least two major 
powers or membership in the League of Nations or United Nations). This part of 
the dataset describes two types of international wars: Interstate wars, in which 
a nation that qualifies as a member of the interstate system engages in a war 
with another member of the interstate system. Extra-systemic wars, in which 
a nation that qualifies as an interstate system member engages in a war with a 
political entity that is not an interstate system member. Extra-systemic wars 
are further divided into two sub-types. The first sub-type, the imperial war, 
involves an adversary that is an independent political entity but does not qualify 
as a member of the interstate system because of limitations on its independence, 
insufficient population to meet the interstate system membership criteria or a 
failure of other states to recognise it as a legitimate member. The second sub- 
type, the colonial war, includes international wars in which the adversary was a 
colony, dependency or protectorate composed of ethnically different people and 
located at some geographical distance or, at least, peripheral to the centre of 
government of the given system member.
Civil war
This dataset is a study of 150 major civil wars involving a total of 204 participants 
between 1816 and 1988. An internal war is classified as a major civil war if
(a) military action was involved, (b) the national government at the time was 
actively involved, (c) effective resistance (as measured by the ratio of fatalities of 
the weaker to the stronger forces) occurred on both sides and (d) at least 1,000 
battle deaths resulted during the civil war.
APPENDIX E. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 251
E.3.2 Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948- 
1978
COPDAB is an extensive, longitudinal, computer-based library of daily interna­
tional and domestic events/interactions. As of January 1, 1980, COPDAB holds 
about 500,000 event records systematically coded from about 70 international 
sources, covering the period between January 1, 1948 and December 31, 1978. 
These event records describe the actions of about 135 countries in the world both 
toward one another and within their domestic environments. The following pages 
identify the COPDAB nations and sources, and contain a brief description of the 
procedures used to code, scale, and store the descriptive and analytic events data.
A typical descriptive event record, such as an international border clash or 
domestic press censorship, which one finds in a public source such as a newspaper, 
chronology, or some historical account, is coded into eight variables. Specifically 
a COPDAB event record contains which source reported who did or said what 
to whom about what issue-area(s) and when. Furthermore, an event record 
contains the evaluation of the coder regarding the type and the scale value of 
an event. International events are occurrences between nation-states which are 
distinct enough from the constant flow of “transactions” , (e.g., trade, mail flow) 
to stand out against this background as “reportable, or newsworthy” . Thus, to 
qualify as a descriptive event, an occurrence has to be actually reported in a 
reputable and available public source. For example, the conclusion of a trade 
agreement would qualify as a descriptive event in COPDAB’s scheme but the 
subsequent routine trade flows conducted under its terms would not.
This data set represents an improvement in relation to the analysis of the role 
of information in the conflict. There are several variables that might be use as 
approximations to define the information structure such us the ones that involve: 
information exchanges, scientific cooperation, tourism, exchange of cultural trips 
or artifacts, etc. It is also an improvement in respect of measuring tensions and 
other interactions which indicates high level of conflict but do not result in war 
or violent confrontation.
E.3.3 The MID data set
There is a growing number of studies on international conflict that employ the 
dyadic interaction between states as the unit of analysis. The most widely 
used data set for this type of study is the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) 
dataset (Bremer, Jones and Singer, 1996 [130]).
The MID data set consists of two types of observations:
1. The dispute level. This level includes general information about the dispute 
such us starting date, number of participants, level of hostility, etc
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2. The individual participant level. This level provides very similar informa­
tion about each participant. It includes the starting and end date of each 
participant in the conflict, the side it fought for etc,.
The extrapolation from the individual level to the dyadic level is easy to 
perform. However, Maoz [131] highlights some of the problems to carry out such 
transformations when we deal with multilateral conflicts:
In strictly bilateral disputes, it is easy to transform the partici­
pation records for a specific dispute into a dyadic record, including 
the combination of data from the dispute profile record in the dispute 
data set. However, performing such a combination on multilateral 
dispute may cause a great number of errors.1
Although the definitions of what constitutes a dispute may vary, considerable 
effort has been made recording all different interactions between states that can 
be categorised as under the general concept of conflict. Despite the problems 
reported by Zaov, the MID constitutes a comprehensive data set on interstate 
conflict, the dependent variable in our study.
E.3.4 Other data sets of conflict
There are other data sets on conflict most, collected by Inter-university Consor­
tium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)3. In this data bank there are over 
50 different abstracts and datasets about conflict and stability at national and 
international level. The range of issues covered is quite large: domestic violence, 
attitudes and justifications of violence, human rights violations, etc. However 
none of these studies include a systematic approach to the study of information 
structures and the realization of conflict. All those compilations of data on con­
flict are in a certain way customised for the sort of theory they attempt to prove 
or disprove. The Correlates of Wax Project Data Set was created in order to 
test a series of hypotheses and theory proposals that have a lot to do with those 
families of political theories of conflict that I have already mentioned. If we try to 
prove another point from another perspective we need more variables or different 
codifications. COPDAB covers a wider range of issues since they attempt not 
only to explain the source of war but instability, international tension as well as 
events that lead to peace, integration and improvements of quality of life. An­
other example is a more recent compilation by Wallensteen and Sollenberg [132] 
which only covers the armed conflict of the past decade. They define conflict as a 
contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the
1Many of these errors are especially relevant for the Eugene data set. They included Non 
Valid Dyads and Inaccurate Levels of Hostility, absurds such us states fighting themselves or 
Distorted Disputes Outcomes
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use of armed forced between two parties, of which at least one is the government 
of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. The data that they pro­
duced is quite good at proving the relative importance of external and internal 
conflict.
E.4 Estimation methods for models of conflict
In most statistical models of conflict the dependent variable itself can be dichoto- 
mous in nature. Although this variable could take many values, in most studies 
it ranges between 1 and 0. Normally 1 means the realization of the variable, for 
instance war, or militarized dispute. This poses some estimating problem.
There is a wide range of estimating methods in the economic literature. The 
most commonly used approaches are the logit and probit models. For example, in 
a logit model the dependent variable Yi, (i =  1 , . . . ,  n), can take only the value 1 
if for example conflict takes place, or 0 if peace. We review these methods in the 
appendix, section: E.4.1. In section E.4.2 we continue with some of the problems 
of logistic analysis. We will also mention some of the econometric methods of 
sampling data. This is of particular interest for those cases where we have dyad 
data with very high numbers of peace years and very few realizations of conflict.
Most data sets of conflict provide cross-sectional and time-series observations. 
Panel data allow us to construct more complicated models than we would if 
we only use time-series or cross-section data. It is very common to encounter 
many estimation problems derived from omitted variables for which panel data 
estimation may offer some solutions. In section E.4.3 we review this methodology. 
We put especial attention to this methods that are applicable to Binary Time 
Series Cross Section Analysis in section E.4.4.
These appendices cover the most commonly used methodology in the empiri­
cal literature of conflict. In the next section we are going to review two well-known 
paradigms of conflict analysis, and then use some of our game-theoretic founda­
tions to propose some improvements to theses models in the following section.
E.4.1 The logit and probit models
In a logit model the dependent variable Yi, (i — 1 ,... ,n), can take only the value 
1 if for example conflict takes place, or 0 if peace. This variable is described by 
a Bernoulli distribution. The only parameter of the Bernoulli distribution is ni, 
the probability of conflict.
If Xi — {1, Xu, X 2i . . .  is a vector of explanatory variables, the logit 
model specifies the relationship between irz- and X{ as a linear function such us:
*< =  E (Y = n X i )  =  I T Y ™ -
(E.1)
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If 7q is the probability of war, 1 — m is the probability of peace.
= l - E ( Y  =  l\Xi) =  I - M ?
Then the odds ratio is simply Taking natural logs, the odds ratio can 
be expressed as:
Li =  log ( j 3 ~ )  =  (E.2)
These models have the following properties: a) As J i  increases increases, 
but never out of the range [0,1] and b) Although L is linear with respect of Xi, 
the relationship between 7q and Xi is non linear.2
However, if we have data only at the individual level we cannot estimate 
equation E.2. If we have observations of a single country which will be either at 
war 7Tj =  1 or in peace,7Tj =  0, the values of the log function will be:
Li =  In if country is in war
L{ =  In f  ^  if country is in peace
which makes no sense.
Gujarati [133] shows how to use the relative frequencies to obtain the esti­
mated logit. However, most part of econometric packages provide methods for 
estimating the logit models by maximum likelihood.
The derivation of the logit log-likelihood function is quite straight forward. 
For simplicity we follow Green’s [134] notation. Each observation is treated as 
an independent event from a Bernoulli distribution. The model with success 
probability F(Xi/3)  leads to the likelihood function:
Pr (Yi =  ih, =  I* .. . . ,  n  =  KW) =  n  [1 -  F (*1®)] n  F V iP )  (E.3)
y—0 y = i
where
* W )  =
ex,f)
1 H- eXi&
2That the probability of an event must range between 0 and 1 is obvious by definition. An 
obvious case is the changes in probability of winning the war as a result of a marginal increment 
in military expenditure. If the ratio of arms is say, 1 to 10, a marginal increase in arms will 
produce a small change in the probabilities of winning but if the ratio is 1 to 1, a marginal 
increase will bring about a huge change in the probabilities of winning (other things equal).
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and taking logs we get
In L =  Y : 2/i I n
oXi/3
1 +  eXi&
The first order conditions are then
d\nL
+  (1 -  yi) In 1
,Xifi
1 +  eXi&
d/3 =  U v i -  i r ^  = 0
(E.4)
(E.5)
and the second order derivatives are
d2 I n LH = d/3d(37 = - E
eX,0
--------------5-XjX!
1 +  ex <f>)2
(E.6)
The variance of fi is computed using the Hessian and equation E.l; we get
V(/t) = 5 > (
.2=1
-1
(E.7)
The F.O.C. can be solved by Newton’s Method. Most part of econometric 
software provide easy option to estimate logit and probit models. There can also 
with a variety of options to test for the significance of the model. Test for omitted 
variables, heteroscedasticity and goodness of fit are commonly available.
The probit model is quite similar to the logit, but assumes a normal cumula­
tive distribution function.
TTj =  Pr(Y -  1) =  Pr(/,* < Ii) =  F(Ii) =  -/ =  f T' e~ ^ 2dt
y  2IT J-oo
(E.8)
Logistic and probit models are quite similar and have been used interchange­
ably in the literature. It is very difficult to choose one on simple analytical 
grounds and, in many cases, the choice is a question of convenience more than 
any other thing.
However, we have to be more careful in the case of conflict studies. We should 
expect different estimates if a) our sample contains very few realizations of y =  1, 
or Y  =  0 and b) if there is a wide variation in one important independent variable. 
Which is the case for most data sets of conflict.
E.4.2 Sampling data on conflict
The usual strategies are random sampling or exogenous stratified sampling. 
When one of the values of Y  is rare in the population, we can either select on
Y  =  1 randomly or take all the available cases and then select a random sample of
Y  =  0. This requires normally previous knowledge of the fraction of ‘ones’ in the
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population. In the case of conflict, this is normally available since considerable 
effort has been put into recording all international disputes since the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815. The selection on Y can be efficient but are only valid with the 
appropriate statistical corrections.
There are many methods for statistical corrections. Prior correction and 
weighting are frequently used in the empirical research on conflict as reported by 
King and Zeng [111].
Prior correction involves computing the usual logistic regression and 
correcting the estimates based on prior information about the fraction 
of ones in the population r, and the observed fraction of ones in the 
sample (or sampling probability), y.
In the logit model Hseih et al [135] and Amemiya and Vuong [136] show 
the statistical properties of variable selection. For the most general formulation 
presented by King and Zeng prior correction is consistent, fully efficient and easy 
to apply. The MLE is a statistically consistent estimate of and the following 
corrected estimate is consistent for /3q
(3o ~ In (E.9)
There are also different approaches to prior correction when information on r  
is not available. One of the clear advantages of prior correction is that it is easy 
to compute. However if the model is misspecified, we can obtain more robust 
estimates by weight selection. It compensates for differences in the sample (y) 
and population (r) fractions of ‘ones’ induced by choice-based sampling. The 
resulting MLE by Manski and Lerman 1977 [137].
I n L w(/3 1 Y )  =  w i Y  l n ( 7 T i ) + u ; o  Y  l n ( l  “  7 u )  ( E . 1 0 )
{Yi=l} {Yi=o>
where w\ =  r/y and wq =  (1 — t)(1 — y)
Weighting can be more appropriate than prior correction when a large sample 
is available and the functional form is misspecified, but it is asymptotically less 
efficient than prior correction.
Finally, there are several problems to avoid selecting on the dependent vari­
able. Sampling design for prior correction and weighting requires independent 
random selection. Other non-random methods of selection require a different 
statistical approach. And most important, when selecting on Y, we have to be 
careful not to select differently on X. Most part of empirical studies pay a lot 
of attention to this point. A clear example for this problem is the choice of all 
politically relevant dyads. If we select all the dyad war years Y  =  1 from a
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comprehensive data sets and then choose a number of (Y =  0) from the whole 
population we are implicitly selecting on X, which will pick up the influence of 
the higher disposition to war that those countries experience.
E.4.3 Panel data methods
A panel data model will take the form:
Vu =  a* +  fa n  +  uit (E .ll)
where £ is a scalar exogenous variable (hi =  1) and u& is the error term with 
mean zero and variance <r2. The parameters a:* and are assumed in this model 
to differ cross-section but to remain constant over time. 3. If heterogeneous
coefficients are disregarded the results of least square regression on all NT  (cross-
section x time-periods) observations can be seriously misleading.
Testing for homogeneity of regression slopes and coefficients can be done in 
three steps. Since parameters are constant over time we can run a separate 
regression in each individual. Then three types of restrictions can be imposed. 
Hi: Regression slope coefficients are identical, and intercepts are not
Uit — <2* +  (3rXit +  uu (E.12)
H2\ Regression intercepts are the same, and slope coefficients are not.
Hit =  o f +  (3'iXit +  uu (E.13)
H3: Both slope and intercept coefficients are the same
Dit ~  o% +  pXit +  uu (E.14)
Under the assumption that the uu are independently normally distributed 
over i and t , this hypothesis can be tested by using the F  test based on sums of 
squared residuals from linear restrictions.
For example, the hypothesis of heterogeneous intercepts but homogeneous 
slopes (Hi) can be formulated as a series of (N  — 1) linear restrictions in equa­
tion E .ll:
H\ : Pi = /?2 = • * * =  Pn
A similar analysis can be produced if we assume that coefficients my vary over 
time. In general, heterogeneity produced by the effects of omitted variables can 
be driven by these three categories:
@ Individual varying but time period invariant
3The possibility of all the coefficients varying over time may be also considered
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® Time period varying but individual invariant
• Individual varying and time period varying
A general variable intercept specification for fitting regression models using 
panel data can take the form:
Vit — p- +  fil%lit +    1" filCXKit +  Vit (E.15)
The classic procedure is to assume that the effects of omitted variables are 
independent of x and are independently distributed. All observations are random 
variations of a representative individual. This isn’t the case for many panels. 
Ideally, the individual and time effects should be introduced such us:
vu ~'yzi +  Xrt +  uit (E.16)
Unfortunately there usually are no observation on Z{ and r*. A natural alter­
native is to consider the effects on the products 7Zi — 7*, and A77 =  Xt. Then, 
the model can be estimated as:
Vit =  7* +  +  fixu +  uu (E.17)
In this specification the effects of omitted variables have been absorbed into 
the intercept term. These effects can be considered fixed or random. In the case 
of fixed effects we assume At constant over all the individuals and 7i constant 
over time. These models are calculated by introducing a set of i dummy variables 
for each individual in the panel and a set of t dummy variables for each year in 
the panel.
In the random effects models the effects across time and individuals are treated 
as random. The residuals consist of three elements:
Vit ~  &i +  A* +  Uit (E.18)
where
Eoii = EXt — Euu — 0, EaiXt — EcxiUn =  EXtUa — 0,
Var(di) =  a l Var(Xt) — a\ Var(uit) -  a\
The residuals in the random models are correlated, and most part of the 
econometric packages estimate these models by Generalized Least Squares meth­
ods (GLS).
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Discrete data
For a random sample of N  individuals, the likelihood function for the linear 
probability model, the logit and the probit models is the following:
L =  f [  -  Fftfxt)]*  (E.19)
i=l
We can proceed to take the first and second order derivatives to find the MLE 
estimator of and the variance. (Amemiya, Maddala)
Most part of static binary panel data analysis assume for simplicity that the 
heterogeneity across cross-sectional units is time-invariant. Thus the individual 
specific effects are capture by the error term as in:
vn =  (%i +  un (E.20)
with
Var(vit\ai) =  Var(uu) — For fixed effects 
Ecu — Eun =  0 ; Var(uit) =  a2 +  a2 For random effects
If the individual specific effect, g:*, is assumed to be fixed, then both di and 
(3 are estimated for the model Pr(yu =  1) =  F(ffxn  +  di). When T tends 
to infinity, the MLE is consistent. In the case of the logit function, there is 
a consistent estimator for small T  size based on the Neyman and Scott [138] 
principle. Since there are only a limited number of observations di suffers from 
incidental parameter estimation problems. Unfortunately, the MLEs for di and 
j3 are not independent of each other for the binary models. When T is fixed, 
the inconsistency of di is transmitted to /3 even if N tends to infinity. Hopefully, 
conflict data sets have a large number of observations, so we may not consider 
alternatives for consistent estimation for small sample size.4
For the random effects models the computation of the MLE produce consistent 
estimators but is computation is more demanding. Hsiao explains the procedure:
An alternative is to assume that the incidental parameters di are 
independent of Xi and are a random sampling from a univariate dis­
tribution jfiT, indexed by a finite number of parameters 6. The log- 
likelihood function becomes
N  T
log L =  E l o g /  n  HP'xu +  -
i=l t=l
4Chamberlain [139], otherwise.
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Which provides consistent estimators of (3 as N  goes to infinity.
E.4.4 Binary-Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis
There is a great number of studies of conflict that use logit or probit estimations 
in conjunction with cross section analysis. If the observations are temporally 
related the results my be misleading. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz address 
this problem in several papers. Beck [140] Beck and Katz [141], [142], Beck et 
al. [143]. These Authors consider a series of relevant issues: First, there is a 
critical distinction between TSCS data and Panel data and secondly, there is 
some concern about the use of lagged dependent variables to correct for temporal 
dependency.
TSCS data is often considered as panel data with a large number of observa­
tions and small number of countries.
When we think of panel data, we are thinking of repeated sample sur­
veys of a large number of respondents, with the number of repetitions 
typically being small. In panel data there is no interest in the sam­
ple per se, with all the inferences of interest being to the underlying 
population.
TSCS data typically consists of annual observations on some coun­
tries (perhaps 15-20 OECD nations or 50 states or 100 or so nations) 
observed annually (say) for some reasonable length of time, say 20-50 
years. Inferences of interest are to the observed countries, which are 
never thought of as a sample from a larger population of countries.
This distinction is quite important when we try to deal with the prob­
lem of temporal dependence. Some schoolers such as Russet and Bon­
net (1999) proposed to use the general estimating approach GEE. The 
theoretical justification for the GEE is in terms of asymptotics in N. 
However, in TSCS data the number of countries N  is fixed. Any 
asymptotic work of TSCS must assume that T  —» oo. Therefore, we 
need T  to be reasonably large. Fortunately most panel data has an 
appropriate size of AT’s and T ’s.
General Estimating Equation (GEE) is an estimating approach that specifies 
within group correlation structure of panel data which is comparable to random 
effects regressions. The GEE is based on quasi-maximum likelihood and is one 
of the most commonly used approaches in conflict data analysis. It has good 
asymptotic properties in N  but there is no evidence on how well it performs with 
small samples.
Beck and Katz proposed an alternative to GEE in order to deal with temporal 
dependence. This is based on the fact that BTSCS and event history or grouped
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duration data are equivalent. Any history method is potentially suitable for 
BTSCS data and they allow corrections for censoring, heterogeneity and duration 
dependence.
Event history analyse the probability of a spell (a duration variable) will end 
in the following interval of time given that it has lasted for until time t.
l(t, A) =  Pr(t < T < t +  A|T > t).
And the hazard rate is the rate at which spells are completed after duration 
t. They are the most common approach in even history analysis. Cox (1975) 
models a continuous time duration hazard rate as:
/j(s|a:ia =  ho(s)e1!"P (E.21)
where x^s is the vector of independent variables at time s. In this model the 
hazard of exit depends both on the independent variables an the length
of time that the unit has been at risk.
For discrete time Beck and Katz use a variant which incorporates logit link.
Pr(fe =  l|s«) =  h(t\xit) =  -  -  (E.22)
This equation differs from the ordinary logit by the inclusion of temporal dum­
mies, Kt-to- Omitting these variables is equivalent to assuming that the baseline 
hazard is constant and therefore the model shows no temporal dependence.
If we have temporal independent data, these dummies would produce ineffi­
ciency and incorrect standard errors, and in some cases inconsistent parameter 
estimations and multicollinearity. The test of whether the temporal dummies 
should be included or not is a standard likelihood ratio test with the hypothesis 
that all the Kt_t0 =  0.
Finally there are some problems that should be taken into consideration. First 
BTSCS data allows for multiple failures per unit. Ordinary logit assumes that 
the probability of failure in any year is the same as any other year (depending 
only on exogenous variables). Since the only relevant information about k is time 
since the most recent event the second and subsequent events are independent of 
the number and timing of previous events.
If conflicts really are multi-year, we should simply drop all but the 
first year of the conflict from the analysis. If we have a theory about 
the duration of peace, we should not include spells of conflict in test­
ing that theory. However, since we can observe different conflicts in 
consecutive years, this would be tantamount to discarding new, but 
very short, spell of peace. A decision on how to proceed should be 
made on theoretical grounds.
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There is another complication regarding left-censoring. Spells are left-censored 
if we don’t know when they started. In data sets there are different criteria to 
establish the starting point. We can either take the beginning of a new security 
regime. For example, it is quite common to make the departure at the end of 
the II World War, taking this point in time as the beginning of a new security 
regime.
Finally, other problems may arise from missing data and fixed variables across 
units. In practice, although they may pose some problems at system level anal­
ysis, they arise seldom given the particular structure of the dyadic data sets.
E.5 Tables
Column I in table E.l replicate Russet and Oneal results while columns II-IV 
show different developments introduced by Beck et al. to correct for dependency. 
The likelihood ratio test for of I versus II, III and IV respectively, indicates strong 
duration dependence.
E.6 Variables of the expected utility generation 
program
These is the list of variables produce by Eugene.
E.6.1 Available for Country-Year, Directed-Dyad- 
Year, and Dispute Dyad Output
CCode: Output will list the COW country code for the individual 
country (if country-year output is selected) or for the two members 
of the dyad (if dyad-year output is selected) for whom the rest of the 
data correspond to. It is highly recommended that this variable be 
included in the output file, or the user will not know which data goes 
with which country.
Year: Output will list the year that the rest of the data corresponds 
to. It is highly recommended that this variable be included in the 
output file, or the user will not know which data goes with which 
year.
Capabilities: Output will include the values of the national capa­
bilities index.
Major Power Status: Output will include a ”1” if the country is a 
major power in the given year, or a ” 0” if it is not.
Table E.l: Comparison of Ordinary Logit and Grouped Duration Analyses
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Ordinary 
Logit Grouped Duration
Logit Logit Cloglog
Dummy0 Spline Dummy6
Variable I II III IV
Democracy -0.55 -0.54 -0.49
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Economic Growth -2.23 -1.15 -1.15 -0.81
(0.85) (0.92) (0.92) (0.76)
Alliance -0.82 -0.47 -0.47 -0.43
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Contiguous 1.31 -0.30 0.69 0.55
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Capability Ratio -0.31 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Trade -66.13 -12.67 -12.88 -12.50
Constant -3.29 -0.94 -0.96 -1.11
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Peace Years -1.82
(0.11)
Spline ( l )c -0.24
(0.003)
Spline (2)c -0.08
(0.01)
Spline(3)c -0.01
(0.003)
Log Likelihood -3477.6 -2554.7 -2582.9 -2554.1
df 20983 20036 20979 20949
N=20990
Source: Beck et all (1999)
Standard errors in parentheses
° 31 temporal dummy variables in specification not shown 
3 dummy variables and 916 observations dropped 
due to outcomes being perfectly predicted 
634 temporal dummy variables in specification not shown 
cCoefficients of Peace Years cubic spline segments
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Table E.2: Involvement in Militarized Interstate Disputes, All Dyads, 1950-92. 
SOURCE: Russett and O’Neal.
All Dyads/IMF Trade Data All Dyads
Variable
Yrs Peace 
Correction GEE
Yrs Peace 
Correction GEE
Lower fi -40.5 -122 -34.0.0 -182
Dependence SEp 22.1 53 21.8 66
P .07 .02 .12 .006
Higher 1.40 0.71 1.52 0.810
Dependence 1.69 2.43 1.96 2.72
.41 .77 .44 .77
Joint Democracy -0.00363 -0.00281 -0.00332 -0.00239
0.00077 0.00087 0.00068 0.00075
< .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
Contiguity 2.14 2.80 2.46 2.92
0.22 0.26 0.21 0.23
< .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
Log Distance -0.399 -0.489 -0.592 -0.701
0.079 0.088 0.076 0.081
< .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
Major Power 1.44 1.58 1.91 1.94
0.22 0.27 0.23 0.25
< .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
Allied -0.430 -0.666 -0.0532 -0.870
0.212 0.242 0.168 0.196
.04 .006 .002 < .001
Log Capability -0.188 -0.169 -0.231 -0.224
Ratio 0.056 0.0778 0.051 0.061
< .001 .034 < .001 < .001
Constant -0.351 -1.85 0.517 -0.362
0.623 0.678 0.626 0.656
.57 < .001 .41 .58
x2 1481.4 970.4 2166.8 1691.5
X2 d.f. 12 8 12 8
P of x 2 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
Pseudo-R2 .33 — .36 —
N 118,466 118,382 271,262 269,712
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Home Region: Output will include an integer marking the region 
that the country (if country-year output is selected) or countries (if 
dyad-year output is selected) is in. Regional memberships are defined 
as given by the COW Interstate System Members list. Integers cor­
respond to regions as follows: Europe=l; Middle East=2; Africa=3; 
Asia=4; North and South Ameriea=5.
Risk Attitude-EUGene: Output will include the values Ri from 
the risk attitude calculations performed by EUGene. If the ’’Country- 
Year” unit of analysis is selected for output, the output will include 
risk scores for a given state in all regions. If the ” Dyad- Year” unit of 
analysis is selected, risk scores will be reported for the two states in 
the dyad for the region that is relevant for their conflict and so to the 
calculation of expected utility.
Risk Attitude - WTR: Output will include the values from the 
risk attitude calculations performed by Bueno de Mesquita (1985).
Risk Details: This outputs the values from the intermediate com­
ponents of the risk attitude calculation from EUGene. Specifically, 
this outputs actual, maximum hypothetical, and minimum hypothet­
ical security values. If the ” Dyad-Year” unit of analysis is selected, 
these values will be reported for the two states in the dyad for the 
relevant region of their conflict and expected utility calculations. If 
the ” Country-Year” unit of analysis is selected for output, the out­
put will include detailed intermediate information on the risk scores 
for the given state in all regions. Values are from -1 to +1, with -1 
indicating a highly risk-averse actor, and a +1 indicating a highly 
risk-acceptant actor.
Regional Uncertainty: Output will include regional uncertainty as 
defined by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992).
Tau with System Leader: Output will include the tau between 
the state in question (country-year unit) or states in question (dyad- 
year unit) with the system leader, which is Britain up to 1945, and 
the US from 1946 forward. Options: User may set whether the tau 
computed with the system leader is based on the alliances of states 
only involved in the relevant region of the ccode vs. the system leader 
dyad (regional option), or is based on all states in the international 
system (global option).
Polity III Data: Output will include selected variables from the 
Jaggers and Gurr (1995) Polity III data set. These variables are de- 
moc, autoc, xrreg, xrcomp, xropen, mono, xconst, parreg, parcomp, 
cent. In addition, the derived variable ” dem” used by Russett and
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others is available (Dem =  Democ - Antoc). In addition, lagged ver­
sions of the democ, autoc, and dem variables are available, along with 
democratization computed as demchg =  dem - lag(dem). Select a spe­
cific subset of Polity III variables by pressing the ” Variable Selection” 
button.
E.6.2 Available for Dyad-Year and Dispute-Dyad 
Output Only
Relevant Region: Output will include an integer marking the re­
gion that is relevant for the computation of expected utility. Regional 
memberships are defined as given by the COW Interstate System 
Members list. Integers correspond to regions as follows: Europe=l; 
Middle East=2; Africa=3; Asia=4; North and South America=5. Po­
litically Relevant: Output will include a dummy variable marking the 
cases of politically relevant dyads. Politically relevant dyads are those 
where at least one state is a major power, or the states are contiguous. 
You may change the degree of contiguity required with the "Change 
Contiguity” button under the variable option. Note that setting con­
tiguity for variable output will also affect contiguity for outputting 
politically relevant dyads only, if you select politically relevant dyads 
for your output population. A ’1’ marks a politically relevant dyad, 
while a ’O’ marks a non-politically relevant dyad.
Contiguity: Output will include a dummy variable marking dyads 
where the members are contiguous on land. Dyad Duration: Output 
will include an integer representing the number of years that both 
members of the dyad have been states continuously since 1816. For 
example, Britain and France receive a ” 0” in 1816, a ” 1” in 1817, etc. 
Canada becomes a state in 1920, and so the US-Canada dyad would 
have missing values to 1920, a 0 in 1920, a 1 in 1921, etc. This counter 
resets when a state drops out of the state system by COW criteria. 
So the France-West Germany duration variable starts at 0 in 1955. 
[Note: this was modified in vl.19. Before vl.19, the duration counter 
counted the number of years from the first time the two states became 
states, and did not reset even when states left the system.
Distance Between States: This outputs the distance between states 
in the dyad as calculated by the program. Note: EUGene will com­
pute distance based on the method in its memory, which by default 
(unless the user changed options under recalculation options) is the 
distance between capitals, adjusted for contiguity and allowing mul­
tiple cities for each country. Tau-b Scores: Output will include the
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tau-b between the two states. Both global tan-values (calculated using 
every state in the system) and regional tau-values (calculated using 
only states in the relevant region for the dyad) will be reported. S 
Scores: (See Signorino and Ritter 1997) Not yet implemented.
Expected Utility - War Trap: Output will include the expected 
utility of country 1 vs. Country 2, based on the operational rules spec­
ified in The War Trap as discussed in this documentation. Utility - 
War and Reason: Output will include various values related to the 
expected utility of Country 1 vs. Country 2, based upon the measures 
developed in War and Reason. A number of values are output: From 
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992:293-294): UA((A), UA((B), 
UA(SQ), UB((A), UB((B), UB(SQ), StakesA, StakesB. From Bueno 
de Mesquita and Lalman (1992:297): PA, PB. From Bueno de Mesquita 
and Lalman (1992:47): Ui(SQ), Uj(SQ), Ui(Acqi), Ui(Acqj), Uj(Acqi), 
Uj(Acqj), Ui(Nego), Uj(Nego), Ui(Capi), Ui(Capj), Uj(Capi), Uj(Capj), 
Ui(Wari), Ui(Warj), Uj(Wari), and Uj(Warj) State i corresponds to 
state A which is the first state in the dyad A vs. B, while state j 
corresponds to state B.
Equilibria - War and Reason: Output will include dummy vari­
ables marking what equilibrium in the international interaction game 
is expected given the various utility values in the dyad. Options: User 
may set whether to generate the equilibrium for a dyad-year by either 
1) using the logical conditions given in War and Reason, or by using 
backwards induction using the computed utility values for each dyad- 
year. For more details about this choice, see the discussion under 
section ’’Equilibria (War and Reason)” on page 17
MID Data: Output will include COW MID dispute data, converted 
into a dyadic form, marking four items (additional details of convert­
ing the COW MID data into dyadic form is given in the next section, 
beginning on page 31): 1) whether state A initiated a MID vs. state 
B in this year. Whether or not A is considered to have initiated a 
dispute depends on user settings for a) marking subsequent years as 
initiations, b) marking either side A or revisionists as initiators, and c) 
marking initiators as only originators or including joiners. Note that 
initiation marks specifically whether A initiated vs. state B. This 
variable is directed; if the user wants to explore non-directed dispute 
onset within this directed dyad, use the highest hostility levels instead 
(if the highest hostility level is i  1 for both sides in a year, there is 
a dispute onset). 2 and 3) the relevant highest hostility level reached 
by state A vs. state B. in this year, and the highest hostility level 
reached by B vs. A. in this year. ’’Relevant” is specified to determine 
the hostility level when there are multiple disputes involving A and B
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in a given year. Rules for selecting the proper dispute from which to 
determine hostility levels are as follows. First, if there’s a new initia­
tion in this year (with initiator defined either as side A or revisionist, 
as specified by the user), the hostility level for the year is taken from 
the first initiated MID. Second, if there is not a new initiation, then 
the value of the first new event in this year is taken, such as join­
ing an ongoing dispute. Third, if there is no new event/dispute but 
there is an ongoing dispute, then hostility values are taken from the 
ongoing MID. Finally, if no dispute is occurring, then a 0 is coded for 
hostility. For years with a MID, coding follows the COW MID data 
set codings: l=no militarized response to a MID, 2=threat of force, 
3=show of force, 4=use of force, 5=war. 4) the COW MID number of 
the relevant dispute (if any) between A and B in this year. Selecting 
MID data for output will enable the options on the ’’Exclusions” and 
’’Dispute Initiator” output tabs. Identify MID
Joiners: Outputs two variables marking whether state A was a joiner 
on the initiating side against B in a dispute that had already-started 
before A became involved, or if A joined on the target side against B. 
That is, this will mark dyads where ccodel was on the initiating side 
against ccode2, but was not an originator (was not involved on day 1), 
or where A was on the target side against B but was not an originator. 
Rules for coding initiators as Side A or Revisionist apply; a Joiner will 
be coded only if it is a state on Side A (if Side A is marked to be the 
initiator) or the revisionist side (if revisionists are specified as the 
initiator). Note that if states are to be marked as joiners, then they 
are marked as such in subsequent years of the same dispute whether 
or not the user has specified wanting subsequent years coded as an 
initiation. That is, the variable marking joining is unaffected by the 
setting on coding subsequent initiation. Peace
Years: Outputs a variable counting the number of years since the last 
dispute in the dyad to use in creating Beck, Katz, and Tucker spline 
variables to account for serial autocorrelation. This variable takes a 
value of 0 for all dyads in 1816, and for the first year a country is 
considered a state. It increments by one for each year a dyad goes 
without a dyadic dispute. In the first year that a MID occurs, Peace 
Years takes the regular incremented value. But in the next year, either 
the year after the MID if the MID lasts one year, or in the 2nd year 
of the MID if the MID lasts longer than a year, it resets to 0. As long 
as the MID continues, the variable takes the value 0, as it does in the 
first year after the MID ends. In the 2nd year after a MID ends, it 
again increments starting at 1. So, if a MID lasts from 1820 to 1825, 
the value of Peace Years would be 0 from 1821 through 1826, and a
” 1” in 1827 (a full year passed without a MID).
E.7 Factor categories
E.7.1 Previous or general relations between sides
® Both sides appear to have limited objectives
@ One or both sides do not appear to have limited objectives
® One or both sides try to penetrate deeply into the other’s territory
® Neither side attempts to penetrate deeply into the other’s territory
© Leader of one side desires to avoid wider war with other side
® ” Non-status quo” side succeeds in establishing a rival government to ’’ status 
quo” side
© ” Non-status quo” side fails to establish a rival government to ’’ status quo” 
side
® ” Non-status quo” side achieves its primary goals
• ” Non-status quo” side has not achieved its primary goals
• ” Non-status quo” side is willing to discuss ending hostilities
© Both sides are willing to negotiate a settlement
a Sides appear unwilling to negotiate a settlement
• The sides are negotiating
® Sides share much common heritage 
® Partial agreements have been reached
• Leader of one side announces a cease fire
• Leader of one side calls for a summit meeting 
® ’’Status quo” side makes some concessions
• Leader of one side heeds warning that harsh measures will result in action 
by the other side
® ’’Status quo” side removes leader of other side who could have restraining 
influence
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® ” Status quo” side rallies support among members of the other side
® One side’s leaders assure other side that regular forces will not be used to 
overthrow them
E.7.2 Great power and allied involvement
© Strong superpower diplomatic support to ’’ status quo” side
• Strong superpower diplomatic support to ” non-status quo” side 
© A superpower appears to be neutral
® A superpower fears growth of conflict into a wider war
© The prestige of a superpower is committed to settlement
© Major powers supply arms and equipment to ’’status quo” side to redress 
imbalance
• Major powers supply arms and equipment to ” non-status quo” side to re­
dress imbalance
® Arrival of arms in one side raises the prospect of a wider war
• Great power interest in the area increases
® A great power’s diplomatic support encourages one side to continue the 
struggle
@ Great power gives ’’status quo” side substantial economic aid 
© Great power gives ” non-status quo” side substantial economic aid 
® Great power supporter o f ’’ status quo” side contemplates intervention 
® Great power supporter of ” non-status quo” side contemplates intervention
• A great power urges one side to avoid provoking a full-scale war
• A great power indicates interest in terminating hostilities and negotiating 
a settlement
® Great powers urge cease fire and avoidance of intensification
• Great powers/superpowers are losing interest in the conflict 
© One great power/superpower becomes active mediator
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® A previously supportive great power/superpower drops out 
® Great powers/superpowers collaborate to resolve conflict 
® Regional powers want a peaceful settlement
® Great power supporter of ” non-status quo” side refuses to assure aid
• Great power supporter of ” status quo” side refuses to assure aid
E.7.3 External relations generally
® One side receives aid from a supporter
• Supporter of one side threatens unilateral intervention 
® Use of force by one side alienates potential allies
• States in the region give material support to ” non-status quo” side 
® States in the region give material support to ” status quo” side
• After major ally of one side withdrew, another ally was acquired
© After major ally of one side withdrew, another ally was not available
® ” Non-status quo” side fearful of potential ally’s intentions
© Countries on which ” non-status quo” side is dependent are unable or un­
willing to give further support
• Countries on which ’’status quo” side is dependent are unable or unwilling 
to give further support
• Both sides dependent for aid on outside party pressing for an end to hos­
tilities
© Despite one side’s military success, its ally is unwilling to impose solution 
® Actions of country supporting one side confirm its threat to intervene
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E.7.4 Military-strategic
• ” Status quo” side has the military advantage
® ” Non-status quo” side has the military advantage 
© Military balance remains heavily in favor of one side 
© Military technology of one side significantly superior 
9 Militarily the hostilities are inconclusive
• One side has overwhelming military and logistical preponderance for the 
terrain
© One side has very weak military forces 
© The military strength of one side increases
9 ’’Status quo” side uses superior military power to win military victory 
® One side is ill-informed on size of forces needed to execute its avowed policy 
© Initial hostilities fail to delay change in status quo
® ” Status quo” side’s forces are ineffective and unable to stop or deflect attack 
of ” non-status quo” side
• Only a small proportion of each side’s forces are engaged 
9 A large proportion of each side’s forces are engaged
® ” Non-status quo” side uses superior military power to win military victory
® The manner in which fighting breaks out suggests that hostilities are largely 
accidental
• Hostilities having broken out almost accidentally, neither side can follow up 
@ One side resorts to guerrilla warfare
© The terrain is unsuitable for guerrilla warfare
@ ” Non-status quo” side has few, primitive arms, and weak training and or­
ganization
• Armed forces of supporters of both sides become involved
• Armed forces of supporters of both sides do not become involved
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• Major ally of one side responds to attacks with large reinforcements
• Military action by one side leads to combat with allies of the other side
® Larger strategic concerns constrain pressure from states influential with 
’’status quo” side
• One side’s ally’s military mission has expanded from logistic support to 
advice on military operations
• Prolonged or intensified hostilities may trigger a mutual security agreement 
to which one side belongs
® Outside parties halt military aid to both sides
• One side unable to cut off arms supply to other side
• External pressures for termination develop
© One side’s move against the other side’s supply lines risks retaliation
® Foreign officers in one side’s armed forces threaten withdrawal if that side 
continues military activities
• Neither side can obtain a decisive military victory at an acceptable level of 
commitment and risk
© Rapid growth of one side’s armed forces sacrifices quality of training
• Force is not used for military victory, but to strengthen diplomacy by threat­
ening a wider war
• Commander of one side’s army advises against more military activity
• One side failed to move beyond terrorism and isolated guerrilla activity
® Military and para-military units act on their own initiative
9 New military effectiveness on one side discourages other side from belief in 
military victory
• Raids by one side into other’s territory inflict no military damage
• One side must commit more troops than anticipated
© One side feels that a cease fire in place would leave the other’s troops too 
close
® Reasons for initial intervention by one side remain, but forces committed 
are inadequate
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® The strategic interests of the side that intervened in hostilities retain im­
portance
® Military tactics of ” status quo” side restrict scale and scope of hostilities 
® One side possesses significant nuclear technology 
® Both sides possess significant nuclear technology
• One side believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability
• Both sides believed to be developing nuclear weapons capability
E.7.5 International organization (UN, legal, public opin­
ion)
• The UN begins to assert itself strongly 
® The UN does not assert itself strongly
© The UN presses for an immediate cease fire
© The adversaries agree to a UN cease fire resolution
© ” Non-status quo” side is anxious to see the conflict in the UN
• ’’Status quo” side is anxious to see the conflict in the UN
• The UN actively seeks a political formula to end the hostilities
• The UN Secretary General urges restraint on both sides
• UN Security Council membership favors end to hostilities and negotiated 
settlement
® UN Security Council adopts a resolution calling for a ceasefire
• A great power vetoes UN Security Council resolution
« UN General Assembly is convened under the Uniting for Peace resolution
• UN General Assembly declines to place question on its agenda
• UN General Assembly favors end to hostilities
• UN General Assembly discusses the conflict but takes no action
• The UN creates a body to make an on-the-spot report and facilitate nego­
tiations
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• A UN body condemns those aiding ” non-status quo”
• A UN body condemns those aiding ” status quo”
® UN agrees to send a peacekeeping force to the area
• Plans for a UN force are elaborated and contingents committed
• UN force’s mandate supports objectives of ” non-status quo” side 
© UN force’s mandate supports objectives o f ’’ status quo” side
• Regional organization to which sides belong offers to mediate 
® One side withdraws from international organization
E.7.6 Ethnic (refugees, minorities)
• Ethnic rivalries exist in ’’ status quo” side
© Ethnic rivalries exist in ” non-status quo” side
• Refugees from one side return to carry out raids
• Violence occurs between ethnic groups within country supporting one side
® Strife between ethnic groups in one side raise doubt about that side’s via­
bility
E.7.7 Economic/resources
• ” Status quo” side faces economic problems as a result of hostilities
9 ” Non-status quo” side faces economic problems as a result of hostilities
• The costs of hostilities for both sides are becoming burdensome in terms of 
other goals
© Great power ally of ’’status quo” side threatens to cut economic aid
• Great power ally of ” non-status quo” side threatens to cut economic aid
• Great powers threaten to withdraw economic aid from both sides unless 
cease fire established
© One side’s advances threaten important resource on other side
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E.7.8 Internal politics of the sides
• ’’Non-status quo” side’s military and territorial objectives appear limited
® ” Non-status quo” side’s military and territorial objectives do not appear to 
be limited
® Opposition in one side increases as violence escalates
• Domestic public opinion comes to favor ’’status quo” side
• Domestic public opinion comes to favor ” non-status quo” side 
© Public opinion in one side rallies against the other side
® Heavy domestic pressure is generated in one side to cease hostilities 
® Public opinion in ’’ status quo” side favors a negotiated settlement 
® Internal unrest likely to be triggered by continued hostilities 
® Internal unrest unlikely to be triggered by continued hostilities 
© ’’Status quo” side counters violence by arrests and strong reprisals 
« ” Non-status quo” side wins political concessions
• At times extremist political groups in both sides gain control over policy 
@ ” Non-status quo” side denies any connection with the hostilities
• ” Non-status quo” side creates a rival government
• One side dramatizes its position by an international incident 
® One side feels responsible for the fate of its proxy forces
® Some military officers on one side believe a military solution is possible
® Opposition within ’’status quo” side reaches high into the military
® One side’s prime role in the military action is widely assumed despite at­
tempts to keep it covert
© Splits occur in the leadership of one side
® Splits within one side become open rifts
® Unity of one side is reinforced as members take action against suspected 
traitors
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• A coalition is emerging within one side in opposition to party in power 
® One side is ideologically committed to prolonging the fight
© Ideological split exists among ” non-status quo” side’s supporters 
9 Ideological split exists among ’’status quo” side’s supporters
• One side seeks to isolate the other side from its base of support 
® Prolongation of hostilities erodes resources of one side
® One side is over-confident in seeking military solution 
® ” Non-status quo” side resorts to guerrilla war
© Initial objective of one side conceived as being limited and for humanitarian 
reasons
® ” Non-status quo” side’s hope for political gains is not fulfilled
• ” Non-status quo” side not prepared to act independently
E.7.9 Communication and information
9 Sides have open and accessible means of communication 
® Sides do not have open and accessible means of communication
• Some military officers of both sides, as citizens of a third party, provide 
communication channel between opposing forces
® Communications are inadequate between one side’s political leader and its 
military forces in the field
E.7.10 Actions in disputed area
® ’’Status quo” side lacks anticipated support in disputed area 
® ” Non-status quo” side lacks anticipated support in disputed area 
® ’’Status quo” side misinterprets nature of events in disputed area
• Supporters o f ’’status quo” side in disputed area begin to turn against it
• Both sides worry about effects of military activity on hostile ethnic groups 
in disputed area
• UN focuses world attention on developments in disputed area
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® Both sides agree to let the UN ascertain the wishes of population in disputed 
area
® International organization body is slow in reaching disputed area
• Moderating third-party forces in disputed area begin to phase out
® Troops of interested parties present in disputed area form a peacekeeping 
force
• One side warns that any offensive action in disputed area will result in wider 
war
® Dangers of all-out war increase when hostilities spill out of disputed area
© Geography of disputed area makes it difficult to prevent one side from 
reinforcing
• Practical geographical limits in disputed area make extended operations 
difficult
® One side has a sanctuary in terrain difficult for other to reach
® Geographic isolation of disputed area keeps ” non-status quo” side activity 
at relatively low level
• Nature/location of ” non-status quo” side’s attack weakens its claim to be 
supporting groups in disputed area
© Each side labels other the aggressor and sees its own actions as defensive
© Important interests of one side in disputed area threatened by other side’s 
actions
® There is united opposition to ” non-status quo” side’s action
® One side’s administration near disputed area is unable to prevent military 
activity
• One side claims proof of the other’s complicity in military activity in dis­
puted area
© Raids by one side into disputed area do not cause significant damage or 
provoke local unrest
® Forces of one side sufficient to control raiding groups in disputed area
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